LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

Class 


PROPORTIONAL 


REPRESENTATION 


BY 


JOHN  R.  COMMONS 

PROFESSOR  OF  SOCIOLOGY  IN  SYRACUSE  UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK:  46  EAST  MTH  STREET 
THOMAS    Y.   CROWELL  &  COMPANY 

BOSTON:  100  PURCHASE  STREET 


COPYRIGHT,  1896, 
THOMAS  Y.  CROWELL  &  COMPANY. 


C.   J.    PETHRS  &  SON,    TYPOGRAPHERS. 


PREFACE. 


IT  is  intended  in  this  book  to  show  the  his- 
torical significance  of  the  recent  movement  for 
Proportional  Representation,  and  a  detailed  appli- 
cation of  the  reform  to  American  politics.  Spe- 
cial consideration  is  given  to  city  government, 
where,  at  present,  other  reforms  are  being  tried, 
and  where,  it  is  believed,  this  one,  if  it  were  un- 
derstood, would  also  be  heartily  accepted. 

I  am  grateful  for  expert  criticism  on  the  proof, 
received  from  Professor  J.  W.  Jenks  of  Cornell 
University,  and  Mr.  Stoughton  Cooley,  Secretary 
of  the  American  Proportional  Representation 
League ;  and  for  helpful  suggestions  from  Pro- 
fessor Richard  T.  Ely,  the  editor  of  this  series. 

JOHN  R.  COMMONS. 

SYRACUSE  UNIVERSITY,  January,  1896. 


1 


LIBRARY  OF 
ECONOMICS  AND  POLITICS 

EDITED  BY 
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CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER.  PAGE. 

I.     THE  FAILUKE  OF  LEGISLATIVE  ASSEMBLIES  .  1 
II.    THE  ORIGIN  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF  REPRE- 
SENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES 10 

III.    THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT  WORK 36 

IY.    THE   GENERAL  TICKET,  THE  LIMITED  VOTE, 

THE  CUMULATIVE  VOTE 86 

\ 

Y.     PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION 99 

VI.    APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY 132 

VII.     "  PARTY' RESPONSIBILITY  " 163 

VIII.     CITY  GOVERNMENT 197 

IX.    SOCIAL  REFORM 223 

X.    THE    PROGRESS    OF    PROPORTIONAL   REPRE- 
SENTATION     S2j&' 

APPENDIX. 

I.     THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  SEATS 271 

II.    THE  HARE  PREFERENTIAL  PLAN 279 

III.  THE  GOVE  BILL.  —  LEGISLATIVE  REPRESEN- 

TATION        285 

IV.  BOOKS,  PERIODICALS,  AND  SOCIETIES      .    .    .  292 


..'' 

y 


PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 


CHAPTER   I. 

THE  FAILURE   OF  LEGISLATIVE  ASSEMBLIES. 

THE  American  people  are  fairly  content  with 
their  executive  and  judicial  departments  of  gov- 
ernment, but  they  feel  that  their  law-making 
bodies  have  painfully  failed.  This  conviction  per- 
tains to  all  grades  of  legislatures,  municipal,  State, 
and  Federal.  The  newspapers  speak  what  the  peo- 
ple feel;  and,  judging  therefrom,  it  is  popular  to 
denounce  aldermen,  legislators,  and  congressmen. 
When  Congress  is  in  session,  the  business  interests 
are  reported  to  be  in  agony  until  it  adjourns.  The 
cry  that  rises  towards  the  end  of  a  legislature's 
session  is  humiliating.  The  San  Francisco  Bulle- 
tin is  quoted  as  saying  :  — 

"It  is  not  possible  to  speak  in  measured  terms  of  the 
thing  that  goes  by  the  name  of  legislature  in  this  State. 
It  has  of  late  years  been  the  vilest  deliberative  body  in  the 
world.  The  assemblage  has  become  one  of  bandits  instead 
of  law-makers.  Everything  within  its  grasp  for  years  has 
been  for  sale.  The  commissions  to  high  office  which  it  con- 
fers are  the  outward  and  visible  signs  of  felony  rather  than 
of  careful  and  wise  selection." 

I 


2  PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

Every  State  in  the  Union  can  furnish  examples 
more  or  less  approaching  to  this.  Statements 
almost  as  extreme  are  made  regarding  Congress. 
Great  corporations  and  syndicates  seeking  legis- 
lative favors  are  known  to  control  the  acts  of  both 
branches.  The  patriotic  ability  and  even  the  per- 
sonal character  of  members  are  widely  distrusted 
and  denounced. 

These  outcries  are  not  made  only  in  a  spirit  of 
partisanship,  but  respectable  party  papers  denounce 
unsparingly  legislatures  and  councils  whose  ma- 
jorities are  of  their  own  political  complexion. 
The  people  at  large  join  in  the  attack.  When 
statements  so  extreme  as  that  given  above  are 
made  by  reputable  papers  and  citizens,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  the  people  at  large  have  come 
thoroughly  to  distrust  their  law-makers.  Charges 
of  corruption  and  bribery  are  so  abundant  as  to 
be  taken  as  a  matter  of  course.  The  honored 
historical  name  of  alderman  has  frequently  become 
a  stigma  of  suspicion  and  disgrace. 

As  might  be  expected,  this  distrust  has  shown 
itself  in  far-reaching  constitutional  changes.  The 
powers  of  State  and  city  legislatures  have  been 
clipped  and  trimmed  until  they  offer  no  induce- 
ments for  ambition.  The  powers  of  governors, 
mayors,  judges,  and  administrative  boards  have 
been  correspondingly  increased.  The  growing 
popularity  of  the  executive  veto  is  one  of  the 


FAILURE  OF  LEGISLATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.      3 

startling  facts  of  the  times.  President  Hayes 
vetoed  more  congressional  bills  than  any  prede- 
cessor, and  his  record  has  been  excelled  by  Presi- 
dent Cleveland.  A  city  has  been  known  to  turn 
out  in  mass-meetings,  and  to  illuminate  the  heav- 
ens with  bonfires,  in  honor  of  a  mayor's  veto  which 
rescued  it  from  outrages  and  robberies  perpetrated 
by  its  own  lawfully  elected  ucity  fathers."  The 
prevailing  reform  in  municipal  government  is  the 
transfer  of  legislative  functions,  and  even  legis- 
lative discretion,  from  the  city  council  to  the 
mayor. 

Our  municipal  institutions  were  transplanted 
from  England.  As  in  the  English  system,  the 
municipal  council  was  supreme.  It  engrossed  all 
the  legislative  and  administrative  powers  of  local 
government.  It  elected  the  mayor  and  heads  of 
departments.  It  governed  its  appointees  through 
its  own  committees.  New  York  was  the  first  city 
to  break  from  this  simplicity,  as  it  has  since  gone 
farthest  in  stripping  the  council  of  power.  Uni- 
versal distrust  led  first  to  the  mayor's  appoint- 
ment by  the  governor,  then  to  his  popular  election, 
and  later  to  popular  election  of  heads  of  depart- 
ments. Again,  the  control  of  finances  was  taken 
from  the  council  and  placed  in  an  ex-officio  Board 
of  Estimate  and  Apportionment.  The  council 
still  retained  the  right  to  confirm  or  reject  the 
mayor's  appointees.  Thus  the  unity  of  govern- 


4  PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

ment  was  lost.  Responsibility  was  ravelled  out 
into  scores  of  aimless  threads.  Mr.  A.  H.  Green, 
a  few  years  ago,  found  "eighty  different  boards 
or  individuals  who  could  create  debt  indepen- 
dently of  each  other." l  Here  was  the  oppor- 
tunity of  the  "  boss "  and  the  party  machine. 
Unity  must  somehow  be  secured.  The  "boss," 
a  mere  private  citizen,  gathered!  into  his  hands 
these  scattered  threads,  -and  centralized  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  city  in  himself.  He  controlled 
nominations  and  elections.  He  appointed  and  re- 
moved officers.  He  pitted  council  against  mayor, 
boards  against  council,  subordinates  against  chiefs, 
making  them  all  responsible  to  him.  But  he  was 
responsible  to  no  one.  The  latest  movement  in 
municipal  reform  is  to  legalize  the  boss  in  the 
person  of  the  mayor,  to  give  him  sole  power  to 
appoint  and  remove  all  heads  of  departments,  but 
to  elect  him  by  popular  vote  and  make  him  re- 
sponsible to  the  people.  The  movement  is  not 
yet  completed.  The  council  remains  a  shrivelled 
and  vicious  relic.  Logically,  it  should  be  abol- 
ished or  reformed. 

A  similar  movement,  though  later  in  time,  is 
affecting  State  legislatures.  The  governor  has 
been  considerably  exalted,  but  the  movement  is 
as  yet  mainly  in  the  stage  of  independent  boards, 
clothed  with  certain  legislative  and  administrative 

1  L.  Williams,  Arena,  vol.  ix.,  p.  644. 


FAILURE  OF  LEGISLATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.     5 

authority.  Where  the  governor  at  first  appointed 
these  boards,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Railway  Com- 
missioners of  Iowa,  popular  election  is  substituted. 
The  Constitutions  of  the  new  States  of  North  and 
South  Dakota,  Montana,  and  Washington,  may  be 
considered  as  stating  the  thought  of  the  American 
people  at  the  present  time  regarding  their  legisla- 
tures.1 Several  administrative  boards  are  created 
in  these  new  States,  all  filled  by  popular  elec- 
tion. Among  these  are  commissions  to  supervise 
and  regulate  insurance,  railroads,  agriculture  and 
labor,  prisons,  and  public  lands.  These  commis- 
sions absorb,  in  various  degrees,  the  powers  of 
legislatures,  executives,  and  judges.  They  are  the 
nondescript,  many-headed  agents  of  the  people 
distrusting  the  legislature,  but  not  yet  ready  to 
confide  everything  to  the  governor's  autocracy. 

If  it  be  inferred  that  these  commissions  are 
created  not  to  belittle,  but  to  enlighten,  the 
legislature,  and  to  act  as  its  agents,  we  need 
only  notice  the  maze  of  constitutional  restrictions 
thrown  about  all  legislative  acts.  "The  articles 
in  the  new  State  Constitutions  on  the  'legislative 
department  'are  long  and  detailed.  They  seem 
to  be  composed  by  the  framers  in  order  to  declare 
what  the  respective  State  legislatures  cannot  be 
permitted  to  do.  ...  [They  declare]  by  what 

1  See  article  by  F.  N.  Thorpe  in  Annals  of  the  American 
Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  September,  1891. 


6  PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

procedure  the  legislature  shall  act,  on  what  it 
shall  not  act,  and  to  what  extent  it  may  act. 
The  chief  limitations  on  the  legislature  are  with 
respect  to  special  or  private  legislation,  corpora- 
tions, political  corruption  among  members,  taxa- 
tion, and  power  to  use  the  credit  of  the  State."  l 

These  constitutional  restrictions,  extending  to 
legislatures  and  municipal  councils,  have  forced 
another  branch  of  government,  the  judiciary,  to 
the  front.  Conscious  of  popular  approval,  judges 
have  steadily  encroached  upon  the  field  of  legisla- 
tive discretion,  and  reluctantly,  it  may  be,  have 
more  and  more  assumed  the  right  to  set  aside 
legislative  statutes.  This  interference,  however 
justifiable  the  reasons,  is  fraught  with  danger  to 
the  judiciary.  It  is  thereby,  at  the  expense  of  its 
integrity  in  the  field  of  administration  and  justice, 
forced  into  the  political  arena,  where  are  the 
heated  questions  of  political  expediency.  Popular 
election  of  judges,  short  terms,  and  partisanship 
will  result.  "  The  executive,"  says  Judge  Horace 
Davis,2  "  all-powerful  at  the  beginning  [of  colonial 
history],  was  reduced  to  a  mere  shadow  of  its 
former  glory,  and  in  these  later  days  is  regaining 
some  of  its  lost  power.  The  legislature,  at  first 
weak,  afterwards  absorbed  the  powers  of  the  other 

1  Thorpe,  as  above,  p.  17. 

2  "American    Constitutions,"    "Johns   Hopkins   University 
Studies  in  History  and  Politics,"  3d  series,  pp.  55,  59. 


FAILURE  OF  LEGISLATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.      7 

departments,  but  is  now  much  reduced  again. 
Throughout  all  these  changes  the  dignity  and 
power  of  the  judges  have  steadily  increased.  .  .  . 
Their  greatest  power,  most  amazing  to  Europeans, 
is  the  authority  to  set  aside  a  statute  which  they 
hold  to  be  in  conflict  with  the  written  Constitu- 
tion. No  other  courts  in  the  world  possess  this 
unique  power.  .  .  .  The  scope  of  this  power 
is  much  broadened  by  the  modern  tendency  to 
limit  legislation.  The  early  Constitutions  were 
very  brief,  containing  usually  little  more  than  a 
bill  of  rights  and  a  skeleton  of  the  government, 
leaving  all  details  to  the  discretion  of  the  legisla- 
ture. Now  all  this  is  changed ;  the  bounds  of  the 
different'  departments  are  carefully  denned,  and 
the  power  of  the  legislature  is  jealously  curbed, 
particularly  in  the  domain  of  special  legislation. 
It  will  be  seen  at  a  glance  that  this  enlarges  the 
relative  power  of  the  courts.  It  limits  the  legisla- 
ture and  widens  the  field  of  the  judiciary  at  one 
stroke." 

Not  only  do  the  judges  pretend  to  override 
the  legislatures,  but  their  exalted  position  renders 
them  confidently  autocratic  in  other  directions. 
They  are  learning  to  dispense  with  juries,  to  dan- 
gerously widen  the  scope  of  injunctions,  and  to 
punish  for  contempt  in  cases  not  contemplated  in 
our  Constitutions.  The  legislatures  and  Congress, 
which  are  legally  in  a  position  to  check  these  usur- 


8  PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

pations,  are  practically  helpless  from  their  lack  of 
ability  and  their  loss  of  popular  confidence. 

This  demoralization  of  legislative  bodies,  these 
tendencies  to  restrict  legislation,  must  be  viewed 
as  a  profoundly  alarming  feature  of  American 
politics.  Just  as  the  duties  of  legislation  are  in- 
creasing as  never  before,  in  order  to  meet  the  vital 
wants  of  a  complex  civilization,  the  essential  or- 
gans for  performing  those  duties  are  felt  to  be  in 
a  state  of  collapse.  The  legislature  controls  the 
purse,  the  very  life-blood  of  the  city,  the  State, 
the  nation.  It  can  block  every  other  depart- 
ment. It  ought  to  stand  nearest  to  the  lives,  the 
wishes,  the  wisdom,  of  the  people.  It  is  their 
necessary  organ  for  creating,  guiding,  watching, 
and  supporting  all  the  departments  of  govern- 
jment.  Above  them  all,  then,  it  ought  to  be 
j  eminently  representative.  But  it  is  the  least  rep- 
f  resentative  of  all.  Surely,  then,  for  the  American 
people  beyond  all  others,  and  in  a  high  degree, 
too,  for  all  peoples  who  are  developing  popular 
government,  it  is  pertinent  to  inquire  carefully 
into  the  fundamental  nature  of  these  representa- 
tive institutions,  the  causes  of  their  failures,  and 
the  means,  if  any  can  be  found,  to  adapt  them  to 
the  exigencies  of  modern  times. 

Why  is  it  that  a  legislative  assembly,  which  in 
our  country's  infancy  summoned  to  its  halls  a 
Madison  or  a  Hamilton  to  achieve  the  liberties 


FAILURE  OF  LEGISLATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.      9 

of  the  people,  has  now  fallen  so  low  that  our 
public  spirited  men  hesitate  to  approach  it  ?  The 
municipal  council  in  early  times,  as  now  in  Eng- 
land and  Germany,  comprised  the  stanchest  men 
of  the  community.  The  American  Congress  was 
once  the  arena  for  a  Webster,  a  Clay,  a  Calhoun, 
whose  debates  a  nation  followed.  If  it  can  be 
shown  by  what  means  representative  assemblies 
formerly  enrolled  the  honored  leaders  of  the  peo- 
ple, and  met  precisely  the  problems  of  the  day, 
we  may  be  able  to  see  how  the  social  and  political 
conditions  of  to-day,  resulting  from  changes  of  the 
past  fifty  years,  have  outgrown  those  early  institu- 
tions, and  rendered  their  original  fitness  a  dis- 
astrous encumbrance. 


10         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 


CHAPTER    II. 

THE    ORIGIN    AND    DEVELOPMENT    OP 
.  REPRESENTATIVE    ASSEMBLIES. 

A  STRIKING  feature  of  social  evolution  is  the 
decay  and  obstruction  of  institutions  which  in 
their  day  were  essential  to  progress.  The  funda- 
mental changes  in  society  are  unobtrusive.  The 
increase  of  wealth  and  intelligence,  the  rise  of  cor- 
porations, the  combinations  of  labor,  the  spread  of 
democracy,  the  deepening  of  religion,  the  unfold- 
ing of  new  ideals  and  hopes,  —  these  are  the  fun- 
damental motives  and  objects  of  social  growth. 
Laws,  legislatures,  commissions,  courts,  are  the 
machinery  and  devices  whereby  the  people  work 
out  their  ideals.  If  the  work  to  be  done  changes, 
the  machinery  becomes  obsolete.  It  may  be  aban- 
doned altogether,  as  was  slavery ;  or  it  may  be  re- 
vised and  readapted,  as  when  the  king,  an  heredi- 
tary executive,  was  displaced  by  the  president,  an 
elected  executive  —  provided  always  that  the  good 
fruits  of  the  past  be  not  jeopardized. 

Representative  assemblies  were  devised  to  meet 
certain  social  ends;  they  sprang  from  historical 
conditions.  It  is  in  the  changing  character  of 
these  ends  and  conditions  that  the  modern  prob- 
lems of  representation  have  arisen. 


EEPEESENTATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.  11 

1.  The  original  object  which  produced  repre- 
sentative assemblies  was  nationalization.  This  is 
shown  in  the  twofold  aspect  of  the  union  of  local 
governments  into  a  nation,  and  the  coalescence  of 
social  classes  in  a  single  representative  assembly. 

(1.)  The  English  nation,  from  which  our  repre- 
sentative institutions  were  inherited,  was  formed 
by  welding  together  independent  local  communi- 
ties into  a  central  organization,  without  destroy- 
ing the  local  governments.  Previous  experiments 
in  nationalization  had  resulted  in  the  tyranny  of 
the  capital  city  and  the  slavery  of  the  provinces. 
The  reason  is  plain  to  every  historical  student, 
and  the  same  forces  were  working  to  the  same 
outcome  In  England.  But  the  principle  of  rep- 
resentation, almost  unknown  to  the  ancients,  was 
discovered ;  and  it  permitted  the  unity  of  a  nation, 
while  preserving  the  freedom  of  the  localities. 

The  primitive  idea  of  a  law-making  body  was 
the  primary  assembly  of  all  the  warriors.  The 
king  and  his  chief  adviser  sagreed  on  resolutions, 
and  offered  them  to  a  simple  yea  and  nay  vote  of 
the  army.  Every  freeman  had  the  right  to  appear 
in  his  own  person  in  the  national  assembly.  After 
the  Norman  conquest  this  right  was  retained  in 
theory,  but  abandoned  in  practice.  Gradually 
only  the  wealthy  land-owners,  the  tenants  in  chief, 
and  the  higher  clergy  appeared.  The  distances 
were  too  great,  the  expense  too  heavy,  and  their 


12         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

influence  too  slight,  for  the  small  land-owners  to 
continue  attendance.  And  as  for  the  serfs  and 
the  town  merchants  and  artisans,  they  never  had 
the  right.  Thus  the  king  and  his  council  of 
magnates  became  the  sole  government  of  Eng- 
land. They  enacted  the  laws  and  controlled  their 
enforcement.  The  people  had  no  voice,  neither 
were  they  represented. 

Slowly  two  forces  were  at  work.  The  king 
gave  away  his  private  estates,  upon  which  he  was 
supposed  to  support  himself  and  his  administra- 
tion, and  was  therefore  compelled  to  look  else- 
where for  funds.  During  the  same  time  the 
unrepresented  classes  of  small  farmers  and  town 
merchants  and  workmen  were  acquiring  wealth. 
The  king  was  forced  to  ask  them  for  contribu- 
tions, or  "subsidies,"  to  help  him  in  his  wars. 
Experience  showed  that  these  aids  could  not  be 
secured  by  compulsion.  The  king  must  obtain 
the  consent  of  his  subjects.  Neither  could  their 
hearty  consent  and  co-operation  be  obtained  when 
they  were  approached  privately  and  individually. 
They  must  have  the  king's  affairs  laid  before  them 
in  assembly,  and  the  state  of  his  exchequer  ex- 
plained. But  a  national  primary  assembly  of  all 
the  people  was  impossible.  However,  there  was 
in  existence  the  more  or  less  well-organized  county 
government,  with  a  history  running  far  back  into 
Anglo-Saxon  times.  Here  was  a  convenient  pri- 


REPRESENTATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.  13 

mary  assembly  of  all  the  landowners,  twice  a  year 
at  the  county  seat,  when  the  king's  justices  made 
their  circuit.  Here  the  germs  of  representation 
had  appeared  in  the  practice  of  electing  juries  to 
present  the  criminal  matters  of  the  county  before 
the  king's  judges,  and  of  electing  assessors  to  levy 
the  king's  taxes  upon  the  county.1  Also  there 
was  a  true  legislative  representation  in  the  prac- 
tice of  the  rural  towns  and  the  boroughs,  which 
sent  delegates  to  the  county  courts.  Very  natu- 
rally, it  occurred  to  the  king  to  ask  this  county 
primary  to  elect  "  two  good  and  discreet  knights," 
who  should  represent  the  land-owners  before  him, 
and  hear  and  act  upon  his  demands.2 

In  the  towns,  also,  had  quietly  grown  up  the 
merchant  and  craft  guilds,  compact  organizations 
of  tradesmen  and  manufacturers,  with  mutual  in- 
terests mutually  protected.  When  the  king  could 
no  longer  wring  from  them  money  by  coercion,  he 
invited  them  to  send  their  two  accredited  dele- 
gates for  a  national  gathering  of  guild  represen- 
tatives. 

What  is  the  significance  of  these  devices?  In 
ancient  Rome  the  tax  collectors  swarmed  from  the 
imperial  city  with  proconsuls  and  armies  at  their 
backs,  to  exact  arbitrary  tribute  from  the  prov- 

1  Stubbs,  "Constitutional  History,"  vol.  i.,  p.  586. 

2  These  were  first  summoned  in  1254,  by  Henry  III.,  on  occa- 
sion of  a  military  campaign  into  Gascony. 


14         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

inces.  Provincial  self-government,  and  with  it 
liberty  and  rights  of  property,  were  destroyed.  In 
England  the  provinces  joined  with  the  central 
government,  through  their  elected  representatives, 
in  determining  the  rate  of  taxation  and  in  assess- 
ing it  to  individuals.  *  Concessions  in  turn  were 
made  by  the  king,  grievances  were  redressed,  local 
self-government,  and  with  it  liberty  and  rights  of 
property,  were  maintained. 

(2)  The  union  of  localities  alone  does  not 
form  a  nation ;  there  must  be  added  the  union  of 
classes.  The  first  was  the  work  of  the  thirteenth 
century,  the  second  of  the  fourteenth.  At  the 
end  of  the  thirteenth  century  there  were  at  least 
four  legislative  assemblies,  each  representing  a 
distinct  class.  They  hardly  deserved  the  name 
of  legislatures  ;  they  were  rather  conventions  of 
different  social  classes,  negotiating  with  the  king 
at  separate  times  and  places,  regarding  their  own 
particular  class  interests.  They  did  not  meet  to- 
gether. Each  convention  separately  enacted  laws 
with  the  consent  of  the  king.  In  1336,aj^uncil 
of  merchants  from  twenty-one  cities  agreed  with 
the  king  "to  increase  customs  on  wool,  to  extend 
monopolies,  and  enlarge  the  privileges  of  trade." l 
Such  matters  were  considered  to  affect  only  mer- 
chants and  townsmen.  In  the  thirteenth  century 
.military  jtermnts  anrl  lanrj-owners^ncluding  the 

i  Stubbs,  "Constitutional  History,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  379. 


EEPEESENTATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.  15 

representatives  from  the  counties,  enacted  the  great 
statutes,  De  Donis,  Quia  Emptores,  and  others,  — 
regulating  the  holding  of  real  property,  without 
consulting  the  burgesses  and  clergy.  The  clergy 
also  managed  their  large  estates  and  voted  taxes 
thereon  without  reference  to  other  assemblies ; 
and  the  laws  of  a  political  nature,  such  as  those 
affecting  Ireland  and  Wales,  or  foreign  relations, 
which  were  not  supposed  to  affect  clergy,  knights, 
or  burgesses,  were  enacted  by  the  jlieat  Council 
without  consulting  these  popular  bodies.1 

By  the  end  of  the  fourteenth  century,  these  as- 
semblies were  combined  in  the  House  of  Lords 
and  the  House  of  Commons.  Here  were  the 
steps:  The  clergy  were  gradually  deprived  of 
their  power  to  legislate.  The  higher  clergy  then 
simply  retained  the  place  they  had  always  held 
in  the  Great  Council,  and  this  became  the  modern 
House  of  Lords.  The  lower  clergy  were  merged 
into  the  electorate  of  the  counties  and  towns. 
Again,  the  representatives  from  the  small  land- 
owners of  the  counties,  and  those  from  the  guilds 
of  the  towns,  were  drawn  together  by  common 
interests  against  king  and  nobility.  They  elected 
a  "speaker"  to  present  their  petitions  to  the  king, 
and  thus,  in  time,  became  the  House  of  Com- 
mons. 

This  legislative  assembly,  therefore,  was  based 

1  Hearn,  "  Government  of  England,"  pp.  423-428. 


16          PEOPOETIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

upon  two  principles,  the  representation  of  local- 
ities and  the  representation  of  the  two  organized 
social  classes,  town  capitalists  and  country  farm- 
ers, which  governed  those  localities. 

This  was  the  original  problem  of  representation. 
How  different  is  it  now !  Not  only  the  kingdom 
of  England,  but  the  "  United  Kingdom  "  of  Eng- 
land, Scotland,  Wales,  and  Ireland,  has  become  a 
nation.  Localities  have  lost  their  significance 
and  their  sanctity.  Certain  sections,  like  Ireland, 
retain  apparently  local,  but  really  class,  griev- 
ances. On  the  whole,  railways,  telegraph,  the 
press,  internal  trade,  and  representation  itself, 
have  brought  the  people  together.  Foreign  rela- 
tions, a  world-wide  system  of  colonies,  national 
armies  and  navies,  have  exalted  a  national  flag 
and  inspired  a  national  patriotism.  No  longer 
would  it  be  tolerable  to  leave  the  laws  upon  the 
tariff  to  merchants  and  importers,  land-laws  to 
real-estate  owners,  foreign  relations  to  the  nobil- 
ity, or  church  taxation  to  the  clergy.  The  repre- 
sentative to-day  is  therefore  not  a  mere  agent  of 
a  close  corporation  or  a  social  class.  After  five 
centuries,  Edmund  Burke  could  say,  "  Parliament 
is  not  a  congress  of  ambassadors  from  different 
and  hostile  interests,  which  interests  each  must 
maintain,  as  an  agent  and  advocate,  against  other 
agents  and  advocates ;  but  Parliament  is  a  deliber- 
ative assembly  of  our  nation,  with  one  interest,  — 


EEPEESENTATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.  17 

that  of  the  whole,  —  where  not  local  purposes,  not 
local  prejudices,  ought  to  guide,  but  the  general 
good,  resulting  from  the  general  reason  of  the 
whole.  You  choose  a  member,  indeed,  but  when 
you  have  chosen  him,  he  is  not  a  member  of 
Bristol,  but  he  is  a  member  of  Parliament."  1 

In  America,  too,  the  problem  of  representative 
government  has  been  that  of  nationalization.  It 
has  passed  three  stages.  First,  counties  and  towns 
were  united  into  colonies ;  second,  colonies  united 
in  the  Confederation ;  third,  States  formed  the  na- 
tion. By  the  first,  the  State  legislatures  arose; 
by  the  third,  the  national  Congress. 

Just  as  the  physical  child,  according  to  the 
biologists,  repeats  in  a  brief  time  its  ancestral 
history  of  geological  ages,  so  did  the  colonies, 
the  children  of  English  political  institutions,  re- 
peat in  a  few  years  the  slow  and  painful  evolution 
of  centuries.  The  stages  are  best  recorded  in 
Maryland.2  Originally  the  Constitution,  as  framed 
by  the  proprietor,  consisted  of  the  governor,  ap- 
pointed by  the  proprietor,  a  council,  appointed  by 
the  governor,  and  a  primary  assembly  of  all  the 
freemen.  At  first  all  could  attend.  But  settle- 
ments expanded  over  a  wide  area.  At  the  second 
assembly,  in  1638,  those  who  could  not  attend 

1  Address  to  the  electors  of  Bristol,  "  Collected  Works," 
Londoii,  1854.  Bonn,  vol.  i.,  p.  447. 

2  See  Doyle,  "  English  Colonies  in  America.  Virginia,  Mary- 
land, and  the  Carol inas,"  p.  286  ff. 


18         PEOPOETIONAL  EEPEESENTATION. 

in  person  were  allowed  to  send  proxies.  But 
proxies  were  apparently  bought  up  by  the  governor 
and  his  council  in  order  to  override  the  popular 
wish.  In  1639  the  third  assembly  met.  On  this 
occasion  the  various  "  hundreds  "  were  instructed 
to  elect  representatives.  Yet,  after  the  election, 
one  person,  at  least,  came  forward  and  claimed  the 
right  of  appearing  in  person,  on  the  ground  that 
he  had  voted  in  the  minority  and  so  was  not 
represented.  The  claim  was  allowed.  In  1642 
the  assembly  became  typically  representative  by 
excluding  the  proxies  and  those  appearing  in 
their  own  right,  and  limiting  its  membership  to 
those  elected  by  the  localities.  Thus  the  linger- 
ing hope  of  doing  justice  to  the  unrepresented 
minority  was  abandoned.  But  the  colony  was 
united  on  the  basis  of  local  interests. 

In  the  colony  of  Massachusetts  Bay  we  find 
again  similar  conditions  and  a  similar  outcome. 
"  The  growth  of  fresh  settlements  brought  with  it 
an  expansion  of  the  constitutional  machinery  of 
the  colony.  .  .  .  The  Constitution  of  Massachusetts 
was  older  than  the  existence  of  the  colony.  The 
legislature  of  the  colony  was  simply  the  general 
court  of  the  company  transferred  across  the  At- 
lantic. At  the  same  time  the  dispersal  of  the 
settlers  at  once  unfitted  that  body  for  the  work 
of  legislation.  The  remedy  first  applied  to  this 
difficulty  was,  not  to  substitute  a  representative 


REPRESENTATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.  19 

assembly  for  a  primary  one,  but  to  limit  the  func- 
tions of  the  court.  It  is  clear  that  there  was  an 
oligarchical  temper  at  work  among  the  leading 
men  in  Massachusetts.  The  action  of  this  was 
plainly  shown  by  the  transfer  of  all  legislative 
rights  from  the  court  of  freemen  to  the  governor, 
deputy-governor,  and  assistants.  At  the  same  time 
the  election  of  the  governor  was  handed  over  from 
the  freemen  to  the  assistants.  .  .  . 

"  True  to  English  precedent,  Massachusetts 
found  the  salvation  of  her  constitutional  liberties 
in  a  question  of  taxation.  When  the  governor 
had  intended  to  change  his  abode  to  Newtown, 
the  assembly  resolved  to  fortify  that  settlement  at 
public  charge.  ...  To  meet  the  cost  a  rate  was 
levied  on  each  town  by  order  of  the  governor  and 
assistants.  Against  this  the  men  of  Watertown 
protested.  .  .  .  Though  the  men  of  Watertown 
gave  way  on  the  main  issue,  their  protest  seems 
to  have  borne  fruit.  In  the  next  year  the  powers 
of  the  governor  were  formally  denned  by  an  act. 
It  was  also  enacted  by  the  General  Court,  in  the 
following  May,  that  the  whole  body  of  freemen 
should  choose  the  governor,  deputy-governor,  and 
assistants.  A  farther  step  towards  self-govern- 
ment was  taken  in  the  resolution  that  every  town 
should  appoint  two  representatives  to  advise  the 
governor  and  assistants  on  the  question  of  taxa- 
tion. We  can  hardly  err  in  supposing  that  this 


20         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

was  the  direct  result  of  the  protest  made  by  the 
men  of  Watertown."1 

It  was  in  Connecticut  that  the  origin  of  repre- 
sentative government  first  appears  as  a  federation 
of  independent  towns,  rather  than  a  local  repre- 
sentation to  resist  a  central  authority.  The  three 
towns  which  had  been  settled  along  the  Connecti- 
cut River  united  in  1638,  and  "  formally  declared 
themselves  a  commonwealth  with  a  Constitution 
of  their  own.  ...  A  system  of  representation 
was  adopted  at  once,  instead  of  being  slowly 
worked  out  through  a  series  of  expedients  and 
compromises.  The  legislature  was  to  consist  of 
a  governor,  six  assistants,  and  deputies.  The  gov- 
ernor and  assistants  were  to  be  elected  annually 
by  the  whole  body  of  freemen,  met  in  a  gei^ral 
court  for  that  purpose.  The  deputies  were  to  be 
elected  by  the  three  existing  towns,  four  from  each. 
As  fresh  towns  were  formed,  their  number  of  repre- 
sentatives was  to  be  fixed  by  the  government."  2 

Other  colonies  passed  through  similar  experi- 
ences. A  common  form  of  representation  was 
developed  in  them  all.  It  was  exactly  suited  to 
the  needs  of  an  independent,  but  busy  and  scat-  • 
tered  farming  and  land-owning  constituency,  in 
their  efforts  to  combine  and  resist  the  royal  and 
oligarchical  tendencies  of  the  times. 

1  Doyle,  "  The  Puritan  Colonies,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  103-106. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  159, 160. 


REPRESENTATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.  21 

The  Confederation  was  a  temporary  experiment 
in  nationalization  which  served  the  purposes  of 
revolt  against  England,  but  failed  in  peace. 

In  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  two 
principles  are  recognized,  —  representation  of  States 
in  the  Senate,  representation  of  the  people  in  the 
House.  But  in  both  cases  representation  is  based 
on  residence.  Pre-eminently,  sections  are  repre- 
sented. 

The  problem  of  nationalization  has  been  solved, 
not  by  Congress,  however,  which  proved  inade- 
quate, but  by  civil  war.  The  days  of  the  bright- 
est glory  of  Congress  were  those  preceding  the 
war,  when  the  question  of  the  Union  was  de- 
bated. Sections  have  yet  their  claims  in  a  nation 
as  %dde  as  ours,  but  social  and  economic  and  class 
questions  have  overshadowed  them.  Foreign  re- 
lations, currency,  customs  duties,  are  national 
questions.  The  war  amendments  have  brought 
citizenship  and  rights  of  property  under  Federal 
protection.  Federal  control  has  reached  out  for 
the  two  most  important  business  interests,  banking 
and  railways.  Federal  interference  has  grown  into 
marvellous  ramifications ;  and,  with  the  consolida- 
tion of  national  trusts  and  syndicates,  we  may 
expect  to  see  it  still  further  extended.  The  sig- 
nificance of  these  momentous  changes  will  appear 
when  we  proceed  to  the  development  of  modern 
political  parties. 


22         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

It  has  appeared  from  the  preceding  pages  that 
the  origin  of  representative  assemblies  in  State 
and  national  governments  depended  upon  the  pre- 
vious existence  of  organized  local  governments 
separated  by  wide  territorial  areas.  This  neces- 
sitated the  adoption  of  what  has  become  the 
district  system  of  electing  single  delegates  to 
represent  semi-autonomous  governments.  Such 
a  system  has  still  its  justification  in  many  re- 
spects, especially  in  a  country  as  extended  as  the 
United  States,  with  its  sectional  differences  of 
climate,  resources,  products,  and  people.  But 
why  this  system  should  survive  to  the  present 
day  in  the  election  of  city  legislatures  is  one  of 
the  enigmas  of  politics,  to  be  solved  by  reference 
to  the  traditions  and  inertia  of  mankind.  In  the 
United  States  and  new  countries  there  are  not 
even  historical  reasons  for  the  growth  of  this 
system.  Here  the  transition  from  primary  assem- 
blies was  made  simply  by  way  of  imitation.  It 
was  to  England  that  the  framers  of  our  municipal 
constitutions  turned  when  our  cities  had  advanced 
beyond  a  size  convenient  for  the  ancient  popular 
assembly.  It  is,  therefore,  in  the  origin  of  Eng- 
lish cities  that  we  shall  find  the  explanation  of 
the  origin  of  the  district  system. 

The  earliest  records  seem  to  indicate  that  Eng- 
lish cities  were  simply  concentrated  hundreds  and 
counties.  In  Norman  times,  the  larger  cities  were 


EEPEE8ENTATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.  23 

organized  like  counties,  with  their  sheriff,  their 
county  court,  composed  of  all  the  freeholders  of 
the  county,  and  the  historical  representatives  from 
the  townships.  Here  we  have  the  origin  of  coun- 
cilmen  elected  from  the  wards,  the  condensed 
townships.  But  the  city  was  not  at  all  an  or- 
ganic body,  with  recognized  common  interests. 
It  was  a  curious  mixture  of  all  the  different  in- 
terests which  happened  to  be  thrown  together  in 
the  neighborhood.  In  primitive  London 1  there 
were  the  original  military  tenants  of  the  crown, 
with  their  independent  manors  and  courts  and 
their  agricultural  serfs;  there  were  the  parishes, 
governed  by  the  bishop  and  the  chapter  and  the 
monasteries;  and  there  were  the  guilds,  admin- 
istered by  their  own  officers  and  administering 
their  own  property.  Over  all  these  jarring  inter- 
ests the  sheriff  presided  as  the  representative  of 
the  king. 

But  the  circumstances  of  the  times  and  the 
needs  of  defence  drew  the  residents  nearer  to- 
gether in  common  interests.  This  appears  first 
in  the  development  of  the  guilds  of  merchants. 
Through  commerce  they  gained  wealth ;  this 
brought  political  power;  and  soon  the  merchant 
guild  absorbed  the  law-making  power  of  the  en- 
tire city,  its  charter  became  the  city  charter,  and 
its  maire  the  city  mayor. 

i  See  Stubbs,  vol.  i.,  p.  407. 


24         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

In  still  later  times,  when  manufactures  arose 
into  prominence  alongside  merchandizing,  new 
guilds  were  organized,  representing  different 
trades.  There  were  the  weavers,  the  shoema- 
kers, the  goldsmiths,  the  butchers,  and  many 
others.  Each  of  these  craft-guilds  had  its  own 
president,  the  alderman.  They  soon  demanded 
a  share  in  the  city  government,  which  was  finally 
granted ;  and  their  aldermen  were  given  the  right 
to  sit  together  as  a  law-making  body,  each  rep- 
resenting his  own  guild.  In  the  reign  of  Ed- 
ward II.,  "all  the  citizens  were  obliged  to  be 
enrolled  among  the  trade-guilds,  and  in  the  reign 
of  Edward  III.  the  election  of  the  city  magis- 
trates was  transferred  from  the  representatives 
of  the  ward-moots  to  the  trading  companies."  l 
Thus,  to-day,  "  London,  and  the  municipal  system 
generally,  has  in  the  mayor  a  relic  of  the  com- 
munal idea,  in  the  alderman  the  representative 
of  the  guild,  and  in  the  councillors  of  the  wards 
the  successors  to  the  rights  of  the  most  ancient 
township  system."  2 

The  question  arises,  How  came  it  that  so  ra- 
tional a  system  as  the  election  of  aldermen  by  the 
different  organized  interests  of  the  cities  should 
have  been  displaced  by  the  arbitrary  system  of 
election  by  territorial  districts  or  wards  ?  The 

1  Stubbs,  vol.  i.,  p.  419. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  424. 


REPRESENTATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.  25 

answer  is  brief.  The  ancient  system  itself  was 
practically  an  election  by  wards,  because  the  dif- 
ferent trades  were  grouped  together,  each  in  its 
own  district  of  the  city.  And  when  the  federa- 
tion of  guilds  was  abolished  and  elections  thrown 
open  to  a  widened  suffrage,  it  seemed  wholly  nat- 
ural to  continue  that  district  system  which  was 
seen  to  be  in  vogue  in  the  counties  and  in  the 
election  of  councilmen. 

When  American  cities  adopted  representative 
government,  they  adopted  the  English  district 
system.  The  transition  is  vividly  portrayed  in 
the  history  of  Boston.1  Until  the  year  1822  the 
government  of  Boston  had  been  a  primary  as- 
sembly/ On  the  1st  of  May,  1822,  the  popula- 
tion had  grown  to  45,000,  the  qualified  voters  to 
7,000  or  8,000,  too  many  for  a  primary  assembly. 
In  that  year  the  General  Court  of  Massachusetts 
drew  up  a  charter  entitled  "  An  Act  establishing 
the  City  of  Boston."  It  was  presented  to  the 
voters  of  Boston,  and  accepted  by  a  vote  of  2,797 
to  1,881.  " ...  As  authorizing  the  first  depart- 
ure from  the  system  of  local  government  which 
had  been  in  operation  nearly  two  centuries,  it  was 
regarded  as  a  measure  of  the  very  highest  impor- 
tance. Not  a  few  of  the  old  residents,  who  had 


1  J.  M.  Bugbee,  "  The  City  Government  of  Boston,"  in  "  Johns 
Hopkins  University  Studies  in  History  and  Political  Science," 
5th  series,  p.  95. 


26          PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

fought  under  the  eyes  of  Washington  in  the  field, 
and  under  the  eyes  of  Samuel  Adams  in  the  town 
meetings,  looked  upon  the  act  which  divided  their 
great  folk-mote  into  twelve  separate  and  silent 
gatherings,  where  men  delegated  their  rights  to 
others,  as  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  democratic 
government." 

Little  need  be  said  about  the  differences  be- 
tween the  original  problems  of  representation  in 
cities,  and  those  of  their  present  development.  The 
city  is,  above  all  political  organizations,  a  unit 
in  itself.  Aldermen  and  councillors  should  not 
represent  wards,  they  should  represent  the  city. 
The  ward  has  no  place  in  city  politics  except, 
perhaps,  as  an  administrative  division.  It  is  well 
recognized  that  cities  present  the  most  aggravated 
failures  of  American  politics ;  and,  so  far  as  the 
legislative  branch  is  concerned,  the  failure  lies 
mainly  in  this  unnatural  partition  into  petty  dis- 
tricts. 

2.  Proceeding  from  these  historical  conditions, 
we  can  perceive  the  impressive  significance  of  the 
modern  growth  of  national  political  parties.  Be- 
fore there  were  national  questions  there  were  no 
national  parties,  and  even  the  early  development 
of  party  divisions  was  on  territorial  lines.  The 
Whigs  were  almost  unknown  in  the  counties,  and 
the  Tories  unknown  in  the  cities.  Consequently, 
there  was  no  important  minority  in  either  division 


REPRESENTATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.  27 

which  was  unrepresented.  Cities  were  unanimous 
on  national  questions,  and  so  were  the  counties, 
because  the  only  important  question  they  had  to 
meet  was  the  demand  of  the  king  for  additional 
subsidies.  More  or  less,  the  distinction  between 
city  and  county  continues  in  England  to  the 
present  day.  The  original  representatives  of  the 
agricultural  and  the  capitalist  classes,  whose  co- 
alescence formed  the  nation,  have  carried  their 
different  interests  into  the  House  of  Commons. 
And  now  that  the  king  is  only  a  figurehead,  and 
the  House  of  Lords  an  occasional  check,  the 
House  of  Commons  has  become  almost  supreme; 
Social  and  economic  questions  divide  its  members ; 
and  they  group  themselves  in  national  parties,  to 
contend,  not  against  king  and  lords,  but  among 
themselves. 

In  the  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
corporate,  autonomous  character  of  local  govern- 
ments is  scarcely  recognized  in  the  creation  of 
representative  districts.  District  lines  are  fre- 
quently changed ;  cities  have  grown  up,  and  have 
been  grouped  with  rural  areas ;  the  apportion- 
ment of  representatives  is  wholly  territorial.  Con- 
sequently, in  the  country  at  large  the  national 
parties  which  have  grown  up  are  often  evenly  di- 
vided in  the  territorial  districts,  and  a  representa- 
tive of  the  majority,  therefore,  does  not  represent 
the  opinions  and  wishes  of  the  mass  of  his  con- 


28         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

stituency.  The  minority  is  simply  discarded  for 
the  time  being. 

In  the  United  States  the  power  of  political 
parties  has  reached  a  vigor  unattained  by  those 
of  any  other  country.  This  power  is  the  growth 
of  not  more  than  fifty  years.  It  has  made  its 
greatest  advances  since  the  period  of  the  civil 
war.  The  peculiar  feature  of  this  development 
has  been  the  supremacy  of  that  new  force  in  polit- 
ical parties,  the  "machine."  Party  organization 
is  an  essential  element  of  party  government ;  but 
the  extent,  perfection,  and  detail  of  this  organiza- 
tion in  the  United  States  are  bewildering.  It  con- 
trols both  candidates  and  voters  with  an  iron-like 
grip,  and  they  glory  in  their  subjection.  These 
parties  are  not  divided  on  territorial  lines.  They 
are  divided  mainly  on  national  questions. 

In  colonial  times  parties  were  unknown.  Or 
rather,  we  might  say,  there  was  a  court  party,  or 
a  party  of  prerogative,  represented  by  the  gov- 
ernor and  his  council,  while  the  legislatures,  the 
representative  bodies,  stood  practically  for  a  united 
people.  The  upper  house  being  appointed  by  the 
governor,  the  lower  house  was  drawn  together  as 
a  single  unit,  representing  all  the  people.  No 
matter  from  what  county  a  representative  was 
returned,  he  was  the  ablest  man  in  the  county, 
for  the  people  were  unanimous  in  their  wishes  to 
withstand  the  party  of  prerogative.  Furthermore, 


REPRESENTATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.  29 

the  districts  were  all  alike,  being  exclusively  agri- 
cultural, and  the  representative  from  one  was  in 
harmony  with  the  people  of  the  others.  There 
was  no  minority  in  any  district  to  be  unrepre- 
sented by  a  delegate  chosen  by  the  majority. 

But  to-day  the  legislature,  whether  in  city, 
State,  or  nation,  instead  of  being  the  organized 
representatives  of  those  who  protest  against  the 
government,  is  itself  the  government.  Within  its 
walls  occur  the  struggles  for  the  control  of  the 
fortunes  and  destinies  of  the  people.  There  is  no 
outside  enemy  whose  constant  presence  enforces 
harmony  and  mutual  help.  Two  national  parties 
stand  face  to  face  in  constant  conflict,  and  which- 
ever masters  the  legislature  masters  the  people. 

3.  Furthermore,  from  the  earliest  times,  the  suf- 
frage, both  in  England  and  the  United  States,  was 
narrowly  limited.  The  masses  of  the  people  were 
not  considered  as  citizens,  or  entitled  to  politi- 
cal weight.  In  the  counties,  serfs,  copyholders, 
and  the  lesser  freemen  were  excluded  from  the 
suffrage.  Only  the  freehold  knights  were  voters. 
The  cities  were  close  corporations,  made  up  of 
the  mayor  and  aldermen,  and  a  few  of  the  leading 
men  of  the  guilds.  Altogether,  perhaps  not  one- 
fifth  of  the  adult  male  population  was  entitled  to 
vote  for  representatives  to  Parliament.  As  a  re- 
sult, on  the  few  questions  of  national  interest  on 
which  they  were  required  to  select  representatives, 


30         PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

the  ruling  classes  in  their  respective  districts  were 
practically  unanimous.  The  trial  of  representa- 
tive government  in  England  on  a  democratic  basis 
did  not  really  begin  until  after  the  years  1867  and 
1884,  when  the  town  and  country  laborers  were 
enfranchised.  And  if  the  failure  of  these  institu- 
tions is  more  complete  in  the  United  States  than 
in  England,  it  is  mainly  because  we  have  been 
longer  trying  to  solve  the  problems  of  democracy 
with  an  aristocratic  and  capitalistic  form  of  repre- 
sentation. For  it  must  be  remembered,  as  already 
shown,  that  the  local  government  and  liberty 
which  representation  preserved  to  Englishmen 
was  the  government  and  liberty  of  .-land-owners 
and  capitalists,  and  not  primarily  of  serfs  and 
laborers. 

In  colonial  times,  also,  the  local  governments 
were  close  corporations,  and  the  representation  by 
districts  suited  their  purposes.  In  the  South  a 
few  aristocratic  slave-holding  families,  united  by 
ties  of  blood  and  marriage,  controlled  each  county 
government.  They  could  come  together  often 
in  social  and  business  meetings,  and,  like  the  di- 
rectors of  a  modern  business  corporation,  could 
choose  their  agents  and  attorneys  to  conduct  the 
county  government  and  to  represent  them  in  the 
State  and  national  legislatures.  They  selected 
the  ablest  men  they  could  find.  They  wanted 
their  property  and  their  independence  well  pro- 


REPRESENTATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.  31 

tected.  And  in  New  England  the  church  mem- 
bers alone,  that  is,  the  wealthy  and  educated 
classes  of  the  community,  held  the  suffrage.  In 
Massachusetts,  in  1780,  only  4  per  cent  of  the 
population  were  voters;  in  1890,  29.7  per  cent.1 

In  the  United  States,  to-day,  not  only  the  origi-^ 
nal  Anglo-Saxon  is  admitted  to  the  suffrage,  but 
also  millions  frorfi  antagonistic^races.  Especially 
is  this  true  of  theTargecities,  where  50  per  cent 
to  80  per  cent  of  the  voters  are  foreign-born  and 
children  of  foreigners.2  If  England  is  threatened 
by  the  widening  of  the  suffrage,  far  more  is  the 
Republic  of  America.  The  great  political  ques- 
tions of  to-day  are  those  which  grow  out  of  the 
citizenship  of  the  manual  laborers,  the  former 
serfs.  These  questions  have  to  do  directly  or  re- 
motely with  the  profound  problem  of  the  owner- 
ship of  wealth  and  the  betterment  of  the  social 

1  See  A.  B.  Hart,   "  Practical  Essays  on  American  Govern- 
ment," pp.  35,  54. 

A  representative  assembly  may  be  seen  to-day  emerging  in 
the  Empire  of  India,  and  the  methods  of  election  there  to  be 
observed  illustrate  precisely  the  advantages  of  limited  suffrage 
and  viva  voce  voting  in  primitive  English  and  colonial  constitu- 
encies. The  natives  are  unrepresented  in  the  British  government 
of  the  empire,  but  they  have  recently  instituted  representative 
assemblies  to  consult  and  petition  the  India  Council  and  the 
Crown.  The  delegates  to  these  assemblies  are  voted  for  in  the 
various  localities  by  only  the  high-caste,  educated,  and  wealthy 
classes,  numbering,  perhaps,  15  per  cent  of  the  population,  and 
they  are  elected  by  acclamation.  They  are  in  all  cases  the  most 
distinguished  men  of  their  constituencies, 

2  Hart,  as  above,  pp.  196, 198. 


.32         PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

conditions  of  the  lowest  classes.  These  classes  are 
distributed  throughout  all  districts.  They  form 
the  wide  foundation  structure  of  every  community, 
upon  which  the  other  classes  are  built.  They 
compose  the  majority  of__the  voters.  They  feel 
that  they  have-not  heretofore  been  represented  in 
the  councils  of  the  city,  the  State,  or  the  nation. 
They  are  unaccustomed  to  political  control,  and 
therefore  they  are  the  fertile  soil  for  demagogues 
and  partisans.  They  hold  the  balance  of  power. 
They  must  be  placated  and  pacified.  The  party 
or  candidate  who  presents  to  them  the  most  spe- 
cious appeals  wins  the  day.  They  themselves  are 
not  allowed  to  combine  according  to  their  natural 
divisions,  and  elect  their  acknowledged  leaders  to 
the  council,  the  legislature,  and  Congress.  Could 
they  combine  throughout  the  nation,  the  labor 
unions,  scattered  as  they  are  through  a  hundred 
districts,  would  unite,  and  the  more  intelligent  of 
the  laborers  would  have  influence  in  selecting 
those  who  represent  them  as  a  body,  just  as  they 
select  their  national  presidents  and  secretaries.  As 
it  is,  they  are  forced  into  artificial  territorial  di- 
visions, and  are  compelled,  along  with  the  whole  of 
the  electorate,  to  submit  to  the  candidates  who 
appeal  to  the  more  ignorant,  thoughtless,  preju- 
diced and  easily  influenced  masses.1 

It  is  in  the  wide  extension  of  suffrage  that  we 

1  On  this  point  see  also  below,  Chapter  VIII. 


EEPBESENTATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.  33 

find  the  underlying  cause  of  the  "  machine  "  and 
the  "boss."  Close  organization,  with  its  minute 
attention  to  details,  and  personal  supervision  of 
the  rank  and  file,  is  the  secret  for  wielding  great 
armies  of  unthinking  men.  The  Catholic  and 
Methodist  churches  and  the  Salvation  Army  are 
striking  triumphs  of  organizing  ability  dealing 
with  the  unprivileged  and  disorganized  masses. 
The  party  machine  does  the  same  for  the  neg- 
lected, isolated,  ignorant  voters. 

4.  Again,  legislation  in  the  olden  times  was 
very  limited,  both  in  the  number  of  subjects  dis- 
cussed and  the  details  of  the  regulations.  The 
people  were  satisfied  to  live  according  to  the  cus- 
toms of  their  ancestors.  Government  was  simply 
a  matter  of  administration.  The  king,  his  council, 
his  officers,  and  his  judges  were  not  called  upon 
to  make  new  laws,  but  to  learn  what  were  the 
customs  of  the  land,  and  then  to  act  accordingly. 
But  to-day  legislation  is  the  most  intricate  of  arts, 
depending  upon  the  profoundest  sciences,  and  dom- 
inating the  most  vital  of  human  interests.  There 
are  hundreds  of  pressing  problems,  requiring  legis- 
lative direction,  which  the  assemblies  of  Edward 
I.,  or  even  the  parliaments  of  George  III.,  never 
dreamed  to  be  of  social  importance.  "Time  was," 
says  Woodrow  Wilson,1  "in  the  infancy  of  na- 
tional representative  bodies,  -when  the  representa- 

i  "  The  State,"  New  York,  1890,  page  583. 


34         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

tives  of  the  people  were  called  upon  simply  to 
give  or  to  refuse  their  assent  to  laws  prepared  by 
a  king  or  by  a  privileged  class  in  the  state ;  but 
that  time  is  far  passed.  The  modern  representa- 
tive has  to  judge  of  the  gravest  affairs  of  govern- 
ment, and  has  to  judge  as  an  originator  of  policies. 
It  is  his  duty  to  adjust  every  weighty  plan,  pre- 
side over  every  important  reform,  provide  for 
every  passing  need  of  the  state.  All  the  motive 
power  of  government  rests  with  him.  His  task, 
therefore,  is  as  complex  as  the  task  of  governing, 
and  the  task  of  governing  is  as  complex  as  is  the 
play  of  economic  and  social  forces  over  which  it 
has  to  preside.  Law-making  now  moves  with  a 
freedom,  now  sweeps  through  a  field,  unknown  to 
any  ancient  legislator;  it  no  longer  provides  for 
the  simple  needs  of  small  city-states,  but  for  the 
necessities  of  vast  nations,  numbering  their  tens 
of  millions." 

The  modern  legislator  must,  therefore,  be  well 
equipped.  He  must  give  the  greater  part  of  his 
time  to  parliamentary  duties,  and,  above  all,  must 
have  a  long  experience  in  his  particular  art.  No 
more  striking  evidence  of  obsolescence  can  be  cited 
than  this,  that,  while  the  duties  of  legislation  have 
increased  as  never  before,  the  law-makers  them- 
selves have  sunken  into  incompetence  and  obloquy, 

5.  There  is  one  external  influence  on  modern 
legislation  so  extremely  important  as  to  demand 


REPRESENTATIVE  ASSEMBLIES.  35 

special  notice.  This  is  the  private  corporation, 
with  its  professional  lobby.  Corporations  are  as 
recent  as  party  machines,  and  both  have  grown 
up  together  like  Siamese  twins.  The  professional 
lobbyists  are  nearly  always  the  managers  of  the 
political  machine.  They  carry  in  their  pockets 
the  political  fortunes  of  the  legislators.  The 
"  third  house  "  is  the  modern  legislature,  at  least 
in  the  United  States.  Corporations,  from  their 
very  inception  and  in  their  daily  activities,  are  the 
creatures  of  government.  Their  life  is  legislation. 
They  cannot,  if  they  would,  dispense  with  their 
lobby. 

This  is  an  entirely  new  feature  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  representative  assemblies.  The  first  general 
corporation  laws  in  the  United  States  were  enacted 
in  the  '50's,  following  the  rapid  extension  of  rail- 
ways and  the  organization  of  banks.  A  legislature 
that  may  have  sufficed  for  simple  duties  in  the 
days  of  isolated  individual  industries,  is  almost 
su^e  to  wither  in  an  era  of  private  corporations 
\v  th  public  functions  and  fabulous  resources. 


36         PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 


CHAPTER  III. 
THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT  WORK. 

IN  the  preceding  chapter  the  main  differences 
have  been  shown  between  the  ancient  and  the 
modern  problems,  constituencies,  and  conditions  of 
representation.  We  have  now  to  inquire  into  the 
actual  workings  of  this  primitive  institution  in  the 
midst  of  modern  surroundings. 

The  position  of  the  American  voter  who  attempts 
independence  is  well  known  to  be  unenviable. 
When  he  comes  to  the  polls  to  cast  his  ballot,  he 
finds  but  one  candidate  to  be  chosen  for  any  given 
office.  He  finds  that,  through  the  machinery  of 
the  political  party  with  which  he  has  acted,  there 
is  one  candidate  offered  to  him.  There  are  practi- 
cally but  two  candidates  in  the  field,  those  of  the 
two  great  parties.  If  the  voter  is  dissatisfied  with 
the  nominee  of  his  own  party,  there  are  three 
courses  open  to  him,  to  vote  for  the  opposing  can- 
didate, to  vote  for  a  third  candidate,  or  to  stay  at 
home.  It  is  likely  that  his  dissatisfaction  with  the 
opposing  candidate  is  more  intense  than  with  his 
own.  Only  in  times  of  exceptional  unrest,  or  as  a 
protest  against  an  exceptionally  corrupt  nomina- 
tion, do  large  numbers  of  voters  so  radically  revolt 
as  to  go  entirely  over  to  the  enemy.  The  majority 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK.          37 

of  the  dissatisfied  simply  stay  at  home.  This  is 
their  only  comfortable  way  to  condemn  their  party's 
nominee.  But  should  they  be  intensely  exasper- 
ated, or  should  they  be  of  an  uncompromising  turn 
of  mind,  they  may  go  to  the  extreme  of  nominating 
and  voting  for  a  third  candidate.  In  this  case 
their  offence  is  even  worse  than  if  they  vote  for 
the  principal  opposing  candidate.  They  indeed 
give  him  a  half  vote,  just  as  they  do  when  they 
stay  at  home ;  and  they  gain  the  opprobrium  of 
"crank,"  and  the  scorn  of  having  " thrown  their 
votes  away." 

In  this  way  the  party  machine  is  the  master  of 
the  situation.  It  alone  can  name  the  candidate; 
the  only ' check  upon  it  is  the  fear  of  a  "bolt"  on 
the  part  of  the  voters.  This  fear  is  reduced  to  a 
minimum.  Though  there  may  be  loud  protests 
and  a  vigorous  show  of  independence,  it  is  well 
known  that  most  of  the  protesters  will  fall  into 
line  on  election  day,  rather  than  see  the  other 
side  win. 

Add  to  the  foregoing  the  fact  that  wards  and 
election  districts  are  bounded  more  or  less  arbi- 
trarily, that  they  include  a  heterogeneous  and  poly- 
glot population,  and  that  boundaries  are  frequently 
changed,  and  we  have  an  additional  reason  for  the 
supremacy  of  the  party  organization.  The  voters 
have  very  few  interests  in  common.  They  see 
little  of  each  other;  they  have  few  of  those  so- 


38         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

cial  and  business  relations  that  would  accustom 
them  to  join  and  work  together.  They  do  not 
meet  in  mass-meeting,  as  in  the  New  England 
town-meeting,  where  individuals  of  all  parties 
come  together  and  discuss  in  public  the  affairs 
of  their  district  and  the  qualifications  of  candi- 
dates, before  the  candidates  are  nominated.  They 
must,  therefore,  look  to  their  party  organization 
for  the  dictation  of  a  policy  and  the  designation 
of  a  candidate.  It  is  in  the  party  that  they  find 
their  common  meeting-place.  The  strength  of 
Tammany  Hall,  with  its  affiliated  saloons,  is  in 
the  social  and  fraternal  life  which  it  furnishes  to 
the  thousands  of  neglected  voters  who  have  no 
home,  no  church,  no  club. 

The  party  organization  is  a  more  or  less  close 
corporation,  composed  of  a  series  of  practically 
self-perpetuating  committees,  the  committees  cor- 
responding to  the  different  election  areas.  The 
party  primary  of  the  smallest  division — precinct, 
township,  or  ward  —  is  the  foundation  of  the  sys- 
tem ;  but  the  primary  is  in  the  hands  of  its  stand- 
ing committee.  A  very  small  percentage  of  the 
party  voters,  for  one  reason  or  another,  attend  the 
primaries.  In  cities  the  percentage  ranges  from 
two  to  ten,1  in  the  townships  from  ten  to  forty. 
A  majority  of  the  voters  in  these  primaries  elect 

1  A.  C.  Bernheim,  in  Political  Science  Quarterly,  vol.  iii., 
p.  99. 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK.  39 

delegates  to  the  nominating  conventions,  or  they 
nominate  ward  or  township  candidates.  This  is 
the  case  with  both  the  ruling  parties.  These 
candidates  are  the  only  ones  between  whom  the 
voters  can  choose  at  the  elections.  The  primaries 
and  the  nominating  conventions,  controlled  by  the 
party  managers,  are  therefore  practically  the  elect- 
ing conventions. 

I  do  not  mean  that  the  party  managers  who  have 
this  power  can  use  it  autocratically.  They  must 
keep  before  themselves  always  the  qualities  of  their 
candidate  which  would  promote  or  mar  his  popu- 
larity. They  must  nominate  a  man  who,  as  they 
say,  is  "available."  But  within  this  limit,  unless 
the  popular  interest  has  been  aroused  by  some 
unusual  emergency,  they  have  a  wide  field  of 
autocracy. 

Such  a  system  results  in  the  selection  of  weak 
and  inefficient  representatives.  They  are  not 
necessarily  corrupt,  but  they  are  tools  and  figure- 
heads. 

In  the  first  place,  the  area  of  choice  is  arbitrarily 
limited.  It  is  a  principle  in  elective  constituencies 
that  the  larger  the  area  over  which  a  district  ex- 
tends, the  more  distinguished  and  capable  are  the 
candidates  of  all  parties.  In  all  districts  repre- 
sentatives can  be  elected  only  from  the  ranks  of 
the  party  which  happens  to  have  the  majority. 
It  is  wholly  improbable  that  the  able  men  of  a 


40         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

party  will  be  distributed  about,  one  by  one,  in  the 
small  districts  where  the  party  has  its  majorities. 
But,  even  were  they  so  benevolently  scattered,  the 
conditions  are  against  their  nomination.  The  po- 
litical managers  must  have  men  who  will  do  their 
bidding.  At  the  same  time,  with  only  one  to 
nominate  and  elect,  the  selection  of  candidates 
is  subject  to  the  dictation  of  cliques.  In  wards 
where  the  party  has  a  safe  or  overwhelming  ma- 
jority, the  party  managers  often  flagrantly  override 
the  honesty  and  decency  of  the  community  by 
nominating  the  basest  of  men.  And,  in  close 
districts  and  wards,  a  compact  faction,  bent  on 
its  own  aggrandizement  and  threatening  to  help 
the  other  party,  can  often  name  a  candidate,  or,  at 
least  prevent  the  nomination  of  an  outspoken  and 
capable  one.  The  influence  of  saloon-keepers  in 
city  and  State  politics  is  well  known  to  depend  on 
the  power  which  close  organization  and  unscrupu- 
lous methods  give  them  over  party  leaders  in  the 
primaries  and  conventions. 

Besides  operating  within  the  party  lines,  these 
same  factions,  as  well  as  other  classes  of  voters, 
hold  the  balance  of  power  between  parties.  Hence 
candidates  must  placate  them.  Now,  it  is  char- 
acteristic of  the  greatest  of  party  leaders  that  they 
raise  up  about  themselves  a  body  of  strong  ad- 
mirers, and  a  body  of  equally  vigorous  haters. 
Consequently,  we  seldom  find  in  American  politics 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT  WORK.          41 

that  a  great  party  leader  can  be  elected  repeatedly 
in  a  close  district.  This  principle  comes  out  dis- 
tinctly in  the  election  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States.  Those  men  who  have  achieved  the 
highest  honors  in  the  leadership  of  their  party  in 
the  halls  of  Congress  and  in  political  battles,  are 
seldom  elected  to  that  high  office.  They  are  not 
often  even  nominated ;  and,  if  nominated,  they  are 
almost  destined  to  be  defeated.  Unknown  and 
obscure  men,  or  men  whose  record  has  been  made 
entirely  apart  from  leadership  in  political  debate, 
are  hunted  out  and  given  the  place  that  in  the 
affection  and  admiration  of  the  party  voters  be- 
longed to  others.  The  true  leaders  must  be  con- 
tent with  appointive  positions. 

In  congressional  and  legislative  elections,  also, 
it  is  well  known  that,  when  a  party  leader  has 
achieved  prominence,  the  entire  resources  of  the 
opposite  party  throughout  the  nation  or  State  are 
thrown  into  his  limited  district  to  compass  his 
defeat.  And  these  extraordinary  exertions  are 
usually  successful,  if  the  district  be  in  any  way 
a  close  one.  Several  leaders  in  Congress,  after 
serving  a  few  terms  and  acquiring  familiarity 
with  the  rules,  and  then  becoming  the  recognized 
leaders  of  their  parties,  have  been  defeated  in  their 
districts.  In  this  way  the  Democrats  lost  the 
services  of  their  leader,  William  R.  Morrison,  and 
the  Republicans  lost  also  their  tariff  leader,  William 


42         PEOPOETIONAL  EEPEESENTATION. 

McKinley,  Jr.  Only  in  the  case  of  a  man  like 
Elaine  or  Garfield,  who  happened  to  live  in  over- 
whelming Republican  districts,  could  the  leaders 
be  kept  in  the  public  stations  where  their  services 
would  redound  to  their  party  and  their  country. 
In  the  case  of  Mr.  McKinley,  a  Democratic  legis- 
lature had  used  the  gerrymander  to  create  for  him 
a  strong  Democratic  district. 

The  same  forces  operate  still  more  inexorably 
the  further  down  we  go  to  the  lesser  and  lesser 
districts  ;  until,  when  we  come  to  ward  politics,  we 
reach  the  very  narrowest  area  of  choice,  with,  con- 
sequently, the  lowest  extreme  of  ability  and  the 
highest  power  of  greedy  factions  and  combines. 

This  is  the  main  reason  why  our  legislative 
bodies  are  composed  of  inexperienced  men.  A 
careful  analysis  of  State  legislatures  will  probably 
show  that,  in  the  average  election,  one-half  the 
representatives  are  new  men,  with  no  legislative 
experience.  An  actual  count  of  the  Indiana  legis- 
lature of  1893  shows  that,  in  a  house  of  one 
hundred  representatives,  there  were  63  men  who 
were  there  for  the  first  time,  16  men  who  were 
serving  their  second  term,  12  men  their  third 
term,  one  man  his  fourth  term,  and  one  man 
his  fifth  term.  And  this  was  not  the  result  of 
a  "landslide,"  bringing  a  new  party  into  power; 
but  the  legislature  was  of  the  same  political 
complexion  which  it  had  borne  for  several  years. 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WO  BIT.          43 

Professor  Hart  asserts  l  that  in  Connecticut,  in  the 
year  1790,  64  per  cent  of  the  members  of  the 
legislature  had  sat  in  it  before,  while  in  1889 
the  number  was  only  5  per  cent.  It  is  well  known 
that  the  American  House  of  Representatives  is 
becoming  more  and  more  a  body  of  one  and  two 
term  men.  In  the  Fifty-third  Congress  (not  a 
"landslide"  Congress),  out  of  a  membership  of 
353,  there  were  133  new  men,  78  men  serving 
their  second  term,  and  only  142  —  i.e.,  40  per  cent 
-  who  were  serving  their  third  term  and  upwards. 
And  everywhere  the  aldermen  have  learned  to  be 
content  with  one  or  two  terms,  but  meanwhile  to 
make  a  heavy "  strike,"  and  then  give  way  to 
another  of  "  the  boys."  Throughout  the  country  it 
may  be  asserted,  as  a  general  rule,  that  the  laws 
of  the  people  are  enacted  by  a  majority  who  have 
had  no  previous  experience  in  law-making. 

This  is  the  explanation  of  two  significant  facts 
in  American  legislation,  the  power  of  the  speaker 
of  the  House,  and  the  power  of  the  lobby. 

The  American  speaker,  unlike  the  English  and 
Canadian,  is  a  man  of  dictatorial  power.  In  the 
national  government  he  is  ranked  next  to  the 
President.  He  appoints  the  committees,  lays 
down  the  rules,  and  controls  legislation.  He  has 
a  similar  position  in  all  State  legislatures,  and  in 
many  municipal  councils.  The  reason  for  this 

1  "  Practical  Essays  on  American  Government,"  p.  90. 


44         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

dictatorship  is  the  same  as  that  which  explains 
the  power  of  a  tribal  chieftain  or  an  imperial 
Caesar  —  the  ignorance,  incapacity,  and  faction  of 
his  subjects.  Leadership  is  essential  wherever  a 
body  of  men  are  compelled  to  act  in  concert.  But 
there  are  two  kinds  of  leadership.  One  is  that 
of  debate,  argument,  and  statesmanship,  depend- 
ing upon  ability  and  enthusiasm,  where  the  fol- 
lowers have  confidence  in  their  chief,  and  accept 
his  leadership,  and  act  in  concert  with  him  volun- 
tarily. This  is  the  leadership  of  Gladstone  in  the 
House  of  Commons.  The  other  is  that  of  coer- 
cion, growing  out  of  necessity  and  circumstance, 
where  followers  distrust  the  ability  of  any  leader 
they  may  choose,  where  they  distrust  their  own 
ability  to  follow,  and- therefore  they  consent  to  the 
abdication  of  self-government  and  the  elevation  of 
a  tyrant.  This  is  the  leadership  of  the  American 
party  speaker.  It  proceeds  from  the  lack  of  ac- 
quaintance among  the  members  of  the  legislative 
bodies,  and  from  their  mutual  incompetency. 
They  serve  short  terms,  they  come  together  for 
the  first  time  knowing  little  of  the  qualifications 
of  each.  If  they  should  keep  the  control  of  affairs 
in  their  own  hands,  there  would  be  wrangling  and 
wire-pulling  over  the  appointments  of  committees, 
and  then  factions  and  mutiny  on  account  of  their 
final  disposition.  The  only  escape  from  this  evil 
is  in  the  power  of  the  speaker. 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK.          45 

If  our  representative  bodies  were  composed  of 
able  men,  if  their  terms  of  service  were  longer 
and  their  legislative  acquaintance  wider,  if  the 
natural  party  leaders  were  not  excluded  from  their 
midst  by  a  petty  district  system  of  election,  —  then 
the  representatives  would  claim  for  themselves 
the  power  which  they  bestow  upon  their  autocrat. 
They  would  appoint  their  own  committees,  as  in 
the  United  States  Senate,  control  their  own  rules, 
make  their  own  laws,  and  the  speaker  would  be 
simply  a  moderator  instead  of  a  dictator. 

Though  the  speaker  has  a  unique  dominion, 
there  is  another  power  in  American  councils,  legis- 
latures, and  Congress,  still  more  ominous  —  the 
lobby.  It  is  the  lobby  which  controls  legislatures 
to-day.  If  any  law  demanded  by  the  people  at 
large,  or  even  by  a  majority  of  the  law-making 
body,  is  defeated  or  emasculated,  its  fate  can  be 
traced  to  the  dominating  influence  of  the  lobby. 

The  lobby  is  a  new  feature  of  representative 
government.  It  is  coincident  with  the  very  re- 
cent growth  of  large  private  corporations.  It  is 
organized  by  them.  They  have  such  immense 
interests  at  stake  on  the  turn  of  legislation,  that 
their  lobby,  with  unlimited  resources  at  its  dis- 
posal, is  almost  irresistible. 

But  the  lobby  could  not  have  acquired  its  pow- 
erful influence  were  it  not  for  certain  qualities  in 
the  legislative  bodies  themselves  which  place  them 


46         PBOPOET1ONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

at  its  mercy.  Corruption  is  not  the  only  explana- 
tion. Legislators  fall  into  the  nets  of  lobbyists 
largely  because  of  inexperience  and  incapacity. 
The  lobbyists  themselves  are  the  shrewdest, 
brightest,  and  most  influential  men  of  the  State 
or  nation.  They  often  control  the  party  spoils, 
and  an  ambitious  legislator  cannot  afford  to  antag- 
onize them.  The  lobby  is  organized  as  well  as 
the  legislature  itself.  It  has  its  chiefs,  who  band 
together.  All  of  the  corporations  and  enterprises 
interested  in  legislation  practically  combine  as  a 
unit.  Then  these  able  and  honorable  chiefs  em- 
ploy their  resources  of  argument  and  suggestion 
with  individual  legislators  and  before  committees. 
They  take  the  dimensions  of  every  individual  who 
comes  in  their  way.  But  if  their  honorable 
methods  are  inadequate,  they  then  turn  the  legis- 
lator in  question  over  to  the  petty  lobbyist  who 
carries  the  pocket-book.  Their  own  hands  are 
clean. 

The  power  of  the  lobby  is  found  mainly  in  the 
fact  of  the  party  machine.  The  lobbyists  are 
usually  the  managers  of  the  machine.  They 
control  State  and  national  party  spoils  and  offices. 
They  have  the  political  fate  of  individual  law- 
makers in  their  hands.  They  are  the  actual 
leaders  in  party  politics.  The  wealth  of  a  Tam- 
many "  boss "  comes  from  his  employment  as 
a  corporation  lobbyist.  There  must  be  leadership 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK.          47 

somewhere.  The  only  question  is,  Shall  the 
leaders  be  elected  to  the  legislature  by  the  people, 
or  shall  they  control  the  legislature  from  outside 
as  mere  irresponsible  private  citizens  ?  As  long 
as  the  people  are  prevented  from  electing  their 
leaders  to  positions  of  responsibility,  there  will 
surely  arise  these  self-constituted  leaders,  whose 
shrewdness  gives  them  control  over  the  weaklings 
and  hirelings  who  are  actually  elected. 

The  absence  of  true  leadership  and  the  opportu- 
nity of  the  lobby  are  shown  in  the  fruitless  bick- 
erings and  factious  combinations  which  so  often 
prevent  a  legislature  from  accomplishing  anything 
good.  A  party  in  the  majority  needs  to  be  held 
together  through  confidence  in  some  leader  or 
leaders.  But  their  forces  are  often  scattered,  and 
legislation  is  blocked.  The  opportunity  of  the 
lobby  is  of  most  value  in  the  election  of  a  speaker, 
who,  when  once  elected,  becomes  the  instrument 
of  those  who  created  him. 

It  is  not  to  be  inferred  that  the  lobby  alone  is 
responsible  for  corrupt  legislatures  and  councils. 
It  is  equally  true  that  corrupt  legislatures  are  re- 
sponsible for  the  lobby.  Law-makers  introduce 
bills  attacking  corporations  for  the  express  pur- 
pose of  forcing  a  bribe.  This  is  called  a  "strike," 
and  has  become  a  recognized  feature  of  American 
legislation,  to  meet  which  the  corporations  are 
compelled  to  organize  their  lobby. 


48         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

A  very  apparent  weakness  and  injustice  of  the 
district  system  is  the  opportunity  it  gives  a  ma- 
jority party  to  crush  out  and  disfranchise  the 
minority.  This  is  seen  flagrantly  in  the  "gerry- 
mander." But,  even  where  the  system  is  not  thus 
abused,  it  is  almost  wholly  a  matter  of  chance 
whether  the  opinions  of  the  people  are  justly 
expressed  or  not.  This  danger  was  not  imminent 
under  the  earlier  conditions  of  representation,  as 
has  already  been  shown,  when  electoral  districts 
were  natural  units  and  the  problem  of  represen- 
tation was  the  federation  of  local  communities. 
But  now  that  party  lines  are  drawn  through  the 
midst  of  every  community,  it  nearly  always  hap- 
pens that  one  party  gains  in  the  elections  an  un- 
just proportion  of  representatives  at  the  expense  of 
others.  From  the  theory  of  the  matter  it  is  pos- 
sible to  exolude  minority  parties  altogether,  and 
to  give  the  entire  legislative  body  to  the  majority. 
Suppose  a  legislature  to  be  composed  of  forty 
members  elected  from  forty  districts,  and  that  the 
popular  vote  of  the  political  parties  stands  respec- 
tively 120,000  and  100,000.  If  the  districts  are 
so  arranged  as  to  have  5,500  votes  each,  and  the 
parties  happen  to  be  divided  in  the  districts  in 
the  same  proportion  as  at  large,  we  should  have 
in  each  district  a  vote  respectively  of  3,000  and 
2,500.  All  of  the  forty  candidates  of  the  ma- 
jority would  be  elected,  and  the  minority  wholly 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK.  49 

excluded.      An   extreme   result  like    this    seems 
improbable,  but  it  sometimes  occurs. 

Again,  it  may  happen,  and  often  does,  that  a 
minority  of  the  popular  vote  obtains  a  majority 
of  the  representatives.  In  the  case  assumed, 
parties  may  have  been  divided  in  the  several 
districts  as  follows  :  — 

4  PARTY  A. 

Majority  of     100  in  25  districts,  2,800  X  25  =  70,000  votes. 
Minority  of  1,500  in  15  districts,  2,000  X  15  =  30,000  votes. 
TOTAL,  100,000 

PARTY  B. 

Minority  of    100  in  25  districts,  2,700  X  25  =  67,500  votes. 
Majority  of  1,500  in  15  districts,  3,500  X  15  =  52,500  votes. 
TOTAL,  120,000 

In  this  assumed  case,  Party  A,  with  a  total  of 
100,000  votes,  obtains  twenty-five  representatives; 
while  Party  B,  with  a  total  of  120,000  votes, 
obtains  only  fifteen  representatives. 

Where  a  system  offers  in  theory  such  fruitful 
opportunities,  it  is  too  much  to  expect  party  man- 
agers to  refrain  from  using  them.  Consequently, 
the  district  system,  combined  with  party  politics, 
has  resulted  in  the  universal  spread  of  the  gerry- 
mander. It  is  difficult  to  express  the  opprobrium 
rightly  belonging  to  so  iniquitous  a  practice  as 
the  gerrymander;  but  its  enormity  is  not  appre- 
ciated, just  as  brutal  prize-fighting  is  not  repro- 
bated, providing  it  be  fought  according  to  the 


50          PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

rules.  Both  political  parties  practise  it,  and 
neither  can  condemn  the  other.  They  simply  do 
what  is  natural:  make  the  most  of  their  oppor- 
tunities as  far  as  permitted  by  the  constitution 
and  system  under  which  both  are  working.  The 
gerrymander  is  not  produced  by  the  iniquity  of 
parties,  it  is  the  outcome  of  the  district  system. 
If  representatives  are  elected  in  this  way,  there 
must  be  some  public  authority  for  outlining  the 
districts.  And  who  shall  be  the  judge  to  say 
where  the  line  shall  be  drawn  ?  Exact  equality  is 
impossible,  and  who  shall  set  the  limits  beyond 
which  inequality  shall  not  be  pressed?  Every 
apportionment  act(  that  has  been  passed  in  this 
or  any  other  country  has  involved  inequality ;  and 
it  would  be  absurd  to  ask  a  political  party  to  pass 
such  an  act,  and  give  the  advantage  of  the  ine- 
quality to  the  opposite  party.  Consequently, 
every  apportionment  act  involves  more  or  less  of 
the  gerrymander.  The  gerrymander  is  simply 
such  a  thoughtful  construction  of  districts  as  will 
economize  the  votes  of  the  party  in  power  by 
giving  it  small  majorities  in  a  large  number  of 
districts,  and  coop  up  the  opposing  party  with 
overwhelming  majorities  in  a  large  number  of 
districts.  This  may  involve  a  very  distortionate 
and  uncomely  "  scientific "  boundary,  and  the 
joining  together  of  distant  and  unrelated  locali- 
ties into  a  single  district;  such  was  the  case  in 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK'  51 

the  famous  original  act  of  Governor  Gerry  of 
Massachusetts,  whence  the  practice  obtained  its 
amphibian  name.1 


But  it  is  not  always  necessary  that  districts  be 
cut  into  distorted  shapes  in  order  to  accomplish 
these  unjust  results.  A  map  of  all  the  congres- 

1  The  term  "  Gerrymander,"  though  not  the  practice,  origi- 
nated with  the  Democratic  party  in  Massachusetts  in  1811,  when 
Elbridge  Gerry  was  elected  governor.  Says  Professor  Ware,  in 
The  American  Law  Review,  January,  1872,  from  whose  article 
the  accompanying  ill; Oration  is  taken:  — 

"  In  order  to  secure  tLeniselves  in  the  possession  of  the  government, 


52         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

sional  and  legislative  districts  of  the  United  States 
would  by  no  means  indicate  the  location  of  all  the 
outrageous  gerrymanders.  In  fact,  many  of  the 
worst  ones  have  been  so  well  designed  that  they 
come  close  within  all  constitutional  requirements. 
The  truth  is,  the  district  system  itself  is  so  faulty 
that  constitutional  restrictions  cannot  correct  it. 
The  national  Congress,  has  attempted  to  do  so  by 
requiring  the  districts  for  congressional  elections 
to  be  compact  and  of  contiguous  territory,  and 
of  nearly  equal  population.  But  the  law  is  every- 
where disregarded.  Parties  are  compelled  to  dis- 
regard it,  for  a  gerrymander  in  a  Democratic  State 
can  be  nullified  only  by  a  gerrymander  in  a  Re- 
publican State. 

f  As  a  result  of  the  district  system,  the  national 
House  of  Representatives  is  scarcely  a  representa- 

i^._tive  body.  In  the  Fifty-first  Congress,  which 
enacted  the  McKinley  tariff  law,  a  majority  of  the 
representatives  were  elected  by  a  minority  of  the 
voters. 


the  party  in  power  passed  the  famous  law  of  Feb.  11, 1812,  providing  for 
a  new  division  of  the  State  into  senatorial  districts,  so  contrived  that 
in  as  many  districts  as  possible  the  Federalists  should  be  outnumbered 
by  their  opponents.  To  effect  this  all  natural  and  customary  lines  were 
disregarded,  and  some  parts  of  the  State,  particularly  the  counties  of 
Worcester  and  Essex,  presented  singular  examples  of  political  geogra- 
phy. It  is  said  that  Gilbert  Stuart,  seeing  in  the  office  of  the  Columbian 
Centinel  an  outline  of  the  Essex  outer  district,  nearly  encircling  the 
rest  of  the  county,  added  with  his  pencil  a  beak  .to  Salisbury,  and 
claws  to  Salem  and  Marblehead,  as  shown  in  the  engraving,  exclaim- 
ing, 'There,  that  will  do  for  a  salamander.'  — '  Salamander,'  said  Mr. 
Russell,  the  editor, '  I  call  it  a  Gerry-mander.'  " 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK. 


53 


PEOPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 


a  ** 

— JMORGANl    , 

OWEN  { 1 — '*•  — T" 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK. 


55 


FIFTY-FIRST  CONGRESS  — ELECTION,  1888. 


PARTIES. 

CONGRESSIONAL 
VOTE. 

ELECTED.      P] 

IOPORTK 

Republican 

.     .    5,348,379 

164 

158 

Democrat  . 

.     .    5,502,581 

161 

162 

Prohibition 

.    .       184,937 

5 

Scattering 

.     .         56,889 

11,092,786 


325 


325 


CONGRESSIONAL  DISTRICTS,  SOUTH  CAROLINA,  1890. 


An  illustration  of  "  compact  and  contiguous  territory. 


56          PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

The  Republicans,  instead  of  having  a  majority  of 
three,  should  have  been  in  a  minority  of  four,  as 
against  the  Democrats.  The  Republicans,  with 
48.2  per  cent  of  the  votes,  elected  50.4  per  cent 
of  the  representatives;  and  the  Democrats,  with 
49.6  per  cent  of  the  votes,  elected  49.6  per  cent 
of  the  congressmen. 

That  this  Congress  did  not  represent  the  people, 
is  emphasized  by  the  "avalanche  "  of  1890. 


FIFTY-SECOND  CONGRESS  — ELECTION,  1890.1 

RTIES.        VOTE.    ELECTED. 


PER  CENT   PER  CENT  OF  REP- 
OF  VOTE.     RESENTATION. 


Republican 

4,217,266 

88 

42.9 

Democrat 

4,974,450 

235 

50.6 

Populist 

354,217 

9 

3.7 

Prohibition 

207,814 

2.1 

Independent 

76,788 

.7 

26.5 

71.1 

2.4 


9,830,535        332  100  100 

This  election  again  displays  the  fortuitous  results 
of  the  system.  The  Democratic  minority  of  49.6 
per  cent  of  the  congressmen  in  the  Fifty-first  Con- 
gress was  changed  to  a  Democratic  majority  of  71.1 
per  cent  in  the  Fifty-second  Congress,  while  in 
the  popular  vote  the  Democratic  proportion  of  49.6 
per  cent  of  the  total  was  increased  only  1  per  cent. 
The  Republicans,  with  42.9  per  cent  of  the  vote, 
secured  only  26.5  per  cent  of  the  representatives. 

1  Calculations  for  the  Fifty-second,  Fifty-third,  and  Fifty- 
fourth  Congresses  are  made  by  Mr.  Stoughton  Coolcy  in  Propor- 
tional Representation  Review,  March,  1894,  based  upon  vcturns  in 
the  Chicago  Daily  News  Almanac. 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK.  57 

The  Republican  vote  fell  off  4.9  per  cent  of  the 
total;  their  representation  decreased  24.1  per  cent. 
It  required  47,923  votes  to  elect  a  Republican, 
44,276  votes  to  elect  a  Populist,  and  only  21,078 
to  elect  a  Democrat.  The  Democratic  majority  of 
147  over  the  Republicans,  and  138  over  all,  should 
have  been  a  Democratic  majority  of  2. 

For  the  Fifty-third  Congress,  elected  in  1892,  the 
total  vote  polled  for  congressmen  was  12,032,203, 
of  which  the  Republicans  polled  5,031,360;  the 
Democrats,  5,670,148 ;  the  Populists,  1,046,392 ; 
the  Prohibitionists,  244,726;  and  39,577  were  scat- 
tering. The  result  of  this  poll  was  that  the  Repub- 
licans elected  131,  the  Democrats  213,  and  the 
Populists- 12  congressmen.  This  is  to  say,  the 
Republicans,  with  41.9  per  cent  of  the  total  vote, 
(a  decrease  of  1  per  cent  below  that  of  the  pre- 
vious election),  secured  36.8  per  cent  of  the  repre- 
sentatives, an  increase  of  10.3  per  cent;  the 
Democrats,  with  47.2  per  cent  of  the  vote  (a  de- 
crease of  3.4  per  cent),  got  59.8  per  cent  of  the 
representatives  ;  the  8.7  per  cent  of  the  Populists 
obtained  3.4  per  cent  of  the  representatives ;  the 
Prohibitionists'  2  per  cent  secured  nothing."  In- 
stead of  a  Democratic  majority  of  79  in  Congress, 
there  should  have  been  a  Democratic  minority  of 
10,  as  against  all  other  parties. 

The  stupendous  Republican  victory  of  1894  was 
equally  illusory.  The  total  vote  cast  for  congress- 


58         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

men  was  11,288,135.  Of  this  number  the  Repub- 
licans cast  5,461,202;  the  Democrats,  4,295,748; 
the  Populists,  1,323,644;  the  Prohibitionists,  182,- 
679;  and  24,862  were  scattering.  The  result  was 
the  election  of  245  Republican,  104  Democrat,  and 
7  Populist  congressmen.  Or,  in  other  words,  the 
Republicans,  with  48.4  per  cent  of  the  total  vote 
(an  increase  of  6.2  per  cent),  elected  68.8  per  cent 
of  the  congressmen ;  the  Democrats,  with  38.1  per 
cent  of  the  vote  (a  decrease  of  9.1  per  cent),  se- 
cured 29.2  per  cent  of  the  representatives;  the 
11.7  per  cent  of  the  Populists  obtained  2  per  cent 
of  the  representatives;  and  the  1.6  per  cent  of  the 
Prohibitionists  failed  of  recognition.  The  Repub- 
lican majority  of  134  in  the  present  Congress 
should  be  a  minority  of  7,  as  against  all  other 
parties. 

The  injustice  of  the  district  system  is  extreme 
in  its  effects  on  new  parties.  Such  parties  suffer 
for  two  reasons.  In  the  case  of  the  dominant  par- 
ties there  is  a  rough  equality,  because  a  Democratic 
gerrymander  in  one  State  is  likely  to  be  balanced 
in  another  by  a  Republican  gerrymander.  But  a 
new  party  cannot  establish  a  gerrymander  to  suit 
itself  until  it  gets  control  of  a  State  government. 
Also,  a  new  party  is  usually  scattered  throughout 
a  large  number  of  districts  and  States,  and  the  dis- 
trict system  prevents  its  members  from  combining 
to  elect  their  fair  share  of  representatives.  For 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK.          59 

example,  in  the  Fifty-first  Congress,  the  Prohibi- 
tionists should  have  had  5  representatives,  they 
received  none;  in  the  Fifty-third  Congress  the 
People's  party  should  have  had  31  instead  of  8, 
and  the  Prohibitionists  should  have  received  8 
instead  of  none  ;  and  in  the  Fifty-fourth  Congress 
the  Populists  were  entitled  to  42  votes  instead 
of  7. 

Many  examples  might  be  given  from  individual 
States  to  show  the  unrepresentative  character  of 
congressional  representation.  Those  States  which 
are  close  in  their  majorities,  and  whose  legislatures 
alternate  frequently,  show  an  endless  seesaw  of 
gerrymanders.  Ohio  has,  perhaps,  had  more  of 
these  partisan  displays  than  any  other  State.  It 
was  during  the  war  that  the  first  Republican  legis- 
lature overthrew  a  long-standing  Democratic  ap- 
portionment act.  The  results  were  brought  out 
forcibly  by  Mr.  Garfield  in  a  speech  in  Congress 
in  1870.  He  said :- 

"  When  I  was  first  elected  to  Congress,  in  the  fall  of  1862, 
the  State  of  Ohio  had  a  clear  Republican  majority  of  about 
25,000  ;  but,  by  the  adjustment  and  distribution  of  political 
power  in  the  State,  there  were  14  Democratic  representa- 
tives upon  this  floor,  and  only  5  Republicans.  The  State 
that  cast  a  majority  of  nearly  25,000  Republican  votes  was 
represented  in  the  proportion  of  one  Republican  arid  three 
Democrats.  In  the  next  Congress  there  was  no  great  politi- 
cal change  in  the  popular  vote  of  Ohio  —  a  change  of  only 
20,000  — but  the  result  was  that  seventeen  Republican  mem- 


60 


PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 


bers  were  sent  here  from  Ohio,  and  only  two  Democrats.  We 
find  that  only  so  small  a  change  as  20,000  changed  their 
representatives  in  Congress  from  fourteen  Democrats  and 
five  Republicans,  to  seventeen  Republicans  and  two  Demo- 
crats. 

"  Now,  no  man,  whatever  his  politics,  can  justly  defend  a 
system  that  may  in  theory,  and  frequently  does  in  practice, 
produce  such  results  as  these." 

The  Republicans  retained  power  in  the  Ohio 
legislature  from  1862  to  1876,  with  a  consequent 
unfair  advantage  in  the  distribution  of  congres- 
sional seats.  In  the  latter  year  a  Democratic  legis- 
lature passed  a  new  apportionment  act.  Since  that 
time  there  have  been  eight  such  acts,  the  results  of 
which  upon  the  fortunes  of  the  two  parties  are  de- 
picted by  the  following  statistical  analysis :  — 

REPRESENTATION  OF  THE  STATE  OF  OHIO  IN 
CONGRESS. 


$ 

REPRESENTATIVES. 

ID 

CzJ 

CONGRESSION- 

ACCORDING TO 

3 

o 

g 

AL  VOTE. 

ACTUAL. 

PROPOR- 

ACTUAL 

i 

3 

TIONAL. 

REPRESENTATION. 

8 

w 

>< 

Rep.     |    Dem. 

Rep. 

Dem. 

Rep. 

Dem. 

45th, 

1877-79 

314,529 

310,434 

12 

8 

10 

10 

1  Rep.  =  1£  Dem. 

46th, 

1879-81 

277,875 

264,737 

9 

11 

10 

10 

1  Dem.  =1£  Rep. 

47th, 

1881-83 

405,042 

340,572 

15 

5 

11 

9 

1  Rep.  =  2§  Dem. 

48th, 

1883-85 

306,674 

268,785 

8 

13 

11 

10 

1  Dem.  =  2  Rep. 

49th, 

1885-87 

395,596 

380,934 

10 

11 

11 

10 

1  Dem.  =  l\  Rep. 

50th, 

1887-89 

336,063 

325,629 

15 

6 

11 

10 

IRep.  =2^  Dem. 

51st, 

1889-91 

412,520 

395,639 

16 

5 

11 

10 

1  Rep.  =  3  Dem. 

52d, 

1891-93 

362,624 

350,528 

7 

14 

11 

101 

1  Dem.  =  2^  Rep. 

53d, 

1893-95 

397,320 

407,120 

9 

12 

10 

10 

1  Dem.  =  1£  Rep. 

54th, 

1895-97 

407,371 

274,670 

19 

2 

12 

82 

1  Rep.  =  6  Dem. 

1  One  Prohibitionist.       2  One  Populist. 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT  WORK.          61 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  Democrats  in  Ohio  have 
never,  since  1862,  had  a  majority  of  the  popular 
vote  on  national  questions,  except  in  1892 ;  yet  in 
four  elections  they  have  returned  a  majority  of  the 
congressmen.  Neither  are  party  calculations  al- 
ways realized.  In  the  Forty-fifth  Congress  the 
Democratic  gerrymander  returned  a  Republican 
majority  of  the  congressmen,  and  in  the  Fifty- 
third  Congress  a  Republican  gerrymander  returned 
a  Democratic  majority,  although  in  the  Fifty-fourth 
Congress  the  same  gerrymander  responded  well  to 
the  Republican  designs. 

In  Indiana,  in  1892,  under  a  Democratic  gerry- 
mander, the  Democrats  cast  for  congressmen  259,- 
190  votes,  and  elected  eleven  congressmen;  the 
Republicans  cast  only  5,522  less  votes,  namely, 
253,668,  but  elected  only  two  congressmen.  It 
required  126,834  Republican  votes  to  elect  one  con- 
gressman, against  only  23,565  Democratic  votes ; 
in  other  words,  one  Democratic  vote  was  worth  5.4 
Republican  votes.  The  Democrats,  casting  47.2 
per  cent  of  the  total  vote,  secured  85  per  cent  of 
the  representatives  ;  and  the  Republicans,  with  46. 2 
per  cent  of  the  vote,  secured  only  15  per  cent  of 
the  representatives.  The  smallest  majority  re- 
ceived by  any  Democratic  candidate  was  42,  the 
largest  was  3,081 ;  whereas  the  smallest  majority 
received  by  a  Republican  candidate  was  4,125,  and 
the  largest  was  8,724.  To  see  that  the  gerryman- 


62         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

der,  though  the  apparent,  is  not  the  essential,  evil 
of  the  district  system,  it  needs  only  to  be  noted 
that  in  the  election  of  1894,  in  Indiana,  with  the 
same  gerrymandered  districts  as  in  1892,  the  Re- 
publicans elected  the  entire  delegation  of  13 
members ;  yet  the  total  Republican  vote  for  con- 
gressmen in  the  State  was  only  50.5  per  cent 
(284,447)  of  the  total  vote,  and  the  Democratic 
vote  was  42  per  cent  (238,371)  of  the  total.1  The 
Republicans  are  entitled  to  only  7,  instead  of  13 
representatives  in  the  present  Congress,  and  the 
Democrats  of  the  State,  who  should  have  elected 
6  congressmen,  are  wholly  unrepresented. 

The  inequalities  of  the  district  system  are  not 
confined  to  the  United  States.  They  appear  in  all 
parliamentary  countries.  Some  interesting  results 
from  England  are  given  by  Sir  John  Lubbock  in 
his  tract  on  "Representation." 2  In  the  parliamen- 
tary elections  of  1886,  there  were  contested  460 
seats.  "  The  total  number  of  votes  given  were 
2,756,900,  of  which  1,423,500  were  for  Unionist, 
1,333,400  for  Home  Rule  candidates,  or  a  major- 
ity of  90,000  votes  for  maintaining  the  Union. 
According  to  the  votes  polled,  the  number  of  mem- 
bers returned  should  have  been  238  Unionists  and 
221  Home  Rulers,  which,  adding  the  members  re- 
turned without  a  contest,  viz.,  Ill  Unionists  and 

1  8.5  per  cent  going  to  Populists  and  Prohibitionists. 

2  The  Imperial  Parliament  Series,  London,  Swan  Sonnenschein 
&  Co.,  1890. 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WOEK.  63 

99  Home  Rulers,  would  have  given  349  Union- 
ists and  320  Home  Rulers,  or  a  majority  of  29. 
The  actual  numbers,  however,  were  394  Union- 
ists and  275  Home  Rulers.  The  Unionists,  there- 
fore, obtained  45  seats  more,  and  the  Home  Rulers 
45  fewer  .seats,  than  they  were  entitled  to  from 
the  votes  polled,  making,  of  course,  90  on  a  divis- 
ion. Thus,  then,  in  1874  the  Conservatives  ob- 
tained 38  seats  more  than  their  votes  entitled 
them  to,  counting  76  on  a  division.  In  1880,  on 
the  contrary,  the  Liberals  had  44  too  many,  count- 
ing 88  on  a  division.  .  .  .  Thus,  whatever  side 
has  the  majority,  we  are  confronted  with  a  violent 
contrast  between  the  voting  strength  in  the  con- 
stituencies', and  the  voting  strength  in  the  House 
of  Commons." 

"  In  my  own  county  of  Kent,"  continues  Sir 
John  Lubbock,  "  the  Liberals  polled  in  the  three 
divisions,  at  the  last  election,  over  13,000  votes, 
against  16,000  given  to  their  opponents,  and  yet 
the  latter  had  all  the  six  seats.  Taking  all  the 
contested  seats  in  the  county,  the  Liberals  polled 
32,000  votes  against  36,000,  and  yet  the  Conserva- 
tives carried  sixteen  members  and  the  Liberals 
only  two."  l 

"At  the  general  election  (in  Ireland)  in  1880, 
86  seats  were  contested.  Of  these  the  Home 
Rulers  secured  52,  the  Liberals  and  Conservatives 
together  only  34.  Yet  the  Home  Rule  electors 

i  Page  17. 


62         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

der,  though  the  apparent,  is  not  the  essential,  evil 
of  the  district  system,  it  needs  only  to  be  noted 
that  in  the  election  of  1894,  in  Indiana,  with  the 
same  gerrymandered  districts  as  in  1892,  the  Re- 
publicans elected  the  entire  delegation  of  13 
members ;  yet  the  total  Republican  vote  for  con- 
gressmen in  the  State  was  only  50.5  per  cent 
(284,447)  of  the  total  vote,  and  the  Democratic 
vote  was  42  per  cent  (238,371)  of  the  total.1  The 
Republicans  are  entitled  to  only  7,  instead  of  13 
representatives  in  the  present  Congress,  and  the 
Democrats  of  the  State,  who  should  have  elected 
6  congressmen,  are  wholly  unrepresented. 

The  inequalities  of  the  district  system  are  not 
confined  to  the  United  States.  They  appear  in  all 
parliamentary  countries.  Some  interesting  results 
from  England  are  given  by  Sir  John  Lubbock  in 
his  tract  on  "Representation."  2  In  the  parliamen- 
tary elections  of  1886,  there  were  contested  460 
seats.  "  The  total  number  of  votes  given  were 
2,756,900,  of  which  1,423,500  were  for  Unionist, 
1,333,400  for  Home  Rule  candidates,  or  a  major- 
ity of  90,000  votes  for  maintaining  the  Union. 
According  to  the  votes  polled,  the  number  of  mem- 
bers returned  should  have  been  238  Unionists  and 
221  Home  Rulers,  which,  adding  the  members  re- 
turned without  a  contest,  viz.,  Ill  Unionists  and 

1  8.5  per  cent  going  to  Populists  and  Prohibitionists. 

2  The  Imperial  Parliament  Series,  London,  Swan  Sonnenschein 
&  Co.,  1890. 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK.  63 

99  Home  Rulers,  would  have  given  349  Union- 
ists and  320  Home  Rulers,  or  a  majority  of  29. 
The  actual  numbers,  however,  were  394  Union- 
ists and  275  Home  Rulers.  The  Unionists,  there- 
fore, obtained  45  seats  more,  and  the  Home  Rulers 
45  fewer  .seats,  than  they  were  entitled  to  from 
the  votes  polled,  making,  of  course,  90  on  a  divis- 
ion. Thus,  then,  in  1874  the  Conservatives  ob- 
tained 38  seats  more  than  their  votes  entitled 
them  to,  counting  76  on  a  division.  In  1880,  on 
the  contrary,  the  Liberals  had  44  too  many,  count- 
ing 88  on  a  division.  .  .  .  Thus,  whatever  side 
has  the  majority,  we  are  confronted  with  a  violent 
contrast  between  the  voting  strength  in  the  con- 
stituencies, and  the  voting  strength  in  the  House 
of  Commons." 

"In  my  own  county  of  Kent,"  continues  Sir 
John  Lubbock,  "  the  Liberals  polled  in  the  three 
divisions,  at  the  last  election,  over  13,000  votes, 
against  16,000  given  to  their  opponents,  and  yet 
the  latter  had  all  the  six  seats.  Taking  all  the 
contested  seats  in  the  county,  the  Liberals  polled 
32,000  votes  against  36,000,  and  yet  the  Conserva- 
tives carried  sixteen  members  and  the  Liberals 
only  two."  l 

"At  the  general  election  (in  Ireland)  in  1880, 

86    seats   were   contested.     Of    these   the   Home 

Rulers  secured  52,  the  Liberals  and  Conservatives 

together  only  34.     Yet  the  Home  Rule  electors 

i  Page  17. 


66         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

basis  of  the  vote  for  Secretary  of  State,  the  Re- 
publicans should  have  had  50  State  representa- 
tives, the  Democrats  43,  the  Populists  5,  and  the 
Prohibitionists  2.  Instead,  the  Republicans  had 
82,  and  the  Democrats  18. 

Ohio  elected  72  Republicans,  35  Democrats,  to 
the  lower  house  in  1892.  Had  the  people  been 
truly  represented,  there  would  have  been  51  Re- 
publicans, 51  Democrats,  3  Prohibitionists,  and  2 
Populists. 

Michigan  in  1894,  with  a  popular  vote  for 
governor  of  237,215  Republicans,  130,823  Demo- 
crats, 30,002  Populists,  and  18,788  Prohibitionists, 
elected  to  the  lower  house  of  the  State  legislature 
99  Republicans  and  1  Democrat.  The  repre- 
sentation should  have  been  57  Republicans,  31 
Democrats,  7  Populists,  and  5  Prohibitionists. 

For  members  of  the  lower  house  of  the  New 
York  legislature  in  the  last  three  elections,  the 
vote  and  actual  elections,  contrasted  with  what 
would  have  been  the  proportionate  elections,  were 
as  follows :  — 

NEW  YORK  ASSEMBLY,   128  MEMBERS.     1892. 

PARTIES.          VOTE.        ELECTED.  PROPORTIONAL. 

Republican    ....  598,012                 54                    60 

Democrat  ......  644,988                74                   65 

Prohibition    ....  33,012                 .  .                      3 

Socialist  Labor  .     .     .  8,472 

Scattering 16,463 

1,301,947  128  128 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK.  67 


1893. 

Republican    ....     538,471  74  65 

Democrat 510,608  54  60 

Prohibition    ....       21,525  .  .  2 

Socialist  Labor  .    .    .         8,631  .  .  1 

Scattering 32,357 

1,111,592  128  1*28 


1894. 

Republican    ....  665,857  105  71 

Democrat 501,015  23  53 

Prohibition    ....  21,626  .  .  2 

Socialist  Labor  .    .    .  9,575  .  .  1 

Populist 6,914  .  .  1 

Scattering 9,339 

1,214,326  128  128 

The  table  on  the  following  page  is  compiled  by 
Mr.  Geo.  H.  Haynes,1  in  order  to  show  the  con- 
trast between  the  popular  vote  and  the  represen- 
tation in  the  New  England  legislatures. 

In  the  four  States,  Maine,  New  Hampshire, 
Vermont,  and  Massachusetts,  representation  in  the 
Senate  must,  according  to  the  Constitution,  be  pro- 
portioned to  population,  and  the  partisan  gerry- 
mander is  therefore  responsible  for  its  distortion. 
In  two  of  these  states,  Maine  and  Vermont,  it 
will  be  noticed  that  the  theory  of  the  gerrymander 
has  been  perfected  in  practice.  In  Rhode  Island 
and  Connecticut,  representation  is  fixed  by  the 

1  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social 
Science,  September,  1895.  "  Representation  in  New  England 
Legislatures." 


68         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 


NEW  ENGLAND  LEGISLATURES.    1894. 


PER  CT.  OF 

PER  CT. 

PER  CT. 

STATE. 

PARTY. 

YOTE  FOR 

IN 

IN 

GOVERNOR. 

SENATE. 

HOUSE. 

C  Republican 

64.3 

100 

96.7 

MAINE                   J  £em°crat 
|  Prohibition 

28.3 
2.5 

0 

0 

3.3 
0 

[  People's 

4.9 

0 

0 

(  Republican 

56.0 

87.5 

72.7 

NEW  HAMPSHIRE  j  Democrat 

40.9 

12.5 

27.3 

[  Prohibition 

2.1 

0 

0 

(Republican 

73.5 

100 

94.6 

VERMONT 

Democrat 

24.4 

0 

4.6 

People's 

1.3 

0 

0.4 

„ 

Prohibition 

0.8 

0 

0.4 

'  Republican 

56.5 

90 

81.3 

Democrat 

36.9 

10 

18.7 

MASSACHUSETTS    - 

People's 

2.7 

0 

0 

Prohibition 

3.0 

0 

0 

„  Labor 

0.9 

0 

0 

/"Republican 

RHODE  ISLAND     J  Democrat 
1  Prohibition 

53.1 
41.3 
4.1 

94.6 
5.4 
0 

95.8 
4.2 
0 

Labor 

1.1 

0 

0 

f  Republican 

53.5 

91.7 

81.3 

1  Democrat 
CONNECTICUT        -f 
j  Prohibition 

43.3 
1.5 

8.3 
0 

18.3 
0 

(  People's 

1.3 

0 

0.4 

Constitution  for  towns  and  cities,  regardless  of 
population.  In  the  lower  houses  of  these  States 
both  towns  and  population  are  represented,  and 
the  gerrymander  is  not  responsible  for  misrepre- 
sentation as  it  is  in  the  other  States  where  popu- 
lation alone  is  considered. 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK. 


69 


LA  CROSSE    CO. 


IS 


0, 

8D 


70         PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

Municipal  elections  give  results  equally  dispro- 
portionate. Three  aldermanic  elections  in  Chicago 
were  as  follows :  — 


ELECTION  OF  ALDERMEN.  —  CHICAGO. 

VOTE.  ELECTED. 


PROPOR- 
TIONAL. 
1893. 

Republican 89,162  20  15 

Democrat 88,280  12  14 

Independent  Democrat     .  17,118  1  3 

Independent 12,466  1  2 

Socialist  Labor     ....  168 

207,194  34  34 

1894. 

Republican 100,647                 22                  18 

Democrat 83,008                  12                   14 

People's 3,557                 .  .                    1 

Socialist  Labor     ....  572 

Independent 6,452 

194,236  34  34 

1895. 

Republican 136,233  28  19 

Democrat 86,287  5  12 

People's 17,199  .  .  2 

Prohibition 942 

Independent 10,649  .  .  1 

251,310  ~34  ~34 

In  St.  Paul,  a  minority  party  elects  a  majority 
of  the  board. 

ELECTION  OF  ALDERMEN.  —  ST.  PAUL.    1894. 

VOTE.  ELECTED. 

Republican      ....  12,180  4 

Democrat 11,327  7 

People's 1,117 

Prohibition      ....       477 
Independent   ....       444 

25,545  ~n 


U     '" 
THE  mSTRlCT^WTMl^AT   WORK.  71 

In  this  election,  six  aldermen,  a  majority  of  the 
board,  received  4,879  votes,  less  than  one-fifth  of 
the  votes  polled. 

The  Minneapolis  election  was  as  follows  :  — 

ELECTION  OF  ALDERMEN.—  MINNEAPOLIS.    1894. 


ELECTED. 

Republican  ......  17,705  9  6 

Democrat     ......  13,378  3  4 

People's  .......    2,132  .  .  1 

Prohibition  ......    1,484  .  .  1 

Scattering    ......  4 

34,703  "l2  12 

The  most  startling  and  seemingly  impossible 
results  ar,e  found  in  New  York  City,  where,  in 
1892,  Tammany  Hall,  with  59  per  cent  of  the 
votes,  elected  every  one  of  the  thirty  aldermen. 
This  election  is  to  be  compared  with  the  State 
senates  in  Maine  and  Vermont.1 

ELECTION  OF  ALDERMEN.  —  NEW  YORK  CITY,  1892. 

VOTTT  WT  TiTTTi-n  PROPOB- 

VOTE.  ELECTED.  TIOXAL. 

Tammany    ......  166,693  30  19 

County  Democracy  .    .    .      4,384 

Republican  ......    99,463  .  .  12 

Prohibition  ......      2,105 

Populist  and  Socialist  .    .      7,359  ^  1 

280,007  30  30 

In  the  election  of  1894,  strangely  enough,  the 
results  were  nearly  proportionate. 

i  See  p.  68, 


72         PEOPOETIONAL  EEPEESENTATION- 


ELECTION  OF  ALDEKMEN.  —  NE W  YORK  CITY,   1894. 


VOTE.  ELECTED. 


PROPOR- 
TIONAL. 


Republican 112,316  14  13 

Tammany 106,238  14  13 

State  Democracy  ....    33,900  2  4 
Socialist  Labor     ....      5,296 

Scattering 7,861 

265,611  30  30 


In  the  foregoing  statistical  exhibits,  political 
parties  have  been  treated  as  corporate  entities ; 
and  the  revelations  of  inequality  have  been  based 
upon  the  total  number  of  votes  cast  for  each,  re- 
gardless of  the  variety  of  opinions  and  interests 
within  the  party.  This  comparison  does  not  re- 
veal the  extent  of  a  still  more  serious  evil,  the 
fact  that  nearly  one-half  the  votes  are  cast  for 
unsuccessful  candidates.  The  candidates  who  are 
actually  elected,  while  they  may  be  said  to  repre- 
sent their  parties,  do  not  represent  all  the  voters 
within  the  parties.  They  are  elected  only  in  the 
strongholds.  Parties  tend  to  become  fecfcional- 
ized,  and  their  antagonisms  are  thereby  intensi- 
fied. Of  the  105  Democratic  representatives  in 
the  Fifty-fourth  Congress,  only  14  are  from  the 
Northern  States,  while  only  28  of  the  241  Repub- 
licans come  from  the  South.  As  the  following 
table  will  show,  there  are  3,062,383  Democratic 
voters  in  the  Union  who  are  not  represented  by 
congressmen  in  whose  nomination  and  election 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK.          73 

they  have  had  a  voice.  The  large  majority  of 
them  are  from  the  Northern  States ;  and  they  must 
be  content  to  have  their  views  on  national  ques- 
tions represented  by  men  from  an  entirely  dis- 
similar section  of  country,  with  different  interests 
and  prejudices.  The  same  is  true  of  Southern 
Republicans.  The  table  on  pp.  74  and  75  shows 
that  44 1  per  cent  of  the  voters  are  in  this  way 
unrepresented  in  Congress. 

This  table  shows  the  percentage  of  unrepre- 
sented voters  in  a  "  landslide "  Congress,  and 
might  therefore  be  considered  as  an  extreme  case. 
Mr.  Salem  Butcher,  in  his  work  on  minority 
representation,  published  in  1872,  made  similar 
calculations  for  three  congressional  elections  in 
which  there  were  only  two  political  parties  con- 
cerned, and  the  representation  was  fairly  propor- 
tionate (see  Table,  p.  76). 

In  the  Assembly  of  New  York  State,  as  shown 
by  the  table  on  p.  76,  the  voters  are  misrepre- 
sented, not  only  in  the  numerical  proportion,  but 
also  in  the  personnel  of  assemblymen.  Only  23 
assemblymen  represent  501,000  Democrats,  and 
13  of  these,  constituting  a  caucus  majority,  are 
elected  by  47,700  Tammany  votes;  352,000 
Democrats  in  the  State  at  large  have  no  spokes- 
men whom  they  can  truly  acknowledge  as  their 
own.  Republican  voters  of  the  city,  too,  must 
depend  upon  rural  Republicans  for  the  protec- 


74 


PEOPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 


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THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT  WORK. 


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76 


PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 


VOTES  FOR  CONGRESSMEN. 


BEPBESENTED. 

UHBEPBE- 
SENTED. 

VOTES. 

MEMBERS. 

PEB 
CENT. 

VOTES. 

PEB 
CENT. 

Fortieth  Congress. 
Republican  .    .    . 
Democrat.    .     .     . 

1,751,804 
583,813 

142 
49 

•       • 

427,841 
1,242,115 

•      • 

TOTAL   .... 

2,335,617 

191 

58 

1,669,956 

42 

Forty-first  Congress. 
Republican  .     .    . 
Democrat.    .    .     . 

2,356,421 
1,167,914 

159 
83 

•    • 

820,824 
1,731,254 

•    • 

TOTAL    .... 

3,524,335 

242 

58 

2,552,078 

42 

Forty-second  Congress. 
Republican  .    .    . 
Democrat.    .    .    . 

1,826,338 
1,360,170 

136 
106 

•    • 

960,209 
1,366,330 

•    • 

TOTAL   .... 

3,186,508 

242 

58 

5,513,539 

42 

tion  of  their  interests.  Altogether,  44.4  per  cent 
of  the  voters  who  actually  cast  their  ballots  are 
unrepresented. 

VOTES  FOR  ASSEMBLYMEN,  NEW  YORK,  1894. 


PABTY. 

BEPBESENTED. 

TJNBEPBE- 
SENTED. 

VOTES. 

MEMBEBS. 

PEB 

CENT. 

VOTES. 

PEB 

CENT. 

Republican     .    . 
Democrat  .    .     . 
Tammany  .     .     . 
Socialist  Labor  . 

585,937 
40,840 
47,701 

105 
10 
13 

• 

79,920 
352,838 
59,636 
9,575 
6,914 
21,626 
9,339 

Prohibition     .     . 

•     • 

.    .    . 

•       • 

TOTAL     .    .    . 

674,478 

128 

55.6 

539,848 

44.4 

THE  DISTBICT  SYSTEM  AT  WORK. 


77 


In  the  Board  of  Aldermen  of  New  York  City, 
in  1894,  although  the  parties  are  represented  in 
nearly  numerical  proportion,  yet  52  per  cent  of 
the  voters  are  actually  unrepresented. 

VOTES  FOB  ALDERMEN,  NEW  YORK  CITY,  1894. 


PARTY. 

REPRESENTED. 

UNREPRE- 
SENTED. 

VOTES. 

MEMBEBS. 

PEB 
CENT. 

VOTES. 

PEB 
CENT. 

Republican  .     .    . 
Tammany     .    .     . 
State  Democracy  . 
Socialist  Labor 
Scattering     .    . 

66,683 
52,679 
8,702 

14 
14 
2 

•       • 

45,633 
53,559 
25,198 
5,296 
7,861 

TOTAL  .... 

128,064 

30 

48.1 

137,547 

51.9 

These  exhibits  for  New  York  State  and  City 
are,  of  course,  typical  for  all  assemblies  elected  by 
single  districts.  Nearly  one-half  the  voters  are 
without  personal  representation  in  the  law-making 
bodies.  The  significance  of  this  fact  is  not  readily 
perceived.  It  is  one  phase  of  the  conditions 
which  give  the  local  machines  their  hold  upon 
the  parties.  In  the  strongholds  the  machines  are 
supreme  because  they  have  no  fear  of  independent 
movements,  and  where  the  minority  is  hopeless 
the  machines  are  left  in  control  from  sheer  indif- 
ference of  the  voters.  The  party  conventions, 
therefore,  which  nominate  general  officers  for  city, 
State,  and  nation,  are  entirely  controlled  by  the 
local  machines.  In  the  legislatures,  however,  the 


78  PROPORTIONAL  EEPEESENTATION. 

machines  frogoa  the  strongholds  control  the  situa- 
tion, and  give  character  to  the  party  as  a  whole. 
In  either  case,  the  rank  and  file  of  the  voters  have 
but  little  direct  influence  in  politics. 

The  significant  feature  of  the  district  system  is 
not  only  the  fact  that  voters  have  a  choice  only 
between  the  candidates  of  the  dominant  political 
parties ;  it  is  also  significant  that  a  very  small 
proportion  of  voters  hold  the  balance  of  power 
between  these  two  parties.  In  the  congressional 
election  of  1890,  which  substituted  a  Democratic 
majority  of  127  for  a  Republican  majority  of  3, 
this  result  was  brought  about  by  a  change  of  only 
5  per  cent  of  the  total  vote,1  the  Republicans  losing 
that  proportion,  and  the  Democrats  gaining  only 
2  per  cent.  On  the  other  hand,  the  election  of 
1894,  which  turned  a  Democratic  majority  of 

79  into  a  Republican   majority  of   134,  was  the 
work  of   9.1  per  cent  of  the  voters,  who   aban- 
doned the  Democratic  party. 

In  Indiana  the  remarkable  overthrow,  in  1894, 
of  a  Democratic  delegation  of  eleven  members, 
and  two  Republicans,  Ijjprtsolid  delegation  of  thir- 
teen Republicans,  was  effected  by  only  5.2  per 
cent  of  the  voters  who  left  the  Democrats,  while 
the  Republican  vote  was  increased  by  only  4.3 
per  cent  of  the  total.2 

In  the  Massachusetts  Senate,  elected  in  1891, 
1  See  pp.  56,  57.  2  See  p.  62. 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WO 

a  change  of  less  than  5  per  cent  fj$m  the  vote 
of  those  elected  to  the  candidates  in'rheir  respect- 
ive districts  who  received  the  next  highest  vote 
would  have  defeated  every  member  of  the  senate, 
and  a  change  of  less  than  lj  per  cent  of  the  vote 
in  twenty-one  districts  would  have  made  the  State 
Senate  Democratic  instead  of  Republican.1 

Professor  Giddings2  asserts  that  "the  total 
possible  gain  or  loss  to  a  political  party  through 
strictly  independent  voting  does  not  exceed,  under 
the  most  favorable  circumstances,  5  per  cent  of 
the  maximum  total  vote  of  a  presidential  year." 
This  statement  is  sustained  by  even  the  unprece- 
dented "landslides"  of  the  past  six  years. 

It  is  in  the  exaggerated  weight  of  small  factions 
holding  the  balance  of  power  between  the  two 
parties  that  is  to  be  found  the  secret  of  the  cor- 
rupt influences  already  described.  The  great 
majority  of  the  voters  are  conservative,  and  do 
not  readily  change  their  party.  Especially  in 
close  districts,  therefore,  interested  elements  can 
dictate  terms  to  both  parties.  This,  too,  gives 
the  bribable  vote  an  infhtence  far  in  excess  of  its 
proportions.  Professor  J.  J.  McCook 3  finds  in 
twenty-one  towns  of  Connecticut  that  15.9  per 

1  J.  M. Berry,  "Proportional Representation,"  Worcester,  1892. 

2  Political  Science  Quarterly,  vol.  viii.,  p.  117  ff.,  "The  Na- 
ture and  Conduct  of  Political  Majorities." 

8  Forum,  September,  1892.  "The  Alarming  Proportion  of 
Venal  Voters," 


80         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

cent  of   the   voters   are  venal.      The    proportion 
ranges  from  3  per  cent  to  50  per  cent.     The  aver- 
age for  the  city  and  county  is  about  12i  per  cent. 
The  proportion  in  other  States  is  doubtless  much 
less ;  but  even  then  it  is  plain  that  the  bribable 
voters  themselves  are  adequate  to  hold  the  balance 
of  power  between  the  parties.     The  single-mem-  I 
bered  district,  therefore,  places  a  magnificent  pre- 1 ' 
mium  upon  bribery. 

We  have  seen  how  unequally  parties  are  rep- 
resented in  the  city,  State,  and  nation.  Our  repre- 
sentative system  was  contrived  to  represent  not 
parties,  but  sections.  The  efforts  toward  its  im- 
provement have  been  directed  not  toward  equality 
of  party  representation,  but  equality  of  district 
representation.  Congressional  statutes  and  State 
constitutions  require  the  districts  to  be  of  "equal" 
population.  But  this  is  not  enforced.  South 
Carolina  has  a  "white  "  district  as  low  as  134,369 
(Census,  1890)  ;  but  the  sole  "black  "  and  Repub- 
lican district,  the  seventh,1  contains  216,512  popu- 
lation. In  Texas  the  districts  range  from  102,000 
to  210,000;  in  Kansas  from  167,000  to  278,000; 
and  in  Pennsylvania  from  131,000  to  310,000 
(both  extremes  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia).  In 
Illinois  in  1892  the  four  Chicago  districts  had  an 
average  population  of  297,980,  while  the  sixteen 
country  districts  averaged  only  164,914. 

1  See  Diagram,  p.  55. 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT   WORK.          81 

State  and  municipal  representation  is  still  more 
unequal.  In  New  York  City  the  State  assembly 
districts  are  identical  with  the  aldermanic  dis- 
tricts. Says  the  Report  of  the  New  York  Senate 
Committee  on  cities:1  "In  the  common  council,  as 
well  as  in  the  legislature,  a  voting  constituency 
of  7,000  has  the  same  representation  as  a  like 
constituency  of  24,000.  The  principle  of  numer- 
ical equality,  therefore,  finds  no  application  what- 
ever in  the  common  council  of  New  York  City. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  the  principle  of  locality 
representation.  The  interests  of  the  first  and  sec- 
ond districts  are  in  all  things  practically  alike ;  the 
total  vote  of  the  two  districts  is  14,498.  The 
interests  of  the  twenty-third  district  are  in  many 
regards  distinct  from  those  of  the  first  and  second. 
The  territorial  area  of  the  first  and  second  com- 
bined is  634  acres,  that  of  the  twenty-third  is 
1,881  acres;  and  yet  the  twenty-third,  with  almost 
twice  the  population  of  the  first  and  second,  and 
three  times  the  area  as  well,  has  but  one  vote  as 
against  the  two  accorded  to  both  the  smaller  area 
and  the  smaller  constituency." 

These  statistics  prove  the  excessive  inequality 
and  minority  domination  of  the  present  system 
wherever  applied.  But  we  have  not  yet  reached 
the  end  of  the  story.  We  must  enter  the  legis- 
lative halls  in  order  to  see  the  final  chapter.  To 

1  P.  92. 


82         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

say  nothing  further  of  the  rule  by  the  speaker 
of  the  House  and  by  the  legislative  committees, 
through  which  power  is  taken  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  assembly  itself,  there  is  on  all  party  ques- 
tions the  imperium  in  imperio  of  the  party  caucus. 
If  one  party  in  a  legislature  has  60  representa- 
tives out  of  100,  the  policy  of  the  legislature  is 
not  dictated  by  an  open  conference  of  the  60  with 
the  40 ;  but  the  majority  party  withdraws,  and  in 
secret  conclave  determines  by  a  majority  vote  what 
shall  be  its  united  action.  Thus  31  members  —  a 
majority  of  the  60,  but  a  minority  of  the  whole  — 
may  determine  the  policy  of  the  legislature,  and 
enact  the  laws  of  the  people.  This  is  no  fanciful 
sketch.  The  power  of  the  party  caucus  is  well 
known.  A  man  who  "  bolts  "  the  caucus  can  have 
no  influence  whatever  in  legislation.  He  has  meas- 
ures of  his  own,  which  he  wishes  to  see  enacted 
into  laws.  These  may  be  appropriations  of  money 
for  improvements,  or  for  State  or  national  institu- 
tions in  his  own  district.  They  may  be  good 
measures,  or  they  may  be  bad.  But  he  knows 
that,  in  order  to  carry  them,  he  cannot  afford  to 
stand  against  the  wishes  of  his  fellow-partisans 
on  other  measures.  Thus  every  representative  is 
in  the  power  of  his  party  caucus.  He  cannot  stay 
out  of  the  caucus,  and  when  he  enters  he  must 
abide  by  its  decisions.  To  say  that  legislatures  are 
deliberative  assemblies,  under  such  circumstances, 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT  WORK.          83 

is  ironical.  They  are  rather  war-camps.  Delib- 
eration involves  consultation  between  opposing  in- 
terests and  opinions,  and  the  development  of  a 
compromise  policy,  which  will  be  modified  more 
or  less  by  all  who  have  a  voice.  But  the  caucus 
rule,  dominated  in  the  interests  of  the  party  rather 
than  of  the  people,  based  on  an  electoral  system 
which  usually  gives  a  political  party  a  clear  ma- 
jority, begets  intolerance  and  the  overriding  of 
minorities.  The  party  emerges  from  its  caucus 
like  an  army  from  its  fortress,  runs  upon  the 
enemy,  listens  to  no  cry  for  quarter  or  compro- 
mise, beheads  its  own  deserters,  and  then  carouses 
over  its  victory. 

We  have  now  been  able  to  follow  the  various 
evil  phases  of  recent  American  political  life  di- 
rectly or  remotely  to  their  root  in  the  system  of 
electing  single  representatives  from  limited  dis- 
tricts, —  a  system  which  we  have  inherited  un- 
changed through  six  centuries  of  political  and 
social  evolution.  At  the  present  time,  when 
political  parties  based  on  social  questions  divide 
the  people  and  seek  representation,  we  are  using 
a  system  of  representation  based_onjocality.  The 
political  parties  inevitably  seize  upon  this  machin- 
ery and  use  it  for  party  ends.  Thus  violently  1 
distorted,  it  represents  neither  sections  nor  parties,  j 
Instead,  it  has  divided  the'  people  in  every  district 


84         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

into  two  camps,  each  dictated  by  its  own  party 
machine  and  spoilsmen. 

These  two  machines  are  often  leagued  together. 
Professor  Bryce  has  pointed  out  the  community  of 
interests  which  exists  between  them  on  occasion 
of  independent  reform  movements,  when  they 
actually  combine  against  the  reformers.1  They 
are  also  in  a  more  or  less  permanent  coalition. 
Men  who  are  jointly  interested  in  corporations 
which  seek  legislation  and  franchises  are  osten- 
sibly opposed  to  each  other  as  prominent  managers 
of  the  different  political  organizations.  Though 
differing  in  politics,  they  unite  the  two  machines 
in  the  promotion  of  their  own  corporate  interests. 
The  perfection  of  this  unity  of  interests  seems  to 
have  been  reached  in  various  cities  where,  as  in 
Cincinnati,  the  same  man  is  reported  to  be  the 
"  boss "  of  both  political  organizations.2  This 
coalition  extends  to  Federal  politics.  Recently  a 
leading  national  manager  has  been  publicly  ac- 
cused, by  a  reputable  member  of  his  own  party,  of 
affording  campaign  assistance  to  the  manager  of 
the  opposing  party  in  return  for  congressional  aid 
to  a  corporation  client.  Both  machines  in  nation, 
State,  and  city  are  the  tools  of  the  corporations 
and  speculators  who  plunder  the  public,  Conse- 

1  See  Bryce,  "  American  Commonwealth,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  111. 

2  See  "  Proceedings  of  the  Cleveland  Conference  for  Good  City 
Government,"  p.  318,  Philadelphia,  National  Municipal  League, 
1895. 


THE  DISTRICT  SYSTEM  AT  WORK.  85 

quently,  those  voters  who  would  be  independent, 
and  would  gladly  revolt  against  ring  rule,  have  no 
place.  They  cannot  elect  an  independent  candi- 
date unless  they  carry  a  majority  of  their  petty 
ward  or  district.  This  is  almost  impossible  in  the 
face  of  the  party  organizations.  They  can  do 
nothing  but  combine  with  one  machine  against 
another.  Hence  come  hopelessness  and  apathy  of 
the  better  classes  of  citizens.  Hence  also  come  \ 
those  violent  explosions  and  hysterics  of  reform, 
those  popular  uprisings,  which  occasionally  break 
down  the  barriers  of  machine  rule,  but  relapse 
again,  like  a  mob  in  contest  with  troops.  The 
gerrymander  and  inequality  in  the  representation 
of  parties  are  bad  enough;  but  the  deadly  evil  of 
the  system  is  the  expulsion  of  ability  and  public 
spirit  from  politics,  and  the  consequent  dictator- 
ship of  bosses  and  private  corporations. 


86         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

THE  GENERAL  TICKET,  THE  LIMITED  VOTE, 
THE  CUMULATIVE  VOTE. 

ENOUGH  has  been  said  to  show  the  array  of  evils 
which  spring  from  the  single-membered  district 
system.  These  evils  have  not  escaped  observation, 
and  various  attempts  have  been  made  to  remedy 
them.  Especially  in  France  have  interesting  ex- 
periments been  made  by  the  substitution  of  "  scru- 
tin  de  liste"  or  the  general  ticket.  Under  this 
method  each  constituency  elects  several  members, 
each  elector  has  as  many  votes  as  there  are  mem- 
bers to  be  elected,  and  those  candidates  are  de- 
clared successful  whose  votes  stand  at  the  head  of 
the  list.  In  this  way  the  majority  party  gets  the  en- 
tire list  and  the  minority  is  wholly  unrepresented. 

There  are  two  applications  of  this  system  which 
lead  to  important  differences  in  the  final  results. 
The  first  is  that  adopted  in  several  instances  in 
the  United  States  in  the  election  of  boards  of 
county  commissioners  arid  boards  of  education, 
where  the  entire  assembly  is  elected  on  a  single 
ticket.  With  such  a  system,  the  question  of  equal 
representation  plays  no  part  whatever.  The  mi- 
nority parties  are  without  a  single  representative. 
But  the  system  usually  results  in  the  election  of 


THE  GENERAL    TICKET.  87 

abler  men  than  the  district  system.  This  would 
naturally  be  expected  from  the  fact  that  a  party, 
in  making  nominations  for  a  large  area,  cannot 
afford  to  nominate  obscure  men.  For  example, 
the  city  of  Cleveland,  Ohio,  recently  introduced, 
with  the  sanction  of  the  State  legislature,  a  far- 
reaching  reform  in  its  system  of  public  schools,  one 
feature  of  which  is  the  election  of  a  school-board  of 
seven  members  on  a  general  ticket.  In  the  first  elec- 
tion under  this  plan  the  vote  stood  as  follows  :  - 

REPUBLICAN.  DEMOCRAT. 

Buss    ....  15,714  Dodge      .  .  13,661 

Boutell    .    .    .  15,595  Goulden  .  .  13,551 

Backus    .    .    .  15,385  Pollner    .  .  13,306 

House.    .    .    .  15,860  Ryan  .    .  .  12,851 

Daykin  .    .    .  16,198  Burke.    .  .  12,814 

McMillan    .    .  15,690  Hoffman.  .  12,777 

Ford   ....  16,036  Plent  .    .  .  12,804 

TOTAL  110,518                        TOTAL  91,764 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  Republicans  obtained 
the  entire  board ;  but  had  there  been  a  change  of 
only  1,000  to  2,000  votes  from  Republicans  to 
Democrats,  the  Democrats  would  have  carried 
their  entire  list. 

The  Cook  County  (Illinois)  commissioners  are 
elected  on  a  general  ticket,  with  the  result  that 
in  1892  the  Democrats,  with  a  vote  of  133,000, 
elected  their  entire  list  of  10  candidates,  and  the 
Republicans,  with  100,000  voters,  were  unrepre- 
sented. In  1893  the  Republicans,  with  votes 
ranging  from  70,926  to  72,554,  elected  9,  and  the 


88         PEOPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

Democrats,  with  votes  ranging  from  69,305  to 
70,980,  elected  one.  This  was  the  first  election 
in  many  years  when  both  parties  had  representa- 
tion on  the  board. 

The  second  application  of  the  general  ticket 
is  a  compromise  between  the  single-membered 
district  and  the  general  ticket.  Districts  are 
retained,  but  they  are  enlarged,  the  number  is 
lessened,  and  a  solid  delegation  to  the  legislature 
of  from  five  to  twenty  representatives  is  elected 
on  a  general  ticket  for  each  district,  by  a  majority 
or  plurality  vote.  For  example,  the  county  of 
Cuyahoga  (including  the  city  of  Cleveland)  sends 
repeatedly  a  solid  delegation  of  six  Republican 
representatives  to  the  Ohio  State  legislature,  and 
not  one  Democrat.  The  county  of  Hamilton  (in- 
cluding the  city  of  Cincinnati)  sends  a  solid  dele- 
gation of  nine  Democrats. 

Representatives  to  Congress  in  the  first  half 
century  of  our  constitutional  history  were  elected 
by  this  system.  Each  State  sent  to  Congress  a 
solid  delegation  of  one  party  0r  another,  elected 
either  by  the  State  legislature  or  by  popular  vote. 
So  unjust  did  the  method  prove  to  be  that  gradu- 
ally the  single-member  district  was  substituted  by 
individual  State  action,  and  finally  Congress,  in 
1842,  made  the  latter  obligatory  in  all  States. 

Presidential  electors  are  still  chosen  by  this 
t  system,  though  the  State  of  Michiga\i  made,  in  the 


THE  LIMITED   VOTE.  89 

election  of  1892,  a  notable  departure,  by  substitut- 
ing the  district  system.  The  legislature  of  1893, 
however,  controlled  by  an  opposing  party,  repealed 
the  law,  and  returned  to  the  general  ticket. 

It  will,  of  course,  be  observed  that  a  legislative 
body  elected  upon  this  basis  will  not  wholly  ex- 
clude a  minority  party.  Indeed,  the  experience 
of  France  seems  to  show  that  as  far  as  equality  of 
representation  is  concerned,  the  general  ticket  — 
scrutin  de  liste  —  is  as  equitable  as  the  single  district 
ticket  —  scrutin  d' arrondissement.  In  the  election 
of  members  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  1885, 
conducted  according  to  scrutin  de  liste,  the  Repub- 
licans, with  4,300,000  votes,  obtained  366  seats, 
whereas  their  numbers  entitled  them  to  only  311; 
while  the  Conservative-Monarchists,  with  3,550,- 
000  votes,  obtained  202  seats  against  their  rightful 
proportion  of  257,  —  a  result  not  materially  differ- 
ent from  that  of  the  district  system  in  the  United 
States.  The  general  ticket  was  abandoned  in 
1889,  after  the  trial  at  this  one  election ;  and  the 
French  method  at  present  is  the  same  as  that  of 
other  countries. 

The  general  ticket  presents  exactly  the  same 
fault  as  the  single-membered  district  —  it  divides 
the  voters  into  two  camps  with  no  representation 
of  the  minority,  and  commits  the  control  of  elec- 
tions to  the  party  machines.  Its  only  difference  is  ^ 
that  it  makes  'the  area*  of  election  larger. 


90         PEOPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

A  modification  of  the  general  ticket,  intended 
to  give  the  minority  party  a  limited,  though  not 
necessarily  proportional,  representation,  is  the 
so-called  Limited  Vote.  This  was  used  for  nine 
years  in  the  election  of  aldermen  in  New  York 
by  "three-cornered"  constituencies,  where,  with 
three  to  be  elected,  each  voter  had  but  two  votes 
instead  of  three.  The  majority  party  therefore 
could  usually  elect  only  two  candidates.  In  Bos- 
ton since  1893  there  have  been  elected  annually 
twelve  aldermen  at  large,  but  each  voter  has  only 
seven  votes.  The  majority  party  therefore  elects 
seven,  and  the  minority  five.  Following  is  the 
election  return  for  1894.  The  two  principal  par- 
ties nominated  but  seven  candidates  each,  while 
minor  parties  nominated  a  smaller  number.  The 
candidates  elected  are  those  twelve  who  receive 
the  highest  number  of  votes,  as  indicated  below. 

VOTES  CAST  FOR  ALDERMEN,  BOSTON,  1894. 

REPUBLICAN.  DEMOCRAT.  INDEPENDENT 

REPUBLICAN. 

Pettier,         10,894 
Hallstrom,    12,976 


Allen, 

31,276 

Barry,            28,592 

Bryant, 

28,630- 

Dever,           27,642 

Dyar, 

24,945 

Flood,            30,718 

Folsom, 

29,534 

Lee,               26,115 

Presho, 

26,479 

Lomasney,    26,657 

Sanford, 

26,062 

McClellan,   24,069 

Witt, 

25,836 

O'Brien,        24,587 

192,762  188,380  23,870 

Independent  Democrat,  Dolan,  10,234 ;  scattering,  19,667. 

Total  vote  for  all  parties,  434,913.    Republicans  elect  seven; 
Democrats  elect  five, 


THE  CUMUL^VE  VOTE.  91 

It  will  be  seen  froiivithe  above  return  that  the 
limited  vote  creates  an  artificial  representation  of 
the  two  dominant  parties,  and  permits  no  repre- 
sentation whatever  of  minor  parties  and  indepen^/ 
dent  movements.  Parties  are  not  represented  in 
proportion  to  this  popular  vote,  else  the  above 
election  wgrtild  have  returned  but  six  Republicans, 
one  indej^fident  Republican,  and  five  Democrats. 
The  fact  6iat  the  dominant  parties  nominate  only 
seven  candidates  makes  a  nomination  almost  equiv- 
alent to  an  election,  the  voters  of  the  majority 
party  having  no  choice  whatever,  and  the  voters 
of  the  minority  having  only  a  possible  choice  of 
two  out.  of  the  seven. 

The  limited  vote  is  an  interesting  example  of 
the  way  in  which  the  very  classes  against  whom 
a  reform  movement  is  aimed  may  divert  it  to 
their  profit.  This  method  of  election  does  not 
permit  independence ;  it  rather  tightens  the  hold 
of  the  party  organizations,  and  is  in  harmony  with 
those  well-known  developments  of  municipal  poli- 
tics where  the  two  party  machines  agree  to  divide 
the  spoils.  It  is  paralleled  by  the  "  bi-partisan  " 
commissions,  which,  instead  of  being  non-partisan, 
are  all-partisan.  And  it  is  a  long  step  in  the  di- 
rection of  that  highest  development  of  machine 
politics  referred  to  in  the  preceding  chapter, 
where  one  man  is  the  "boss"  of  both  political^ 
organizations.  The  limited  vote  in  Boston  has 


92         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

not  appreciably  improved  the  type  of  aldermen, 
and  cannot  be  said  to  have  accomplished  any 
result  except  a  permanent  alliance  of  the  two 
machines.  In  New  York  the  law  was  repealed 
after  a  trial  of  nine  years. 

The  general  ticket  has  been  shown  to  be  crude, 
even  barbarous,  in  its  destruction  of  minorities. 
The  limited  vote  is  less  barbarous,  but  it  does  not 
widen  the  field  for  independence.  The  Cumu- 
lative Vote  is  a  further  modification  of  the  gen- 
eral ticket  in  the  direction,  apparently,  of  freedom 
for  the  voter.  According  to  this  plan,  the  elector 
has  as  many  votes  as  there  are  representatives 
to  be  elected,  but  he  may  dispose  of  them  as  he 
pleases.  Not  only  may  he  distribute  them  one 
by  one  among  the  candidates  of  one  or  all  parties, 
as  in  the  general  ticket  or  limited  vote,  but  he*- 
may  cumulate  them  upon  one  or  more  candi-, 
dates.  In  this  way  a  small  minority,  which  would' 
have  no  opportunity  in  the  limited  vote,  may  elect 
a  small  number  of  candidates  by  cumulating  all 
its  votes  on  one  or  more.  For  example,  in  the 
election  of  Boston  aldermen,  given  above,  if  the 
Independent  Republicans  could  have  cumulated 
their  23,870  votes  upon  one  of  their  candidates, 
instead  of  dividing  them  singly  between  two,  and 
being  compelled  to  vote  presumably  for  five  regu- 
lar Republicans  in  order  to  use  all  their  lawful 


THE  CUMULATIVE  VOTE.  93 

number  of  votes,  they  could  have  elected  that  one 
by  a  vote  as  large  as  that  received  by  any  other 
candidate. 

With  the  cumulative  vote,  very  much  depends 
upon  the  size  of  the  districts.  If  they  are  small, 
as  in  the  election  of  representatives  to  the  lower 
branch  of  the  Illinois  legislature,  the  result  differs 
but  little  from  the  limited  vote.  In  Illinois  each 
district  elects  on  a  general  ticket  three  members  of 
the  State  House  of  Representatives ;  but  the  voter 
may  cumulate  or  divide  his  votes,  giving  one  vote 
to  each  candidate,  or  one  and  a  half  votes  to  each 
of  two  candidates,  or  three  votes  to  one  candidate 
(called  "plumping").  This  system  was  adopted 
in  1870,  and  has  therefore  had  a  trial  of  twenty- 
five  years.  Testimony  as  to  its  practical  workings 
will  throw  light  upon  the  problem  before  us.  Mr. 
M.  N.  Forney  has  published  answers  from  Illinois 
editors  to  inquiries  which  he  submitted  to  them.1 
From  these  replies  and  other  sources,  the  follow- 
ing conclusions  are  drawn. 

1.  It  appears  that  representatives  of  third  parties 
in  Illinois  do  not,  as  a  rule,  secure  election.  In 
1892  the  Prohibitionists  in  the  State  mustered  for 
representatives  24,684  voters  (not  votes)  ;  the  Peo- 
ple's Party,  20,108,  out  of  a  total  of  872,948.  If 
these  parties  could  have  concentrated  their  votes, 

1  See  "  Political  Reform  by  the  Representation  of  Minorities," 
New  York,  1894. 


94         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

they  would  have  elected  four  and  three  members 
respectively,  out  of  a  total  of  153.  In  the  elec- 
tion of  1894,  the  results  were  as  follows: — 

ILLINOIS  LEGISLATURE,  1894. 

VOTE  FOR        ___    _____ 

REPRESEK-     OF  TOTAL 
TATIVES.  101AI* 


57 

3 

11 


Republicans     .    . 

1,332,488 

53.4 

92 

Democrats   .    .     . 

914,735 

37.2 

61 

Prohibitionists      . 

43,402 

1.7 

.  . 

People's  Party 

174,465 

7.1 

Independent     .    . 

6,323 

.2 

.  . 

Ind.  Democrats    . 

1,407 

.  . 

,  , 

Ind.  Republicans  . 

8,867 

.3 

.  . 

Amer.  Citizen  .    . 

2,585 

.1 

.  . 

Scattering    .    .    . 

2,575 

.1 

TOTAL   .    .    . 

2.48fi.847 

100 

1S3 

153 


The  elections  are  therefore  confined,  as  in  the 
limited  vote,  to  the  candidates  of  the  two  domi- 
nant parties.  Unlike  the  single-membered  district 
system,  however,  both  parties  have  representatives 
from  every  part  of  the  State  instead  of  from  the 
strongholds  only,  and  there  are  no  hopeless  minori- 
ties of  the  two  main  parties.  Every  citizen  who 
has  business  before  the  legislature  has  some  mem- 
ber of  his  own  party  to  transact  that  business. 
The  vote  in  the  legislature  is  close,  requiring  the 
constant  attendance  of  all  members.  By  the  elec- 
tion of  1892  it  stood  75  to  78. 

2.  Votes  are  wasted  whenever  a  popular  candi- 
date receives  "  plumpers  "  beyond  the  numb gi? 

^? 


THE  CUMULATIVE  VOTE.  95 

necessary  to  elect  him.  "A  candidate  who  runs 
too  far  ahead  is  just  as  dangerous  to  his  party  as 
the  man  who  runs  far  behind.  Under  the  old 
system,  the  man  who  runs  ahead  does  so  at  the 
expense  of  his  adversary,  but  under  the  cumula- 
tive system  it  is  at  the  expense  of  his  col- 
leagues." l  For  example,  in  the  election  of  1894 
the  vote  of  the  forty-fifth  district  was  as  follows:  — 

Callahan      .    .    .  Republican  ....  11,140 

Black Democrat     ....  9,793£ 

Tiptit      ....  Democrat     ....  9,699£ 

Lathrop  ....  Republican  ....  9,628 

Palmer   ....  People's  Party  .     .    .  2,92l£ 

Smith     ....  Prohibition  ....  960 

The^total  Republican  votes  were  20,768,  repre- 
senting approximately  6,923  voters ;  the  Demo- 
cratic votes  were  19,493,  representing  6,498 
voters.  Yet  the  Democratic  minority  elected  two 
representatives,  and  the  Republican  plurality  only 
one,  because  Callahan,  Republican,  received  at 
least  1,400  votes  more  than  he  needed ;  but  his 
colleague,  Lathrop,  lacked  at  least  75.  This  re- 
sult occurred  in  one  district  in  1892,  and  in  three 
districts  in  1894. 

3.  In  order  to  obviate  this  waste,  all  the  re- 
sources of  the  party  managers  are  enlisted,  and 
the  party  machine  becomes  even  more  indispensa- 
ble than  under  the  old  system.  In  the  first  place, 
the  managers  determine  how  many  candidates, 

1  See  Forney,  above. 


96         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

shall  be  nominated.  Only  where  the  parties  are 
close,  as  in  the  forty-fifth  district  above  cited,  do 
both  parties  nominate  two  candidates.  In  other 
cases,  the  minority  nominates  but  one,  and  a  nomi- 
nation is  equivalent  to  an  election.  For  example, 
the  vote  in  the  thirty-sixth  district  was  :  — 

Kitzmiller  .     .     .  Republican  ....  16,525 

Mounts  ....  Democrat      ....  9,013j| 

Jones      ....  Democrat      ....  9,059 

Winters  ....  People's  Party  .    .    .  2,360 

Kelly Prohibition  ....  1,117 

The  Republicans,  though  lacking  but  1,500  of  the 
Democratic  vote,  nominated  but  one  candidate. 
Again,  in  close  districts,  the  managers  must  exer- 
cise great  care  in  selecting  good  "  running  mates," 
as  did  the  Democrats  in  the  forty-fifth  and  thirty- 
sixth  districts.  For  these  reasons  the  party  or- 
ganization is  greatly  strengthened,  there  is  a 
strong  opposition  to  "  plumping,"  and  voters  are 
careful  not  to  disobey  the  party  instructions. 

4.  The  quality  and  ability  of  representatives 
are  no  better  than  under  the  old  system.  In  close 
districts,  where  four  candidates  are  nominated, 
there  may  be  a  slight  improvement;  but  in  other 
districts,  where  a  nomination  is  equivalent  to  elec- 
tion, the  worst  elements  get  control,  and  bid  de- 
fiance to  the  people.  There  are  frequent  "  deals  " 
between  parties,  the  minority  agreeing  to  put  up 
one  man,  and  the  "  gang  "  in  both  parties  control- 
ling the  primaries. 


THE  CUMULATIVE   VOTE.  97 

If  districts  are  larger,  electing  five  to  fifteen 
members,  the  cumulative  vote  gives  a  decided 
advantage  to  very  small  parties,  both  from  the 
smaller  quota  necessary  to  elect  a  single  candi- 
date, and  from  the  increased  waste  of  the  larger 
parties.  In  England  the  school  boards  are  elected 
on  the  cumulative  plan  by  districts  returning  four 
or  more  members. 

A  correspondent  of  the  New  York  World,  report- 
ing the  first  election  held  in  Manchester  under 
this  system,  wrote  :  1  — 

In  Manchester  there  were  fifteen  members  of  the  school 
board  to  be  elected,  and  each  voter  had  fifteen  votes  at  his 
disposal.  *  Forty-four  candidates  went  to  the  polls,  and  over 
390,000  votes  were  given  by  26, 513  voters.  .  .  .  Manchester 
is  famous  for  two  things,  —  first,  the  fervor  of  its  Protes- 
tantism ;  second,  the  number,  organization,  and  strength  of 
its  working-classes.  But  at  this  election  the  two  Roman 
Catholics  were  brought  in  at  the  head  of  the  poll,  one  of 
them  receiving  nearly  20,000  more  votes  than  any  Protes- 
tant candidate,  and  no  working-class  candidate,  of  whom 
there  were  seven,  being  elected  at  all,  the  highest  vote  any 
of  them  received  being  3,854,  while  one  of  them  got  only 
166.  Here  is  the  list  of  the  successful  candidates,  with  the 
votes  given  to  each  :  — 

Rev.  Canon  Toole,  Roman  Catholic    ....  54,560 

George  Richardson,  Roman  Catholic  ....  36,308 

Wm.  Birch,  "  Philanthropist " 35,415 

Herbert  Birley,  Episcopalian 34,026 

Wm.  B.  Callender,  Episcopalian 31,824 

1  Quoted  by  Dutcher,  "  Minority  or  Proportional  Representa- 
tion," New  York,  1872,  p.  72. 


98         PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

Robert  Gladstone,  Episcopalian 24,237 

Thos.  Dale,  Episcopalian 20,688 

Joseph  Lainb,  Episcopalian 22,987 

Lydia  Becker,  "  No  Religion  " 15,249 

Richard  Haworth,  Wesleyan 13,137 

Rev.  W.  McKerrow,  Presbyterian 9,919 

Robert  Rumuey,  Presbyterian 9,510 

Dr.  John  Watts,  Unsectarian 8,861 

John  Cooper,  Wesleyan 8,020 

Oliver  Heywood,  Secularist 7,902 

The  90,868  votes  given  to  the  Roman  Catholic  can- 
didates were  polled  by  about  7,000  voters,  who  either 
"  plumped "  for  the  reverend  gentleman  who  heads  the 
list,  or  split  their  votes  between  him  and  the  lawyer  who 
foUows  him.  The  133,762  votes  given  to  the  five  Church 
of  England  candidates  were  polled  by  about  9,000  voters ; 
so  that  it  seems  that  in  Manchester  the  relative  strength  of 
the  Church  of  England  and  the  Church  of  Rome  is  as  nine 
to  seven.  It  is  quite  clear  that  under  the  old  system  the 
former  could  have  elected  all  the  candidates,  while  the  lat- 
ter would  have  been  unrepresented ;  but  it  is  equally  clear 
that  these  two  parties  underestimated  their  own  strength, 
and  that  between  them  they  might  have  elected  all  the  can- 
didates but  one.  The  Catholics  might  have  had  six  in- 
stead of  two  candidates,  and  given  each  of  them  15,144 
votes ;  the  Episcopalians  might  have  had  eight  candidates, 
and  given  each  of  them  16,720  votes ;  while  all  that  the 
other  parties  could  have  done  would  have  been  to  elect  the 
remaining  candidate. 


J  f s: 


The  cumulative  vote,  therefore,  whether  in 
small  or  large  constituencies,  must  involve  either 
/  waste  and  guesswork,  or  extreme  dictatorship  of 
(/party  machinery. 


PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION.         99 

CHAPTER  V. 
PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

THE  cumulative  vote  makes  it  possible  for  the 
elector,  entitled  to  vote  for  a  number  of  candi- 
dates, to  concentrate  his  entire  voting  strength 
upon  a  single  candidate.  This  is  the  advantage  to 
minority  parties  which  it  gives,  as  compared  with 
the  general  ticket.  It  compels  all  parties,  there- 
fore, to  cumulate  in  order  to  prevent  a  waste  of 
votes.-  Now,  suppose  every  elector  were  required 
to  "plump"  all  of  his  votes  on  a  single  candidate. 
Every  one  would  then  be  equally  well  provided 
for,  if  he  had  but  one  vote  on  a  general  ticket, 
instead  of  as  many  votes  as  there  are  candidates. 
Ten  votes  given  to  one  candidate  count  no  more 
than  one  vote  given  to  that  candidate,  provided 
every  other  elector  has  but  one  vote.  It  has,  in- 
deed, been  proposed1  that  representatives  should 
be  elected  on  general  ticket,  but  that  each  elector 
should  be  entitled  to  vote  for  but  one  candidate, 
the  candidates  who  stand  highest  on  the  poll  up  to 
the  required  number  being  declared  elected.  This 
would  be  in  effect  a  compulsory  "plumping."  The 

1  L.  C.  F.  Garvin,  "How  to  effect  Municipal  Reform,"  Arena, 
September,  1894. 


100       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

same  objections  would  apply  as  against  the  cumu- 
lative vote.  It  would  waste  the  elector's  voting 
strength  by  giving  surplus  votes  to  popular  candi- 
dates, which  the  electors,  could  they  know  before- 
hand, would  wish  to  give  to  others  representing 
the  same  views.  The  party  organization  would 
therefore  decide  for  the  electors  exactly  how  their 
votes  should  be  cast. 

But  this  dictation  could  be  avoided  and  the 
voter's  freedom  guaranteed,  if  he  were  permitted 
to  indicate  on  his  ballot  his  second  and  third 
choices,  for  whom  his  single  vote  should  be 
counted,  if  it  were  not  needed  to  elect  his  first 
choice,  or  if  it  were  given  for  a  candidate  who 
could  not  be  elected.  '  This  is '  the  "  single  trans- 
ferable vote,"  which,  as  its  name  would  indicate, 
allows  each  elector  to  vote  for  but  one  candidate, 
instead  of  the  entire  number  to  be  elected,  but 
permits  him  to  indicate  second  and  third  choices. 
The  total  number  of  votes  cast  is  therefore  the 
same  as  the  number  of  valid  ballots,  which, 
divided  by  the  number  of  members  to  be  elected 
(or  number  of  members  plus  one),  gives  the  unit 
or  quota  of  representation  necessary  to  elect  a 
single  representative.  Each  voter  marks  his  ballot 
with  the  figures,  1,  2,  3,  etc.,  opposite  the  names 
of  candidates  in  the  order  of  his  preference.  In 
counting  the  ballots,  at  first  only  the  first  choices 
are  counted,  and  as  soon  as  a  candidate  has 


PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION.       101 

received  a  number  of  first  choices  equal  to  the 
quota,  he  is  declared  elected.  After  that  no  more 
votes  are  counted  for'tdm,  but  remaining  ballots 
which  give  him  first  choice  are  counted  for  the 
candidates  marked  second  choice,  or  if  the  second 
choice  be  declared  elected,  then  for  the  third 
choice,  and  so  on.  After  the  ballots  have  been 
gone  over  once  in  this  way,  and  it  is  found  that 
the  full  number  of  members  is  not  elected,  as 
would  usually  be  the  case,  then  candidates  whose 
total  vote,  either  by  way  of  first  or  secondary 
choices  is  less  than  a  quota,  are  declared  "  out " 
in  the  inverse  order  of  their  vote,  and  their  ballots 
are  transferred  to  the  successive  choices  indicated 
thereon,  until  the  complete  number  of  members 
is  declared  elected. 

This  method  of  election  has  been  exhibited  by 
Miss  C.  H.  Spence  of  South  Australia,  in  some 
fifty  public  meetings.  By  massing  together  the 
results  of  these  several  elections,  she  has  presented 
the  following  scrutiny  of  3,824  votes  for  the  elec- 
tion of  six  parliamentary  representatives.  There 
were  twelve  names  of  candidates  on  her  voting- 
papers,  arranged  in  alphabetical  order.1 

"  The  instructions  to  voters  were  that  they  should  mark 
with  figures,  in  the  order  of  their  preference,  the  candidates 

1  "Report  of  meeting  on  Proportional  Representation,  or 
effective  voting,  held  at  River  House,  Chelsea,  London."  John 
Bale  &  Sons,  18<M,  p.  36. 


102       PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 


CANDIDATES. 

First  Votes. 

SUR- 
PLUS. 

ELIMINATED. 

Q 

M 

H 

Charlston.  ', 

Magarey. 

Robinson. 

^ 

Guthrie. 

6.  Fowler. 

7.  Buttery. 

h 

0> 

1 

od 

* 

64 

CO 

W 

ia 

Angas  (Capital)  .... 
Baker  (Do.)  

419 
262 
361 
190 
682 

1 

11 
2 

2 
2 

4 
1 
4 
11 

10 

10 
2 

2 

7 
6 

31 

72 

44 
47 
17 
11 

12 
15 
64 

139 

27 

637 
517 
637 

615 

^637 
637 
144 

Birks  (Single  Tax)  .  .  . 
Buttery  (Labor)  .... 
Charlston  (Do.)  .  . 

Fowler  (Capital)  .... 
Glynn  (Irish  Catholic)  .  . 
Guthrie  (Labor)  .  .  .  •  . 
Harrold  (Capital)  .... 
Magarey  (Prohibition)  .  . 

167 
320 
136 
,,$} 

4 
8. 

18 
1 

1 

1 
6 
36 
1 

37 
11 
2 

9 
32 

28 

88 

127 

Robinson  (Labor)  .... 
Stirling  (Wom.'s  Suff  rage), 
Null  

'  466 

_4 

~4 

13 

17 
t 

21 

22 

63 
6 

216 

31 
80 

49 

6)3,824 
637- 

45 

-«1 

19 

lot, 

** 

£^ 

92 

187 

290 

342 

3,834 

as  far  as  six  or  fewer.  This  is  all  the  voter  has  to  do.  His 
vote  is  to  be  counted  for  one,  and  that  one  the  first  on  his 
list  who  needs  his  vote  and  can  use  it.  If  his  first  choice 
has  already  reached  the  quota,  or  has  too  few  votes  even 
with  his  aid  to  do  so,  the  vote  is  transferred  to  his  next, 
as  shown  by  his  number,  and  used  and  not  wasted. 

"  The  quota  is  found  by  Mr.  Hare's  original  method,  by 
dividing  the  whole  number  of  votes  by  the  number  of  rep- 
resentatives needed,  in  this  instance  six.  The  votes  should 
be  first  mixed  thoroughly  together,  and  then  taken  out 
one  by  one  and  numbered,  and  allotted  according  to  first 
choice,  as  shown  in  the  first  vertical  column  of  the  table 
appended.  The  votes  are  found  to  be  3,824,  which,  divided 
by  six,  gives  as  a  quotient  or  quota  637,  leaving  out  the 
fraction. 


PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION.        103 

"  This  shows  that  only  Charlston  and  Magarey  had  any 
surplus;  and,  after  cutting  the  pile  of  votes  once,  like  a 
pack  of  cards,  so  that  there  might  be  no  arrangement  of 
preferred  second  choices,  the  45  and  the  19  unneeded  votes 
were  taken  from  the  top,  and  allotted  according  to  second 
choice,  as  seen  by  columns  two  and  three. 

"  Next,  the  returning  officer  declares  Robinson,  the  lowest 
on  the  poll,  not  elected,  and  proceeds  to  distribute  his 
original  and  transferred  votes  by  second  choice,  or  third, 
if  second  is  already  elected.  (See  column  3.)  Next,  Har- 
rold  is  declared  not  elected,  and  his  votes  dealt  with  sim- 
ilarly. Thus,  step  by  step,  six  of  the  twelve  candidates  are 
eliminated  from  the  contest,  leaving  six  elected. 

"  Of  these,  two  have  quotas  of  first  choice  votes,  two  have 
quotas  of  first  and  transferred  votes,  and  two  have  what 
Mr.  Hare  calls  approximate  quotas  sufficient  for  returning 
them.  .  .  .  -The  appropriation  of  transferred  votes  may 
be  followed  in  the  horizontal  lines.  At  the  foot  we  see 
a  line  marked  '  Null ; '  these  were  ineffective  apparently 
more  than  in  reality.  These  144  voting  papers  could  not 
be  used  because  the  voters  had  marked  the  names  of  men 
who  had  already  obtained  the  full  quota  of  637  votes,  or 
who  had  been  eliminated  as  hopeless. 

"  But  I  believe  that  there  were  only  two  unrepresented ; 
one  who  had  marked  one  name,  and  that  one  of  the  unsuc- 
cessful candidates,  while  the  other  voter  had  ingeniously 
picked  out  the  six  who  failed  to  make  a  quota." 

The    single    transferable    vote  has  become  the  | 
classical    form     of    proportional     representation,  i 
from  the  great  ability  with  which  it  was  presented  I . 
by  its  author,  Mr.  Thomas  Hare,  and  advocated 
by  John  Stuart  Mill.1     It  was  also  devised  inde- 

i  See  Chapter  X.  and  Appendix  IV. 


104       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

pendently  by  the  Danish  statesman,  M.  Andrae, 
and  introduced  by  him  into  the  election  of  a 
portion  of  the  members  of  the  "  Rigsraad  "  in  1855, 
and  for  the  "  Landsthing  "  in  1867.  It  is  advo- 
cated by  the  English  Proportional  Representation 
Society,  of  which  Sir  John  Lubbock  is  president. 

There  is  a  practical  difficulty,  almost  insur- 
mountable, in  the  application  of  this  system  to 
large  constituencies,/!!  the  fact  that  all  the  votes 
of  the  entire  constituency  must  be  brought  to- 
gether to  the  central  bureau  for  counting.  They 
cannot  be  counted  by  the  various  precinct  officials, 
leaving  only  the  totals  to  be  handled  by  the  cen- 
tral board.  ^The  Hare  system  doubtless  works  well 
in  a  constituency  of  a  thousand  voters,  as  in  the 
Mechanics'  Institute  of  San  Francisco,  where  it 
has  been  successfully  employed  in  three  elections, 

I      or -in  constituencies  electing  only  three  to  seven 
/  I     candidates    by   a   restricted    suffrage,    as    in    the 

*  Danish  law  of  M.  Andrae ;  but  when  ten  thousand, 
or  a  hundred  thousand,  or  a  half  million  votes  are 
to  be  counted,  and  a  large  number  of  the  ballots 
must  be  recounted  to  make  the  proper  transfers, 
the  task  is  too  heavy.^) 

j  The  Hare  system  is  "advocated  by  those  who,  in 
/a  too  doctrinaire  fashion,  wish  to  abolish  political 
j  parties.  They  apparently  do  not  realize  the  im- 
possibility of  acting  in  politics  without  large 
groupings  of  individuals,  nor  do  they  perceive  that 


PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION.       105 

the  Hare  system  itself,  thcSpi  apparently  a  system 
of  personal  representation,  would,  nevertheless, 
result  in  party  representation.  And  this  from  the 
fact  that  voters  who  act  rationally,  and  wish  to 
see  their  own  views  most  strongly  represented  in 
legislation,  would  always  transfer  their  secondary 
choices  to  candidates  of  the  same  party  as  the  ones 
who  receive  their  first  choices.  The  only  way  in 
which  the  system  could  lessen  party  cohesion 
would  be  to  require  the  names  of  candidates  to 
be  printed  in  alphabetical  order,  as  in  the  present 
Massachusetts  and  California  ballot  laws,  and  not 
by  party  tickets,  so  that  the  voters  would  be  com- 
pelled to  search  through  the  entire  ballot  for  the 
candidates  of  their  own  party.  This  would  doubt- 
less encourage  independent  voting,  but  would  by 
no  means  abolish  parties.  A  study  of  the  scru- 
tiny of  votes  taken  by  Miss  Spence,  as  given  above, 
shows  that  the  "  surplus "  votes,  and  votes  of 
"eliminated"  candidates,  have  been  transferred  r 
as  far  as  possible  within  party  lines.  In  an  actual 
instead  of  a  trial  election  the  adherence  to  party 
would  be  closer. 

With  the  present  organization  of  parties  in  the 
United  States,  and  with  the  customary  method  of 
printing  party  tickets  on  the  so-called  Australian 
ballot,  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  Hare 
system  would  be  forced  into  the  service » of  par- 
ties. There  is  a  general  agreement  among  the 


106       PEOPOETIONAL   EEPEESENTATION. 

leading  advocates  ^1  ftportibnal  representation 
that  a  system  of  e^^Ri  is  needed  which  will  do 
as  little  violence  as  possible  to  existing  prejudices 
and  habits,  —  a  system  which  will  fit  in  with  the 
methods  of  voting  and  the  political  traditions  of 
the  people,  and  yet  will  utilize  these  traditions 
and  methods  in  such  a  way  as  to  free  the  voter 
from  the  tyranny  of  the  single-membered  district 
system.  It  must  also  be  a  system  in  which  the 
ballots  can  be  counted  at  the  precincts  where 
they  are  cast. 


VOTE  FOR  PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTORS, 
INDIANA,  1892. 

DEMOCRAT. 

REPUBLICAN. 

PEOPLE'S. 

PROHIB. 

I. 

262,270* 

255,615* 

22,208* 

13,050 

II. 

260,661  * 

253,878* 

21,861 

12,830 

III. 

260,600* 

253,836* 

21,883 

12,827 

IV. 

260,586 

253,815* 

21,876 

12,824 

V. 

260,580 

253,799* 

21,873 

12,823 

VI. 

260,560 

253,807  * 

21,873 

12,821 

VII. 

260,588  * 

253,793 

21,873 

12,821 

VIII. 

260,547 

253,808* 

21,865 

12,820 

IX. 

260,575 

253,787 

21,873 

12,819 

X. 

260,600* 

253,792 

21,873 

12,813 

XI. 

260,591  * 

253,777 

21,871 

12,820 

XII. 

260,590* 

253,767 

21,867 

12,819 

XIII. 

260,581 

253,767 

21,867 

12,815 

XIV. 

260,538 

253,770 

21,865 

12,816 

XV. 

260,533 

253,770 

21,864 

12,815^ 

3,910,390 

3,808,791 

328,392 

192,533 

In  order  to  approach  the  solution  of  our  prob- 
lem from  a  standpoint  familiar  to  Americans,  we 
may  examine  the  principles  involved  in  a  vote  for 


PEOPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION.       107 


presidential  electors,  'arfl  A^  possible  modifica- 
tions necessary  to  make  iPB^an  election  propor- 
tional. Take,  for  example,  the  vote  in  the  State 
of  Indiana  in  1892,  as  shown  on  p.  106.  The 
particular  candidates  are  indicated  by  Roman  nu- 
merals, in  the  order  in  which  they  stood  on  the 
respective  tickets. 

Of  course,  under  the  existing  system  of  majority 
(or  rather  plurality)  rule,  the  fifteen  Democratic 
nominees  are  declared  the  successful  candidates, 
seeing  that  individually  each  one  receives  more 
votes  than  any  Republican  candidate.  But  with 
proportional  representation,  parties,  rather  than  in- 
dividuals, must  receive  their  just  deserts.  There- 
fore the  following  calculation  is  made :  — 

Democrats 3,910,390 

Republicans 3,808,791 

«        People's  Party     . ; 328,392 

Prohibitionists     .    .' 192,533 


8,240,106 
8,240,106  -r  15  =  549,340  =  unit  of  representation. 

Since  there  are  fifteen  representatives  to  be 
elected,  it  would  appear  that  every  party  should 
be  entitled  to  one  representative  for  every  fif- 
teenth part  which  it  receives  of  the  total  vote 
for  all  parties.  This  quotient  would  be  549,340, 
which  would  be  the  unit  of  representation.  Di- 
viding, now,  the  several  party  votes  by  the  unit 
of  representation,  we  have, — 


108      PEOPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 


REMAINDER.     ELECTING. 

Democrats,        3,910,390^549,340  =  7  +  165,010  7 

Republicans,     3,808,791  -  549,340  =  7  +   63,411  7 

People's  Party,    328,392  —  549,340  =  0  +  328,392  1 

Prohibitionists,    192,533  -  549,340  =  <0_+ 192,533  _0_ 

Total,           14  IT 

The  People's  party,  having  the  largest  remainder 
above  a  full  quotient,  would  be  entitled  to  the  odd 
delegate,  making  the  complete  representation  con- 
sist of  seven  Democrats,  seven  Republicans,  and 
one  Populist. 

It  now  remains  to  select  the  individual  candi- 
dates on  the  several  tickets.  This  is  done  by 
taking  the  seven  Democrats,  seven  Republicans, 
and  one  Populist,  who  show  the  highest  number 
of  individual  votes.  I  have  indicated  the  success- 
ful candidates  by  an  asterisk. 

Here  we  have  the  simplest  modification  possible 
of  the  existing  general  ticket  with  which  Ameri- 
cans are  familiar,  (it  secures  justice  between 
parties,  obviates  the  waste  of  cumulative  voting, 
breaks  the  monopoly  of  the  dominant  parties,  and 
elects  the  most  popular  and  representative  men  in 
each  party.  \ 

But  as  a  practical  instrument  for  a  scheme  of 
proportional  representation,  it  presents  serious  dif- 
ficulties. Like  all  of  the  plans  for  minority  rep- 
resentation that  have  been  examined,  as  well  as 
the  existing  single-membered  district,  it  is  based, 
primarily,  upon  the  theory  that  the  voter  casts 


PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION.       109 

his  ballot  for  individual  candidates  and  not  for 
a  political  party.  This  is  the  primitive  theory  of 
representation,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  emerged 
from  the  primary  assembly  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  proxies.  Based,  however,  upon  this 
earlier  theory,  the  modern  voter  approaches  the 
election  with  the  idea  of  his  political  party  upper- 
most in  his  mind.  He  votes  for  persons  because 
they  are  the  nominees  of  his  party.  The  person- 
ality of  the  candidates  is  a  secondary  considera- 
tion. This  is  seen  in  an  extreme  case  in  the 
general  ticket  of  a  presidential  election.  Each 
political  party  nominates  a  list  of  candidates  equal 
to  the  total  number  to  be  elected ;  and  the  voters 
of  the  majority  party,  by  voting  individually  for 
each  candidate  on  their  party  ticket,  elect  the  en- 
tire ticket.  For  this  reason  the  plan  is  not  suited 
to  proportional  representation,  under  which  the 
political  parties  could  not  hope  to  elect  an  entire 
delegation,  and  would  naturally  not  wish  to  nomi- 
nate a  larger  number  of  candidates  than  they  could 
expect  to  elect. 

At  the  same  time  there  is  a  very  prevalent 
modification  in  the  method  of  voting  the  general 
ticket  in  the  United  States,  which  will  suggest  a 
way  out  of  this  difficulty.  The  voter  is  usually 
given  the  privilege  of  voting  a  straight  ticket  by 
placing  a  single  mark  opposite  the  title  of  the 
party  of  his  choice.  In  this  way  he  gives  a  vote 


110       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

individually  for  each  candidate  on  the  ticket, 
although  not  required  to  check  the  individual 
names.  Plainly,  if  all  the  votes  are  cast  in  this 
way,  the  final  result  as  between  parties  is  the 
same  as  though  each  voter  cast  but  one  vote  for 
a  party  instead  of  his  ten  or  fifteen  or  more  votes 
for  the  individual  candidates  of  that  party.  Con- 
siderations of  this  kind  influenced  Mr.  Thomas 
Gilpin  of  Philadelphia,  who  in  the  year  1844 
published  his  pamphlet  "  On  the  Representation 
of  Minorities  of  Electors  to  act  with  the  Majority 
in  Elected  Assemblies."  l  This  was  probably  the 
"earliest  attempt  to  find  a  philosophical  solution 
for  the  problem  of  presentation."2  Mr.  Gilpin 
proposed  that  voters  should  have  but  one  vote, 
which  they  should  cast,  not  for  a  candidate,  but 
for  a  party.  The  constituencies  were  to  be  en- 
larged, and  each  party  committee  or  convention 
was  to  present  one  list  of  candidates.  The  voter 
was  to  hand  in  to  the  election  officers  his  party 
ticket  which  might  contain  "  as  candidates  the 
whole  number  of  representatives  to  be  voted  for 
in  the  district;  and  these  should  be  placed  in 
preferences  highest  on  the  list,  in  order  that  those 
set  first  on  it  may  be  chosen  according  as  the 
number  of  votes  given  may  entitle  the  ticket  to 
one  or  more  of  its  candidates."  The  total  number 

1  Philadelphia,  John  C.  Clark,  printer,  1844. 

2  Professor  Wm.  R.  "Ware,  in  American  Law  Review,  Jan- 
uary, 1872. 


PEOPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION.       Ill 

of  tickets  voted  divided  by  the  number  of  persons 
to  be  elected,  gives  the  electoral  quota,  which,  in 
turn,  used  as  a  divisor,  determines  the  number  of 
candidates  who  are  elected  on  each  list.  No  pro- 
vision was  made  whereby  the  elector  could  indi- 
cate his  preferences  among  the  candidates  on  his 
party  ticket,  the  rule  being  that,  as  already  quoted 
from  Gilpin,  if  a  given  list  was  entitled  to,  say, 
three  quotas  of  votes,  the  first  three  candidates 
were  to  be  the  elected  deputies. 

In  1846  M.  Victor  Considerant  published  at 
Geneva,  Switzerland,  a  plan  similar  to  that  of 
Gilpin,  but  independently  originated.1  He  did 
not  contemplate  a  full  list  of  candidates  on  all 
party  tickets,  but  only  partial  lists,  as  the  nomi- 
nating agencies  might  choose.  Each  list  was  to 
be  published  before  election  and  given  an  official 
number.  Each  elector  was  to  vote  for  a  ticket  by 
writing  on  his  ballot  the  number,  "  No.  1,"  "  No. 
2,"  etc.,  and  then  also  to  name  the  candidates  of 
his  own  ticket  whom  he  wished.2 

In  1870  M.  Borely  of  Nimes,  France,  proposed 
that  each  elector  should  himself  indicate  his  pref- 
erences by  numbering  the  candidates  1,  2,  3,  etc. 

1  "De  la  Sincerite  du  gouvernement  representatif,  ou  Exposi- 
tion de  1'Election  Veridique."    Reprinted  by  Karl  Biirkli,  Zurich, 
1892. 

2  "  D'e'crire  sur  son  bulletin  le  nurnero  de  sa  section,  et  au-des- 
sous,  la  liste  des  noms  qu'il  aura  choisis  panni  les  candidats  de 
sa  section,"  p.  12, 


112       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

In  this  form  the  plan  was  adopted  in  1871  by  the 
Association  Reformiste  of  Geneva,  Switzerland, 
and  became  known  as  the  liste  libre,  or  "free 
ticket." 

While  recognizing  political  parties  as  primarily 
entitled  to  representation,  it  was  again  soon  per- 
ceived that  the  restriction  of  the  elector  to  one 
vote  for  a  single  party  did  not  permit  him  to  vote 
for  individual  candidates  on  other  party  tickets 
whom  he  may  have  preferred;  and  his  freedom 
of  choice  within  his  own  party  would  not  be 
great,  seeing  that  his  party  managers  would  nom- 
inate no  more  candidates  than  they  hoped  to 
elect.  In  1875  the  Swiss  Association,  therefore, 
abandoned  the  double  vote  for  party  and  for  can- 
didates within  the  party,  and  advocated  a  combi- 
nation of  the  cumulative  vote  and  the  free  ticket. 
The  voter  was  to  have  as  many  votes  as  there 
were  deputies  to  elect,  and  he  might  cumulate 
them  as  he  saw  fit.  However,  to  avoid  the 
wasted  votes  of  the'  crude  cumulation,  the  free  list 
feature  was  added;  and  it  was  provided  that  the 
total  number  of  votes  given  to  individual  candi- 
dates on  the  respective  tickets  were  to  be  added 
together  to  determine  the  share  of  representation 
which  the  parties  as  such  should  b&ye. ' 

Much  can  be  said  in  favor  of  this  plan,  espe- 
cially in  connection  with  the  Australian  system  of 
voting,  where  all  the  party  tickets  appear  upon 


PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION.      113 

the  same  "  blanket  ballot."  It  is  also  well  adapted 
to  the  Massachusetts  and  California  ballots,  where 
candidates  are  named  alphabetically,  and  not  ac- 
cording to  parties.  By  it  the  voters  may  plump 
their  votes  without  regard  to  the  instructions  of 
the  party  managers,  yet  with  the  assurance  that 
no  votes  are  wasted.  For  example,  in  the  election 
in  the  forty-fifth  Illinois  district,  as  given  on  page 
95,  where  the  Republican  Callahan  ran  so  far 
ahead  of  his  ticket  that  his  colleague  was  de- 
feated and  two  Democrats  were  elected,  the  "  free 
ticket  "  amendment  would  have  given  the  follow- 
ing result:  — 

REPUBLICAN.  DEMOCRAT.  PEOPLE'S  AND 

PROHIBITION. 

Callahan,  11,140  Tiptit,   9,793£ 

Lathrop,     9,628  Black,    9,699£ 

Total,     20,768  19,493  3,88l£ 

Republican,  20,768 
Democrat,     19,493 
People's,         2,92Ji 
Prohibition,      960 


Total,  44,142£  —  3  =  14,714  =  unit  of  representation. 

Republican,  20,768  —  14,714  =  1  +  6,054,  electing  2 
Democrat,  19,493  —  14,714  =  1  +  4,779,  electing  1 
People's,  2,921  —  14,714  =  0  +  2,0214,  electing  0 
Prohibition,  960  —  14,714  =  0+  930,  electing  0 
~2  ~3 

In  the  crude  cumulation,  where  candidates  and 
not  parties  are  considered,  as  in  the  Illinois  method, 
the  Republicans  with  a  majority  of  the  votes 


114       PEOPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

elected  only  one  candidate,  who  received  1,400 
votes  more  than  he  needed.  But  with  the  free 
ticket  modification,  these  1,400  wasted  votes  are 
counted  for  the  party  to  which  this  leading  candi- 
date belongs  and  are  in  effect  transferred  to  his 
colleague.  Thus  that  party  secures  its  rightful 
proportion  of  two  representatives  instead  of  one, 
and  the  candidate  running  ahead  of  his  ticket 
becomes  a  help  instead  of  a  danger. 

A  bill  based  upon  this  combination  was  intro- 
duced by  Hon.  Tom  Johnson  in  the  Fifty-second 
Congress,  and  is  given  herewith :  — 

52d  CONGRESS,  IST  SESSION. 
H.  R.  9222. 

IN   THE   HOUSE   OF   REPRESENTATIVES. 

June  15, 1892. 

Referred  to  the  Committee  on  Election  of  President  and 
Vice-President,  and  ordered  to  be  printed. 

Mr.  Johnson  of  Ohio  introduced  the  following  bill :  — 
A  BILL 

PROVIDING  FOR  THE  ELECTION  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 
BY  PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives 
of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled, 
That  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  shall  be 
voted  for  at  large  in  their  respective  States. 
SEC.  2.     That  any  body  of  electors  in  any  State  may,  in 

convention,  nominate  any  number  of  candidates  not  to  ex- 


PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION.       115 

ceed  the  number  of  seats  to  which  such  State  is  entitled  in 
the  House,  and  cause  their  names  to  be  printed  on  its  ballot. 

SEC.  3.  That  every  elector  shall  be  entitled  on  his 
ballot  to  one  vote  each  for  as  many  persons  as  the  State 
whereof  he  is  a  resident  is  entitled  to  seats  in  the  House, 
and  he  may  cumulate  his  votes  on  a  less  number  of  persons 
in  such  manner  as  he  may  choose. 

SEC.  4.  That  the  sum  of  all  the  votes  cast  for  all  the 
candidates  in  any  State  shall  be  divided  by  the  number  of 
seats  to  which  such  State  is  entitled,  and  the  quotient  to  the 
nearest  unit  shall  be  known  as  the  unit  of  representation. 

SEC.  5.  That  the  sum  of  all  the  votes  cast  for  all  the 
candidates  of  each  body  of  electors  nominating  candidates 
shall  be  severally  divided  by  the  quota  of  representation, 
and  the  units  of  the  quotients  thus  obtained  will  show  the 
number  of  representatives  to  which  each  such  body  of 
electors  is  entitled ;  and  if  the  sum  of  such  quotients  be 
less  than  the  number  of  seats  to  be  filled,  the  body  of  elec- 
tors having  the  largest  remainder  after  division  of  the  sum 
of  all  the  votes  cast  for  all  its  candidates  by  the  quota  of 
representation,  as  herein  specified,  shall  be  entitled  to  the 
first  vacancy,  and  so  on  until  all  the  vacancies  are  filled. 

SEC.  6.  That  the  candidates  of  each  body  of  electors 
nominating  candidates  and  found  entitled  to  representation 
under  the  foregoing  rules,  shall  receive  certificates  of  elec- 
tion in  the  order  of  the  vote  received,  the  candidate  receiv- 
ing the  highest  number  of  votes  the  first  certificate,  and  so 
on ;  but  in  case  of  a  tie,  with  but  one  vacancy  to  be  filled, 
the  matter  shall  be  determined  by  lot  between  the  candi- 
dates so  tied. 

This  combination  of  the  cumulative  vote  and/ 
the  "free  ticket"  answers  in  most  respects  the/' 
ideal  of  electoral  reform.  It  gives  to  the  voter 


116       PROPORTIONAL  EEPEESENTATION. 

the  widest  freedom  of  choice  between  all  the  indi- 
vidual candidates  on  all  the  tickets,  avoids  the 
waste  and  the  consequent  "machine  "  supremacy 
of  the  simple  cumulative  vote,  and  opens  the  way 
for  independent  movements  within  and  without 
the  dominant  parties.  There  are,  however,  two 
minor  objections.  If  voters  are  allowed  to  write 
on  their  ballots  the  figures  1,  2,  3,  etc.,  against 
individual  candidates,  it  becomes  easy  to  make 
those  "  distinguishing  marks "  which  the  laws 
against  bribery  seek  to  prohibit.  This  objection 
would  not  hold  against  a  plan  by  which  the  voter 
gives  but  one  vote  to  a  candidate  or  one  to  a 
ticket.  Again,  the  cumulation  involves  a  waste  of 
votes  between  the  groups  or  factions  within  the 
party  corresponding  to  the  waste  which  the  sim- 
ple cumulation  permits  between  parties.  Voters 
of  a  given  faction  who  cumulate  on  their  own  first 
choices  of  their  party  candidates,  and  who  fail  to 
distribute  their  votes  so  as  to  aid  the  secondary 
candidates  of  the  same  faction,  would  be  at  a  dis- 
advantage, and  minor  but  shrewder  factions  would 
secure  disproportionate  influence  in  the  party  repre- 
sentation. This  objection,  however,  is  not  a  serious 
one,  provided  the  several  factions  nominate  sepa- 
rate tickets,  as  they  could  easily  do. 

The  cumulative  vote,  with  the  "free  ticket" 
amendment,  has  been  adopted  by  the  Canton  Zug 
in  Switzerland,  and  is  favored  by  Professor  Ernest 


PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION.       117 

Naville,  the  leading  advocate  of  proportional  rep- 
resentation in  that  country.  It  is  simpler  than 
the  plan  finally  agreed  upon  by  the  Swiss  and 
American  advocates  of  the  reform,  and  would  per- 
haps secure  all  the  advantages  of  the  latter.  It 
could  be  adopted  in  Illinois  by  a  slight  amend- 
ment to  the  cumulative  vote,  though  the  small 
size  of  the  constituencies  would  prevent  the  best 
results.  It  is  the  only  form,  too,  which  could 
conveniently  be  adopted  in  States  like  Massachu- 
setts, and  California,  whose  ballot  laws  require 
that  candidates'  names  be  printed  in  alphabetical 
order,  and  not  by  party  groupings.  In  these- 
States,  the  voter  could  cumulate  his  votes  on  in- 
dividual candidates,  and  it  would  be  the  duty  of 
the  returning  officers '  to  separate  out  the  candi- 
dates by  parties  and  add  up  the  individual  votes 
in  order  to  find  the  several  party  votes.  The 
simple  rule  of  three  would  then  determine  the 
party  representation,  and  the  individual  candi- 
dates who  stood  highest  on  the  party  lists  would 
be  declared  elected. 

It  is  evident,  however,  that  the  advantages  of 
cumulation  will  be  secured  to  the  party,  though 
not  to  favored  candidates,  if  voters,  being  allowed 
to  cast  but  one  vote  for  individual  candidates  on 
any  of  the  party  tickets,  are  permitted  to  cast  all 
the  unused  votes  to  which  they  are  entitled  for  a 
single  party,  by  merely  making  the  legal  mark 


118       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

against  the  title  of  the  party.  Thus  if  a  voter  in 
a  constituency  electing  twenty  candidates  chooses 
to  give  single  votes  to  five  candidates  on  one  or 
more  tickets,  he  may,  instead  of  cumulating  the 
remaining  fifteen  on  a  single  candidate,  by  writing 
the  figures  "  15  "  against  the  candidate's  name,  be 
permitted  to  "  bunch  "  them  directly  for  the  party 
ticket  to  which  his  favorite  candidate  belongs  by 
making  the  simple  cross  against  the  party  emblem. 
His  fifteen  votes  would  go  for  the  party  thus  indi- 
cated ;  and  his  remaining  five  would  count  both  as 
preferences  for  individual  candidates  within  the 
parties,  and  as  votes  for  the  parties  to  which  those 
candidates  belong. 

This  is  the  plan  finally  agreed  upon  by  the 
Swiss  Association,  and  recently  incorporated  into 
the  electoral  laws  of  Neuchatel  and  Geneva.  It 
was  also  adopted  by  the  American  Proportional 
Representation  League  at  Saratoga  in  1895,  as 
most  nearly  suited  to  American  habits.  A  bill 
drawn  up  by  a  committee  of  the  League  1  appointed 
for  the  purpose  is  given  herewith,  together  with 
an  introductory  statement  by  the  committee  :  — 

"  The  accompanying  bill  is  provided  with  especial  refer- 
ence to  the  election  of  boards  of  aldermen  in  cities;  but 

1  Professor  J.  R.  Commons,  Syracuse  University ;  Mr.  Stough- 
ton  Cooley,  Secretary  American  Proportional  Representation 
League;  Professor  J.  W.  Jenks,  Cornell  University.  This  bill 
has  not  been  officially  adopted  by  the  League.  It  is  simply  the 
recommendation  of  the  committee. 


PEOPOETIONAL  EEPEE8ENTATION.       119 

the  same  provisions  may  be  adapted,  with  simple  verbal 
changes,  to  the  election  of  members  of  a  legislature,  or 
congressmen,  or  any  board  consisting  of  a  number  of 
representatives  with  equal  powers.  The  number  of  candi- 
dates on  any  ticket  ought  ordinarily  not  to  exceed  fifteen, 
and  may  well-be  as  small  as  five.  In  case  of  large  bodies, 
therefore,  the  city  or  State  can  be  divided  into  large  terri- 
torial districts,  and  the  proportional  system  applied  to  each. 
"  It  has  been  presumed  that  the  general  laws  of  the  State 
provide  for  the  nominations  by  parties  and  by  petition; 
follow  the  general  plan  of  the  Australian  system  of  voting ; 
provide  for  election  inspectors,  canvassers,  etc. ;  lay  down 
principles  determining  the  validity  of  votes ;  and  in  gene- 
ral provide  for  the  carrying  out  of  elections,  —  so  that  this 
bill  provides  only  the  specific  requirements  needed  for  the 
proportional  system." 

BILL 

TO    ESTABLISH   A    SYSTEM    OF   PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTA- 
TION  IN   CITIES. 

SEC.  I.  The  members  of  the  board  of  aldermen  to  be 
chosen  at  any  election  shall  be  chosen  by  all  the  voters  of 
the  city  on  a  general  ticket,  and  not  by  separate  districts. 

SEC.  II.  Any  party  or  body  of  voters  which  polled  at 
the  last  preceding  city  election  one  per  centum  of  the  total 
vote  cast  for  the  principal  office  filled  at  said  election,  or 
which  shall  present  a  nomination  paper  signed  by  voters 
equal  in  number  to  such  percentage  [or  by  the  number 
specified  in  the  law  of  the  State  concerned],  may  nominate 
a  ticket  or  list  of  any  number  of  candidates  for  said  board 
of  aldermen  not  to  exceed  the  total  number  of  persons  to  be 
elected  to  said  board ;  and  the  names  of  the  persons  thus 
nominated  shall  be  printed  on  the  official  ballot,  but  so  that 


or 


120       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

the  list  of  candidates  nominated  by  each  party  or  body  of 
voters  shall  be  printed  separately. 

SEC.  III.  A  candidate  may  be  placed  upon  several  party 
tickets,  but  he  may  choose  in  favor  of  one  of  them.  All 
the  votes  cast  for  him  are  then  counted  for  the  ticket 
chosen.  In  default  of  a  choice  by  him,  the  ticket  to  which 
he  shall  be  assigned  is  determined  five  days  before  the 
election  by  lot,  by  the  proper  officer,  in  the  presence  of  the 
official  representatives  of  the  parties  or  petitioners  con- 
cerned, if  they  wish  to  appear. 

A  candidate's  name  cannot  be  placed  on  any  ticket  if  he 
makes  objection  in  writing  to  the  proper  officer  five  days 
before  the  election. 

SEC.  IV.  Each  voter  shall  have  as  many  votes  as  there 
are  persons  to  be  elected,  which  he  may  distribute  as  he 
chooses  among  the  candidatts,  giving  not  more  than  one 
vote  to  any  one  candidate,  votes  thus  specifically  given  to 
be  known  as  "  individual  votes  ;  "  and  each  such  vote  shall 
count  individually  for  the  candidate  receiving  the  same  and 
for  the  ticket  to  which  the  candidate  belongs.  In  case  a 
voter  does  not  use  the  total  number  of  votes  to  which  he  is 
entitled  by  specifying  that  number  of  candidates,  the  re- 
mainder of  his  votes,  to  be  known  as  "  ticket  votes,"  shall 
be  counted  for  any  ticket  as  a  whole,  provided^  that  he 
designate  such  ticket  by  title  ;  otherwise  only  the  "  indi- 
vidual votes  "  shall  be  counted.  His  entire  ballot  will  be 
void  if  more  than  one  ticket  is  designated  by  title. 

The  voter  casts  his  "  individual  votes  "  by  marking  in 
the  space  provided  by  law  opposite  the  names  of  the  sepa- 
rate candidates  ;  he  casts  his  "  ticket  votes "  by  marking 
in  the  space  provided  at  the  head  of  the  ticket. 

SEC.  V.  Judges  and  inspectors  of  election  shall  deter- 
mine for  each  precinct,  and  the  central  canvassing  board 
for  the  city,  the  following :  — 


PEOPOETIONAL  EEPEESENTATION.       121 

1.  The  number  of  votes  invalidated  for  any  cause. 

2.  The   number  of  valid  "individual  votes"  cast  for 

each  candidate. 

3.  The   number  of  valid  "individual  votes"  cast  for 

each  party  or  ticket. 

4.  The  number  of  "  ticket  votes  "  cast  for  each  ticket. 

5.  The  total  number  of  valid  votes  cast  for  each  ticket, 

including  "  individual  votes  "  and  "  ticket  votes." 

6.  The  total  number  of  all  valid  votes  cast. 

SEC.  VI.     In  determining  the  results  of  the  election,  — 

1.  The  total  number  of  valid  votes  cast  for  all  tickets 

shall  be  divided  by  the  number  of  candidates  to  be 
elected;  the  quotient,  ignoring  fractions,  to  be 
known  as  the  "  unit  of  representation." 

2.  The  total  number  of  valid  votes  cast  for  each  ticket 

shall  be  severally  divided  by  the  unit  of  represen- 
tation', and  each  such  ticket  shall  be  entitled  to 
a  number  of  aldermen  equal  to  the  quotient  thus 
obtained,  ignoring  fractions. 

3.  If  the  sum  of  such  quotients  be  less  than  the  number 

of  persons   to  be  elected,  the  ticket  having  the 
largest  remainder  after  the  division  aforesaid  shall 
be  entitled  to  an  additional  alderman  ;  thereafter, 
the  ticket  having  the  second  largest  remainder; 
and  so  on,  until  the  whole  number  is  chosen. 
SEC.  VII.     When  the  number  of  representatives  to  which 
each  ticket  is  entitled  shall  have  been  determined  as  pro- 
vided in  Section  VI.,  the  candidates  upon  such  tickets  who 
shall  have  received  the  highest  number  of  votes  (not  exceed- 
ing the  number  of  representatives  to  which  such  ticket  is 
entitled)  shall  receive  certificates  of  election.     In  case  of  a 
tie  between  tickets  or  candidates,  the  lot  decides. 

SEC.  VIII.     If  a  ticket  obtains  more  representatives  than 
it  has  presented  candidates,  the  number  of  seats  remaining 


122       PEOPOETIONAL  EEPEESENTATION. 

to  be  filled  is  distributed  among  the  other  tickets  in  pro- 
portion to  the  votes  cast  for  each. 

SEC.  IX.  When  there  is  a  vacancy  in  any  seat,  the  candi- 
date who  has  received  in  the  general  election  the  greatest 
number  of  votes  after  the  last  one  elected,  in  the  party  or 
group  within  which  the  vacancy  has  occurred,  is  chosen  to 
fill  it. 

In  order  to  illustrate  the  practical  operation  of 
this  measure  if  enacted  into  law,  I  give  herewith 
an  abstract  of  the  report  of  a  special  commission 
to  the  Belgian  Parliament  appointed  for  the  pur- 
pose of  holding  a  trial  ballot  in  Brussels,  Nov.  19, 
1893.  The  report  is  published  in  full  in  La 
Representation  Proportionelle,  Brussels,  Decem- 
ber, 1893.  It  gives  a  detailed  and  careful  ex- 
hibit of  all  the  steps  in  proportional  voting.  To 
Americans  it  is  especially  useful ;  since,  although 
the  Belgian  bill  differs  in  some  points  from  the 
American,  yet  it  is  an  application  of  the  Swiss 
plan  to  the  Australian  ballot  —  a  ballot  not  used 
in  Switzerland. 

The  Belgian  parliament,  having  in  hand  the  re- 
vision of  the  constitution,  determined  to  test  the 
claims  of  the  advocates  of  proportional  representa- 
tion by  a  trial  election  of  the  eighteen  represen- 
tatives from  Brussels  in  parliament ;  and  although 
parliament  finally  rejected  the  reform,  yet  the 
object  lesson  has  attracted  international  attention. 
The  commission  having  the  matter  in  charge 


PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION.       123 

placed  in  nomination  six  different  tickets,  —  a 
larger  number  than  would  usually  have  been  pre- 
sented, since  the  Catholics  and  Independents,  and 
the  Socialists  and  Progressists,  would  usually 
nominate  fusion  tickets. 

Although  there  were  eighteen  seats  to  be  filled 
from  the  Brussels  district,  the  committee  did  not 
place  full  tickets  in  nomination,  the  largest  being 
that  of  the  Socialists,  containing  ten  names.  As 
no  party  could  hope  to  secure  all  the  seats,  no 
party  would  nominate  a  full  list  of  candidates 
unless  required  by  law  to  do  so.  Each  party 
would  nominate  one  or  two  more  than  it  hoped  to 
elect.  On  page  124  is  given  the  form  of  ballot 
used  in  this  election,  with  initials  for  the  names  of 
the  candidates.  These  candidates  were  men  who 
had  retired  from  active  politics,  but  whose  polit- 
ical reputation  made  them  well  known  in  the  city. 

The  instructions  given  to  voters  were  as  fol- 
lows:— 

INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  ELECTORS. 

A.  The  elector  may  stamp  the  white  spot  in  the  square 
placed  at  the  head  of  a  list  of  candidates.     By  voting  in 
this  way  he  gives  eighteen  votes  to  the  ticket,  no  matter  how 
many  candidates  there  are  upon  it.     ("  Ticket  votes.") 

B.  He   can,  after  having  stamped   the  square  at  the 
head  of  the  ticket,  also  stamp  the  white  spot  in  one  or 
more  squares  placed  at  the  right  of  the  names  of  those  can- 
didates who  figure  on  the  same  ticket.     By  doing  this  he 


124 


PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTA  TION. 


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PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION.       125 

gives  eighteen  votes  to  that  ticket  and  one  vote  of  prefer- 
ence ("  individual  votes  ")  to  each  of  the  candidates  whom 
he  has  thus  designated. 

C.  The  elector  who  has  not  voted  at  the  head  of  any  ticket 
can  stamp  the  white  spot  of  one  or  more  squares  placed  at 
the  right  of  the  names  of  candidates  on  whatever  ticket  the 
candidate  may  appear.     In   this  way  he   gives   for   each 
square  stamped  one  vote  of  preference  to  the  candidate  des- 
ignated,   and   one  vote  to  the   ticket  to  which  this  candidate 
belongs.     (Mixed  ballots.)     (This  differs  from  the  American 
bill  and  from  the  Swiss  laws,  in  which  the  elector  gives 
"  individual  votes  "  on  as  many  tickets  as  he  pleases,  and 
then  gives  the  remainder  of  the  number  to  which  he  is 
entitled  to  any  ticket,  even  though  his  "  individual  votes  " 
are  on  both  tickets.) 

D.  The  following  ballots  are  void  :  — 

1.  Ballots  having  more  than  one  vote  at  the  head  of 
tickets. 

2.  Ballots  upon  which  the  elector  has  stamped  the  white 
spot  placed  at  the  head  of  a  ticket,  and  has  voted  at  the 
same  time  for  candidates  on  the  other  tickets.  (Not  void 
in  American  bill  and  Swiss  laws.) 

3.  Ballots  in  which  the  elector  has  voted  for  more  than 
eighteen  candidates." 

The  people  of  Brussels  took  a  lively  interest  in 
the  experiment.  Meetings  were  held  in  various 
parts  of  the  city,  and  the  method  of  voting  was 
explained.  About  12,000  electors  cast  their  bal- 
lots. The  voting-booths  were  open  from  9  A.M. 
to  4  P.  M.  The  counting  of  ballots  was  begun  at 
once,  and  completed  in  all  the  precincts  in  three- 
quarters  of  an  hour  to  four  hours'  time  for  from 


126       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

300  to  1,940  ballots  each.  This  work  was  found 
to  be  not  at  all  complicated,  and  was  done  as 
easily  and  rapidly  as  in  the  ordinary  elections. 

The  work  of  the  central  bureau  began  at  5.30 
P.M. ;  and  the  returns  from  the  several  precincts 
were  added  up  as  rapidly  as  they  came  in.  The 
first  results  were  as  follows:  — 

Number  of  votes 12,192 

Blank  or  void  ballots 333 

Valid  ballots 11,859 

A  large  number  of  the  void  ballots  had  been 
purposely  annulled  by  the  voters,  who  had  cov- 
ered them  with  fantastic  inscriptions.  The  party 
votes  were  the  following :  — 


PARTY.                TICKET 

TICKET 

MIXED 

TOTAL 

BALLOTS. 

VOTES. 

VOTES. 

VOTES. 

Moderates           546  X  18  = 

9,828  + 

1,865  = 

11,693 

Progressists     2,013  X  18  = 

36,234  + 

3,278  = 

39,512 

Socialists          5,748  X  18  = 

103,464  + 

3,217  = 

106,681 

Flemish 

Democrats    1,127X18  = 

20,286  + 

1,427  = 

21,713 

Independents     411  X  18  = 

7,398  + 

1,027  = 

8,425 

Catholics             972  X  18  = 

17,496  + 

1,909  = 

19,405 

TOTAL        10,817  X  18  = 

194,706  + 

12,723  = 

207,429 

A  very  small  number  of  the  ballots  contained 
"  mixed  votes,"  —  only  1,042  out  of  11,859,  —the 
great  majority,  10,817,  being  cast  for  "tickets." 
With  the  American  law  there  would  doubtless  be 
a  larger  proportion  of  mixed  or  scattering  votes, 
since  the  voter  who  has  marked  the  head  of  his 


PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION.       127 

ticket  is  not  prohibited  from  scattering  a  portion 
of  his  votes  for  candidates  on  other  tickets.  In 
the  Belgian  law,  of  course,  each  "  ticket  vote  " 
counts  eighteen  votes  for  the  party ;  in  the  Amer- 
ican bill  it  counts  only  the  surplus  remaining  after 
the  "  individual  votes "  have  been  counted  for 
those  several  tickets  in  which  the  individually 
designated  candidates  appear. 

The  1,042  mixed  ballots  contained  12,723  votes, 
an  average  of  twelve  to  the  ballot,  whereas  the 
voter  was  entitled  to  eighteen.  This  may  be  ex- 
plained. The  elector  who  scatters  his  votes  is 
embarrassed  in  finding  eighteen  individuals  who 
satisfy  him,  and  on  the  average,  therefore,  loses 
one-third  of  his  party-voting  strength.  He  finds 
it  easier  to  vote  for  tickets  than  for  candidates. 
The  modified  "  ticket  vote  "  of  the  American  bill, 
therefore,  again  assists  those  who  wish  to  vote 
mixed  tickets,  and  in  so  far  promotes  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  voter.  It  allows  him  to  use  all 
the  votes  to  which  he  is  entitled  after  he  has  scat- 
tered his  individual  votes  among  various  tickets 
by  merely  "  bunching  "  the  remaining  votes  on  a 
single  ticket. 

For  the  distribution  of  seats  among  the  political 
parties  the  Belgian  reformers  have  indorsed  a  plan 
drawn  up  by  Professor  D'Hondt,  and  explained  in 
Appendix  I.  to  this  book.  It  is  a  complicated 
plan,  and  does  not  secure  better  results  than  the 


128       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

simple  rule  of  three  adopted  in  Geneva  and  Neu- 
chatel  and  by  the  American  League.  Accord- 
ing to  this  latter  simple  division,  the  distribution 
would  be  the  following:  The  total  number  of 
votes,  207,429,  divided  by  eighteen,  gives  11,523 
as  the  unit  of  representation.  Dividing  the  party 
votes  by  this  unit  provides  for  fifteen  representa- 
tives; the  remaining  three  are  assigned  to  the 
parties  having  the  largest  remainders. 


TOTAL 


VOTE.        REPRESENTATION. 

DER. 

AT 

Moderates  .... 

11,693  - 

-    11,523  =  1  + 

170  = 

1 

Progressists     .    .    . 

39,512  - 

-    11,523  =  3  + 

4,943  = 

3 

Socialists    .... 

106,681  - 

-     11,523  =  9  + 

2,974  = 

9 

Flemish  Democrats 

21,713  - 

-     11,523  =  1  + 

10,190  = 

2 

Independents      .     . 

8,425  - 

-    11,523  =  0  + 

8,425  = 

1 

Catholics    .... 

19,405  - 

-    11,523  =  1  + 

7,882  = 

2 

TOTAL 15 18 

It  is  impossible  under  any  plan  yet  devised 
to  find  an  exactly  proportionate  representation.1 
Representatives  are  living  units,  -and  cannot  be 
parcelled  into  fractions  for  the  accommodation  of 
unfortunate  remainders.  But  taking  the  above 
distribution,  we  find  that  the 

Moderates  get  one  representative  for  11,693  votes. 

Progressists  get  one  representative  for  13,170  votes. 

Socialists  get  one  representative  for  11,853  votes. 

Flemish  Democrats  get  one  representative  for  10,856  votes. 
Independents  get  one  representative  for  8,425  votes. 

Catholics  get  one  representative  for  9,702  votes. 

1  In  Appendix  I.  will  be  found  a  comparison  of  different  plans 
proposed  for  the  distribution  of  seats. 


PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION.       129 

After  determining  the  number  of  representatives 
to  which  each  party  is  entitled,  the  next  step  is 
to  designate  the  individual  candidates  actually 
elected.  The  vote  for  candidates  on  the  Progress- 
ist ticket  is  here  given,  the  others  being  similar. 
This  ticket  is  entitled  to  three  seats,  and  the  indi- 
viduals chosen  are  those  having  the  three  highest 
votes,  as  indicated  below. 

INDIVIDUAL  VOTES  ON  PROGRESSIST  TICKET. 

VOTES  OF  PREF-  VOTES  OF  PREF- 
ERENCE ON      ERENCE  ON         TOTAL. 
TICKET  BALLOTS.  MIXED  BALLOTS. 

DA 738  459  1,197* 

DEM  .  ^    .     .     .  1,012  495  1,507* 

GEN 394  442  836 

LAB 228  349  577 

LAV 282  365  647 

SCA 616  428  1,044* 

SP 388  367  755 

CA 393  373  766 

The  report  of  the  commission  states  that  the 
most  important  men  of  each  party  lead  the  tickets 
in  the  number  of  their  votes.  In  this  connection 
should  be  noted  the  small  number  of  preferences 
given  on  ticket  ballots.  Of  the  10,817  ticket  bal- 
lots only  6,317  indicated  preferences  for  candi- 
dates, the  remaining  4,500  voting  straight  tickets 
with  only  the  single  mark  against  the  title.  The 
6,317  "ticket  votes,"  which  contained  also  indi- 
vidual votes  of  preference  on  the  same  ticket,  in- 
dicated only  21,105  such  preferences,  an  average 


130       PEOPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

slightly  exceeding  three,  as  against  the  average  of 
twelve  individual  votes  011  the  1,042  mixed  bal- 
lots. It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  the  mixed 
ballots,  which  do  not  throw  their  entire  weight 
for  one  party  against  others,  and  so  have  little 
influence  upon  the  share  of  party  representation, 
have,  nevertheless,  a  disproportionately  large  in- 
fluence in  designating  the  candidates  upon  each 
ticket  who  shall  be  elected.  This  might  occur; 
but  in  the  above  election,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
candidates  who  received  the  largest  number  of 
votes  of  preference  on  ticket  ballots  generally  re- 
ceived a  similar  advantage  on  the  mixed  ballots. 

In  this  connection  the  objection  is  made  against 
the  Swiss  system  that  a  strong  party  with  surplus 
votes  might  defeat  the  leader  of  another  party  by 
giving  ^preference  votes  to  a  weak  candidate  on 
the  ticket  of  the  latter.  That  this  objection  has 
but  little  weight  can  be  seen  by  examining  the 
above  table  of  individual  votes  on  the  Progressist 
ticket.  Not  often  would  a  party  be  so  strong  as 
willingly  to  transfer  votes  to  an  opposing  party 
which  would  be  liable  to  swell  the  latter's  repre- 
sentation at  the  expense  of  its  own.  It  could 
jeopardize  only  one  of  the  candidates  on  the  lat- 
ter's ticket,  and  this  would  not  affect  the  leader 
unless  the  party  were  so  small  as  to  be  entitled  to 
only  one  representative.  In  the  Progressist  ticket, 
it  will  be  seen,  209  votes  would  have  been  needed 


PROPORTIONAL  PEPRESENTAT10N.       131 

to  displace  S.C.A.,  the  lowest  successful  candidate 
on  the  ticket,  by  G.  E.  N.,  the  next  in  order,  while 
the  leader  of  the  party,  D.  E.  M.,  exceeds  S.  C.  A. 
by  nearly  500  votes.  The  principal  leader  of  a 
party  may  always  be  expected  to  run  considerably 
ahead  of  his  ticket.  As  between  the  larger  par- 
ties, therefore,  which  are  entitled  to  more  than 
one  representative,  the  objection  has  no  weight, 
while  with  a  party  barely  entitled  to  but  one 
representative  it  assumes  an  improbable  waste  of 
votes  by  the  larger  parties.  It  might  be  added, 
however,  that  in  *the  cumulative  variety  of  the 
free  ticket  as  proposed  in  the  Johnson  bill  and 
adopted  in  Canton  Zug,  the  principal  leaders  of  a 
party  would  be  further  removed  from  such  risk 
than  in  the  single-vote  variety. 


132       PEOPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 


CHAPTER  VI. 
APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY. 

IN  stating  the  advantages  of  proportional  repre- 
sentation there  are  two  lines  of  discussion,  a  theo- 
retical and  a  practical.  The  theoretical  principle 
involves  the  goal  towards  which  electoral  reform 
should  be  directed.  But  to  reach  this  goal  a  plan 
of  action  must  be  devised.  In  the  latter  case  the 
discussion  is  practical,  dealing  with  the  various 
methods  which  have  been  proposed. 

In  a  Democratic  form  of  government,  unlike  an 
absolute  monarchy,  methods  are  as  important  as 
measures.  If  a  practicable  and  effective  method 
of  proportional  representation  cannot  be  discov- 
ered, the  theoretical  principle  is  a  mere  dream. 
We  shall  therefore  best  perceive  the  general  prin- 
ciple and  the  practical  method  by  examining  them 
together. 

In  the  first  place,  proportional  representation 
recognizes  the  nature  of  modern  political  parties 
as  based,  not  altogether  on  sectional  divisions,  but 
on  social  and  economic  problems  of  national  scope. 
There  is  in  various  quarters  a  disposition  to  decry 
and  resist  any  recognition  of  parties.  It  is  pointed 
out,  for  example,  that  the  very  essence  of  civil 


APPLICATION  OF   TBS  REMEDY.  138 

service  reform  lies  in  taking  the  offices  "  out  of 
politics,"  and  that  the  evils  of  municipal  govern- 
ment proceed  from  political  parties. 

The  contention  is  mainly  one  of  definition. 
Possibly  a  new  definition  is  needed  of  "party," 
as  well  as  "politics."  The  latter  has  come  to 
mean  a  base,  underhanded  manipulation  and  diplo- 
macy. But  there  is  also  an  honorable  and  neces- 
sary politics.  All  action  by  government,  whether 
city,  State,  or  nation,  is  political  action.  And  all 
action  by  individuals  towards  incorporating  their 
views  in  laws  and  public  policy  must  be  through 
associations  or  groupings  of  individuals  under 
their  chosen  leadership.  These  groups  are  politi- 
cal parties,  and  this  action  is  the  genuine, 
educational,  vital  function  of  parties  in  popular 
government. 

But  where  there  is  freedom  and  intelligence, 
such  groupings  are  not  rigidly  permanent.  They 
turn  on  political  questions,  and  as  questions 
change  there  come  new  alignments  of  individuals. 
If  the  electoral  machinery  prevents  this,  and  forti- 
fies the  dominant  parties  against  inroads,  compel- 
ling alignment,  on  new  questions  the  same  as  on 
old,  and  forcing  the  same  alignment  on  municipal 
and  State  questions  which  exists  on  national  ques- 
tions, the  party  becomes  a  machine,  sustained  by 
spoils  and  plunder,  and  there  is  no  freedom  for 
the  voter.  If,  however,  the  electoral  machinery 


184         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

be  modified  so  as  to  permit  the  representation  of 
new  elements  within  the  old  parties,  or  to  facili- 
tate the  representation  of  new  parties,  then  we 
should  have,  not  rigidity  and  corruption,  but 
natural  and  wholesome  political  growth,  whether 
in  city,  State,  or  nation. 

*!  Proportional  representation,  therefore,  is  based 
nipon  a  frank  recognition  of  parties  as  indispensable 
'(in  free  government.  This  very  recognition,  in- 
stead of  making  partisan  government  all-powerful, 
is  the  necessary  condition  for  subordinating  parties 
to  the  public  good.  To  control  social  forces,  as 
well  as  physical  forces,  we  must  acknowledge  their 
existence  and  strength,  must  understand  them, 
and  then  must  shape  our  machinery  in  accordance 
with  their  laws.  We  conquer  nature  by  obeying 
her. 

At  the  same  time,  though  recognizing  political 
parties  based  on  social  questions,  yet,  in  a  nation 
of  such  vast  territory  as  the  United  States,  sec- 
tional differences  also  demand  recognition.  These 
are  amply  provided  for  in  our  Federal  Constitution. 
The  Senate  of  the  United  States  represents  the 
States,  without  regard  to  population  or  parties. 
It  is  not  proposed  to  criticise  this  practice.  It 
is  an  important  feature  of  our  Federal  system. 
Yet  it  does  not  seem  that  the  Senate  should  have 
the  same  weight  in  legislation  as  the  House  of 
Representatives.  It  ought  to  sink  to  the  level 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY.  135 

of  a  revisory  board  like  the  House  of  Lords,  or  the 
upper  chambers  of  the  Canadian  and  Provincial 
parliaments.  Such  would  become  its  status,  if  the 
House  truly  represented  the  people,  and  furnished 
a  lifelong  arena  for  their  political  leaders.  As 
it  is,  the  Senate  shines,  not  by  ability,  but  by 
comparison. 

The  House  is  supposed  to  represent  the  people. 
A  combination  of  sectional  and  party  representa- 
tion would  be  secured  in  this  branch  by  elect- 
ing State  delegations  on  the  proportional  basis. 
Congress  has  power  to  provide  without  Constitu- 
tional amendment  for  this  plan  of  election.  The 
gerrymander  has  destroyed  whatever  unity  of  local 
representation  the  present  system  may  retain  in 
theory.  Districts  are  frequently  changed ;  agri- 
cultural, manufacturing,  mining  areas  are  thrown 
together.  The  State,  however,  is  a  truly  organic 
unit,  accustomed  to  act  as  such ;  and  State  election 
of  national  representatives  would  harmonize  with 
this  unity,  and  would  permit  the  free  play  of  sec- 
tional as  well  as  national  interests. 

In  State  legislatures  a  similar  distinction  might 
be  made.  In  the  lower  house  the  county,  or  a 
small  group  of  counties,  electing  ten  or  twelve 
representatives,  could  be  made  the  unit.  In  a 
House  of  one  hundred  members,  there  would  be 
eight  or  ten  districts,  each  sending  its  delegation 
elected  on  the  proportional  basis. 


136         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

The  State  senate  should  be  elected  on  a  general 
ticket  for  the  State  at  large,  one-half  perhaps  at 
each  election.  It  is  difficult  to  describe  the  prin- 
ciple upon  which  senates  at  present  are  chosen. 
Their  membership  is  small,  ranging  from,  thirty- 
five  to  fifty.  Hence  senators  cannot  stand  for 
counties.  Only  nine  of  the  fifty-two  Indiana 
senators  represent  single  counties,  and  two  of 
these  are  from  one  county.  The  others  represent 
the  most  arbitrary  combinations  of  two,  three,  and 
four  counties  each,  arranged  only  for  partisan  pur- 
poses. May  not  the  senate  be  given  a  distinctive 
place  and  character,  elected  on  the  broad  basis  of 
the  State,  representing  the  whole  people,  thereby 
attracting  to  its  halls  the  recognized  leaders  of 
thought  and  action  throughout  the  common- 
wealth? 

At  the  same  time  local  interests  would  have 
their  influence.  A  political  party  with  only 
meagre  sagacity  would  distribute  its  nominees 
either  for  Congress  or  for  a  State  senate  as  widely 
as  possible  over  the  State.  Only  in  this  way 
could  it  appeal  to  the  voters  of  all  classes  and  in- 
terests. Even  now  we  see  this  distribution  in  the 
nomination  of  tickets  of  State  candidates,  from 
the  governor  to  the  chief  of  statistics.  If  sec- 
tional differences  are  decisive,  political  parties 
may  be  trusted  to  provide  for  them. 

The  canton  of  Geneva,  with  a  single  legislative 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY.  137 

assembly  of  one  hundred  members,  elects  them 
on  the  proportional  plan,  in  three  nearly  equal 
groups ;  one  group  of  thirty-four  from  the  city  of 
Geneva,  one  group  from  the  right  and  another 
from  the  left  bank  of  the  river. 

In  municipal  elections  the  unity  of  the  city 
would  be  recognized  by  abolishing  the  wards  alto- 
gether, and  by  electing  only  one  legislative  assem- 
bly instead  of  two.  With  a  single  chamber  also, 
as  in  foreign  cities,  responsibility  will  be  central- 
ized, and  the  honor  of  the  position  enhanced. 
The  board  of  aldermen  or  common  council  might 
consist  of  thirty  members,  ten  of  them  to  be 
elected  each  year.  There  might,  indeed,  be  cities 
of  extensive  area,  or  with  sections  of  opposing 
interests,  where  two  or  three  general  tickets  could 
be  elected.  But  as  a  rule  this  would  not  be  neces- 
sary, for  the  parties  would  be  careful  to  distribute 
candidates  among  the  sections. 


•N  *  The  significance  of  proportional  representation, 
as  far  as  it  affects  popular  elections,  consists  in 
the  fact  that  it  prohibits  the  exaggerated  influ- 
ence of  small  factions  holding  the  balance  of 
power  between  two  parties.  For  this  reason  it 
will  remove  the  incentives  to  bribery  and  extrava- 
gant use  of  money  in  elections.  The  secret  bal- 
lot has  made  bribery  difficult  and  dangerous,  but 
it  has  not  touched  the  inducements  to  bribery. 


138         PROPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

The  number  of  close  districts  is  so  large  that  ma- 
jorities in  the  legislatures  and  Congress,  as  well 
as  popular  majorities  for  executive  and  judicial 
officers,  turn  on  narrow  margins.  The  bribable 
vote  is  as  large  as,  or  even  larger  than,  the  shifting 
vote,1  and  is  therefore  adequate  to  decide  elec- 
tions, and  to  turn  the  control  of  legislative  bodies 
with  large  majorities  from  one  party  to  the  other. 
But  with  proportional  representation  there  is  no^ 
faction  or  group  which  holds  the  balance  of  power. 
*  A  change  of  the  entire  venal  vote,  should  it  equal 
the  Connecticut  average  of  12J  per  cent,  would 
affect  only  12^  per  cent  of  the  result.  But  as 
the  changes  of  this  kind  are  more  or  less  offset 
by  both  parties,  they  could  not  disturb  more  than 
one  per  cent  to  three  per  cent  of  the  total  vote.  It 
can  therefore  be  seen  how  diminutive  would  be 
the  briber's  influence.  Successful  bribery  would 
endanger  only  one  candidate  out  of  a  party's 
representation.  And  this,  unless  the  legislature 
were  minutely  close,  would  not  be  worth  the 
briber's  expense.  A  legislature  elected  by  bribery- 
could  be  of  no  service  unless  it  contained  a  ma- 
jority for  the  bribers.  The  only  cases  in  which 
bribery  might  be  expected  to  give  a  political  party 
such  a  clear  majority,  would  be  in  those  States 
where  the  party  vote  is  very  close,  as  in  New 
York  and  Indiana,  where  the  two  parties  often 

i  See  pp.  79,  80, 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY.  139 

differ  by  less  than  1  per  cent  of  the  total  vote. 
But  even  in  such  cases,  it  must  be  remembered, 
there  are  third  and  fourth  parties,  which,  if  repre- 
sented, would  hold  the  balance,  and  would  prevent 
a  clear  majority  for  either  of  the  great  parties. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  Federal  Congress.  In 
other  States,  where  one  party  has  a  heavy  major- 
ity, the  bribable  vote  is  not  large  enough  to  over- 
come it.  The  secret  ballot  makes  bribery  difficult ; 
proportional  representation  makes  it  fruitless. 

>^  -  Proportional  representation  based  upon  political 
opinions,  rather  than  territorial  areas,  is  a  "  specif- 
ic "  for  the  gerrymander.  As  already  shown,  the 
gerrymander  is  an  inevitable  result  of  the  district 
system.  It  is  merely  a  phase  of  the  attempt  to 
outline  the  districts  or  the  wards.  If  there  are 
no  districts,  there  can  be  no  gerrymander.  Other 
remedies  must  fail.  The  courts  in  various  States 
have  recently  taken  upon  themselves  the  right  to 
overrule  certain  redistricting  acts  contrived  for  the 
election  of  State  legislators.  This  policy  is  dan- 
gerous to  the  integrity  of  the  courts,  as  well  as 
fruitless.  The  courts  are  not  empowered  to  sub- 
stitute an  apportionment  of  their  own  creation ; 
and  therefore,  by  declaring  an  existing  gerry- 
mander unconstitutional,  they  merely  call  back  a 
previous  one  of  another  party,  usually  their  own, 
and  equally  vicious  with  the  one  condemned.  But 


140         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

proportional  representation,  by  abolishing  districts 
altogether,  wipes  out  the  very  substance  of  the 
gerrymander.  It  relieves  the  courts  and  the  le- 
gislatures of  an  onerous  burden  and  a  dangerous 
power.  So  inevitable  and  self-evident  is  this 
remedy  for  the  troublesome  gerrymander  that  to 
add  more  words  in  explanation  of  it  could  only 
weaken  the  force  of  the  simple  statement. 

Not  only  are  parties  primarily  represented,  they 
are  represented  with  mathematical  accuracy  in 
proportion  to  their  strength.  Justice  and  equal- 
ity become  realities.  Instead  of  the  flagrantly 
distorted  assemblies,  which  by  way  of  rhetoric  we 
call  representative,  we  should  have  a  true  reflec- 
tion of  the  people.  And  this  equal  representation 
is  elastic.  It  conforms  to  all  the  movements  of 
population.  If  cities  increase  in  size,  their  repre- 
sentation increases  in  legislatures  and  Congress. 

Even  more  significant  than  unequal  representa- 
tion as  between  parties,  is  the  large  number  of 
voters  who  under  the  district  system  are  wholly 
unrepresented.  The  tables  given  in  Chapter  III.1 
show  for  certain  elections  of  congressmen,  of  mem- 
bers of  the  New  York  Assembly,  and  of  aldermen 
of  New  York  City,  the  number  of  electors  who 
voted  for  successful  candidates,  and  are  therefore 
represented  by  men  of  their  choice,  and  the  num- 

1  See  pp.  74-77. 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY.          141 

ber  who  voted  for  unsuccessful  candidates,  and 
are  therefore  unrepresented.  By  reference  to 
those  tables  it  will  be  seen  that,  by  the  congres- 
sional election  of  1894,  44.5  per  cent  of  the  voters 
are  unrepresented  in  Congress  by  men  of  their 
own  choosing.  That  this  is  the  usual  proportion 
is  shown  by  the  fact  that  for  the  Fortieth,  Forty- 
first,  and  Forty-second  Congresses,  elected  more 
than  twenty  years  earlier,  the  proportion  of  unrep- 
resented voters  was  42  per  cent.  In  the  New 
York  Assembly  elected  in  1894,  44.4  per  cent  of 
the  voters  are  unrepresented ;  and  in  the  Board  of 
Aldermen  of  New  York  City  51.9  per  cent  are 
unrepresented. 

The  theory  by  which  it  is  sought  to  justify  the 
present  system  in  its  denial  of  representation  to 
nearly  half  the  voters,  is  based  on  the  assertion 
that  a  minority  party  in  one  district  will  be  a 
majority  party  in  another ;  and  that,  therefore,  the 
minority  voters  whose  particular  candidates  are 
not  successful  will,  nevertheless,  be  represented, 
because  legislators  in  other  districts  will  be 
elected  by  voters  of  the  same  political  faith. 

That  such  an  argument  should  be  generally  ac- 
cepted as  adequate  is  striking  evidence  of  the  hold 
which  political  parties  as  corporate  entities  have 
gained  upon  the  popular  imagination.  So  unques- 
tioned is  the  notion  of  the  solidarity  and  the  com- 
munity of  interests  of  men  of  the  same  party,  no 


142         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

matter  how  far  apart  they  may  live  in  different 
sections  of  the  nation,  the  State,  or  the  city,  that 
one-half  the  people  are  willing  to  forego  the  right 
of  personal  representation,  and  to  permit  distant 
and  often  antagonistic  interests  to  choose  for  them 
their  own  representatives.  It  is  assumed  that  the 
Negroes  and  Republicans  of  the  Southern  States 
are  represented  by  Republicans  chosen  in  the 
North,  and  that  Northern  Democrats  can  find  their 
spokesmen  in  the  Democrats  from  the  South.  In 
the  present  New  York  Assembly,  13  of  the  23 
Democratic  assemblymen  were  elected  by  47,700 
Tammany  voters  of  New  York  City.  Can  it  be 
said  that  the  350,000  Democrats  of  the  remainder 
of  the  State  will  find  their  views  expressed  by 
these  Tammany  assemblymen  from  the  city? 
Are  the  Republican  merchants  of  the  city  repre- 
sented by  the  farmers  from  the  country?  These 
voters  for  defeated  candidates  have  no  voice  in  the 
selection  of  the  standard-bearers  of  their  own  party. 
In  this  important  sense  they  are  unrepresented. 
Unable  to  affect  elections  within  their  own  party, 
they  leave  the  machine  in  control.  The  present 
influence  of  Tammany  Hall  would  be  much  lessened 
in  State  and  Federal  politics,  did  not  the  district 
systetn  make  its  leaders  spokesmen,  not  only  for  its 
own  following,  but  also  for  the  unrepresented 
Democracy  of  the  State  at  large.  Proportional 
representation  would  increase  the  representation 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY.  143 

of  the  latter  while  reducing  the  representation  of 
Tammany,  and  so  lessen  its  autocratic  power. 
Candidates,  too,  are  not  nominated  on  one  issue 
alone,  but  on  several.  It  is  this  tempering  and 
modulation  of  the  representative  body  so  as  to 
correspond  with  all  phases  of  opinion  and  policy 
throughout  the  country  or  the  State  that  propor- 
tional representation  guarantees. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that,  in  this  discussion,  we  are 
not  concerned  directly  with  the  basis  of  suffrage. 
We  are  not  inquiring  whether  it  shall  be  wide  or 
limited,  plural  or  singular,  male  or  female,  old  or 
young,  white  or  black,  intimidated  or  free.  We 
take  the  suffrage  for  granted,  and  inquire  only 
whether,  such  as  it  is,  it  is  effective ;  whether,  with 
the  show  of  representation,  there  is  essential  dis- 
franchisement,  and  what  are  the  remedies  therefor. 

>  Proportional  representation  promises,  above  all, 
the  independence  of  the  voter,  and  freedom  from 
» the  rule  of  the  party  machine.  It  will  not  abolish 
parties,  it  recognizes  them.  But  it  permits  new 
alignments  and  groupings  of  individuals  within 
and  without  existing  parties  at  the  expense  of  the 
iron-bound  classification  imposed  by  the  modern 
highly  developed  party  machine. 

The  secret  of  machine  rule  lies  in  the  control 
of  nominations,  and  the  rigid  alignment  of  voters 
in  two  camps.  Freedom  from  the  machine,  then, 


144         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

means,  first,  power  on  the  part  of  the  voters  to  con- 
trol the  nominations  of  their  party;  and  second, 
power  to  defeat  obnoxious  candidates  without  en- 
dangering the  success  of  the  party.  Both  of  these 
advantages  are  provided  for  in  the  proposed  bill. 

First,  as  to  influencing  nominations.  In  many 
of  the  cities  of  this  country,  where  representative 
institutions  have  most  signally  failed,  the  public 
alarm  is  showing  itself  in  spirited  independent 
movements  of  the  best  classes  of  citizens  from  all 
political  parties.  But  these  municipal  leagues  and 
civic  federations  can  act  only  indirectly  upon  the 
city  authorities.  They  have  very  little  influence 
upon  the  nominations  of  the  two  parties  for  mu- 
nicipal officers.  They  do  not  attempt  independent 
political  action,  their  only  resource  being  to  enter 
into  combination  with  one  of  the  machines  in  order 
to  defeat  the  other.  But  suppose,  in  such  a  situa- 
tion, proportional  representation  were  adopted. 
The  Municipal  League  could  then  nominate  an 
independent  ticket  by  petition  signed  by  one  per 
cent  of  the  voters  at  the  last  general  election. 
Let  this  ticket  be  nominated  in  advance  6f  the 
nominations  by  the  dominant  parties.  Let  it  con- 
tain names  of  the  best  citizens  of  both  parties,  men 
whose  ability,  public  spirit,  and  integrity  are  every- 
where acknowledged.  The  two  dominant  parties 
would  be  almost  forced  to  indorse  these  candi- 
dates. In  that  case  the  candidates  would  select 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY.          145 

the  party  for  which  their  individual  votes  should 
be  counted.  If  it  should  happen  that  the  entire 
ticket  of  the  Municipal  League  were  indorsed  by 
the  various  parties,  the  League's  ticket  would 
wholly  disappear ;  but  the  members  and  friends  of 
the  League  would  scatter  their  votes  among  the 
other  tickets,  voting  individually  for  their  own 
original  candidates.  The  following  will  illustrate 
the  process. 

Suppose  there  are  ten  aldermen  to  elect,  and 
that  the  League  can  muster  300  voters,  the  Re- 
publicans 500,  the  Democrats  400,  and  the  Labor 
party  100.  Each  voter  being  entitled  to  ten 
votes,  there  would  be  13,000  votes  in  all,  requir- 
ing 1,300  to  elect  a  single  candidate.  Suppose 
the  League  to  place  in  nomination  the  following 
ticket,  consisting  of  three  Republicans,  three  Dem- 
ocrats, and  one  Labor  candidate. 

TICKET  OF  MUNICIPAL  LEAGUE. 
REPUBLICANS  <  B.... 


DEMOCRATS 
LABOR  \  G... 


If,  now,  the  character  of  their  nominees  is  so 
distinguished  that  the  existing  parties  would  be 
constrained  to  indorse  them  all,  and,  being  thus 


146       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

indorsed,  the  candidates  should  indicate  the  ex- 
isting parties  as  the  beneficiaries  of  their  votes  (in 
accordance  with  section  3  of  the  bill),  the  tickets 
to  be  voted  at  the  election  would  be  as  follows  :  — 


REPUBLICANS.  DEMOCRATS. 


A  *A  *D  *G 

B  *B  *E  N 

C  *C  *F  O 

DHL 
E  I  M 

K 


Each  party,  unless  required  by  law,  would  nom- 
inate, not  a  complete  list,  but  only  about  as  many 
as  each  expected  to  elect.  If,  now,  the  300  voters 
of  the  League  should  distribute  their  votes  indi- 
vidually for  the  seven  League  candidates,  as  indi- 
cated above,  while  all  others  should  vote  straight 
tickets  for  their  respective  parties,  the  result 
would  be  :  — 

Republicans,  5,000  +  900  =  5,900  votes,  electing  5  aldermen. 
Democrats,  4,000  -f  900  =  4,900  votes,  electing  4  aldermen. 
Labor,  1,000  +  300  =  1,300  votes,  electing  1  alderman. 

TOTAL,  12,100  10 

In  this  extreme  case  the  League  has  seen  its 
own  ticket  disappear,  but  has  dictated  the  nomina- 
tions of  the  other  parties,  and,  by  adding  its  votes 
to  theirs,  has  elected  its  own  nominees.  The  five 
Republicans  elected  would  include  A,  B,  C,  who 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY.          147 

receive  800  individual  votes  each,  against  500 
each  for  H,  I,  and  K.  The  four  Democrats  would 
include  D,  E,  F,  who  receive  700  individual  votes 
each,  against  400  each  for  L  and  M.  The  Labor 
candidate,  G,  receives  400,  against  100  for  N  and 
O.  Of  course  it  is  not  expected  that  in  actual 
practice  the  500  Republicans,  for  example,  would 
all  vote  straight  tickets.  Many  of  them  might  give 
preferences  for  H,  I,  and  K,  but  many  more  would 
give  their  preferences  for  A,  B,  and  C,  while  the 
entire  weight  of  the  League  would  be  thrcrwu  for 
A,  B,  and  C.  And  so  for  the  other  parties. 

What  reason  have  we  to  suppose  that  other 
parties  would  swallow  the  League  ticket,  as  above 
indicated?  Simply  the  fact  that  their  voters  are 
perfectly  free  to  abandon  their  party  nominees, 
and  to  vote  for  the  League  candidates  of  their 
own  political  stripe,  yet  not  nominated  by  their 
own  machine.  For  example,  if  the  other  parties 
declined  to  indorse  the  League  candidates,  the 
tickets  now  to  be  voted  would  be :  - 

MUNICIPAL  LEAGUE.       REPUBLICANS -X       DEMOCRATS.       LABOR. 

rAx  H  L  N 

Republican  j  B  x  I  MO 

1C  x  K  R 

/-DPS 
Democrat]  E  Q  T 

(F  u 

Labor  j  G 


148       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 


I  have  indicated  the  vote  of  a  supposed  Repub- 
lican who  gives  one  vote  each  to  the  Republicans 
on  the  League  ticket,  and  his  other  seven  votes  to 
his  own  ticket  straight.  Supposing  all  the  Repub- 
licans, Democrats,  and  Laborites  to  do  the  same  (of 
course  an  extreme  case),  we  should  have  the  fol- 
lowing result :  — 


MUNICIPAL  LEAGUE. 

3,000  straight 
1,500  Repub. 
1,200  Demo. 
100  Labor 
5,800 
Electing  4 


REPUBLICANS.        DEMOCRATS. 


5,000 
—  1,500 


4,000 
—  1,200 


1,000 
—  100 


900 

1 


The  extent  to  which  the  Municipal  League 
could  go  in  electing  its  candidates  would,  of  course, 
depend  upon  the  ripeness  of  voters  for  revolt  from 
their  parties.  In  a  case  like  that  above,  where  the 
parties  declined  to  indorse  any  of  the  League  can- 
didates, we  might  expect  a  much  larger  disaffec- 
tion than  above  supposed,  and  the  election  of  a 
larger  number  of  League  candidates.  It  will  be 
noticed  that  the  Republicans,  by  "  bolting "  their 
party,  have  succeeded  in  electing  six  Republicans 
instead  of  the  five  to  which  their  proportions  origi- 
nally entitled  them.  But  three  of  these  six  are 
nominees  of  the  League,  A,  B,  and  C,  who  get 
800  votes  each  (300  from  the  League  and  500 
from  the  Republicans).  One  of  the  League  Dem- 
ocrats is  elected  with  700  votes. 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY.  149 

I  have  given  two  extreme  variations  out  of  the 
several  combinations  possible.  Many  others  might 
be  suggested  and  worked  out.  I  will  conclude 
with  one  more. 

Suppose  the  Republicans  and  Democrats  each 
nominate  one  of  the  League  candidates.  The  tick- 
ets would  be :  — 

MUNICIPAL  LEAGUE.X       REPUBLICANS.       DEMOCRATS.        LABOR. 

A  Ax  Dx  N 

B  H  L  O 

C  I  M 

D  K  R 

E  PS 

F  Q  T 
-   G- 

I  have  indicated  the  vote  of  a  Leaguer  who 
gives  one  vote  to  each  of  his  nominees  on  the 
Republican  and  Democratic  tickets,  and  eight  to 
his  League  ticket.  Supposing  the  others  to  vote 
likewise,  and  the  other  parties  to  vote  straight,  we 
should  have :  — 


League, 
Republicans, 
Democrats, 
Labor, 

2,400  votes, 
5,300  votes, 
4,300  votes, 
1,000  votes, 

electing 
electing 
electing 
electing 

2  aldermen. 
4  aldermen. 
3  aldermen. 
1  alderman. 

13,000  votes,    electing    10  aldermen. 

In  this  case  the  League  has  elected  two  men  on 
its  own  ticket,  and  two  of  its  own  nominees  on 
other  tickets. 

So  much  for  the  influence  of  voters  upon  the 


150       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

nominations  of  candidates.  The  second  element 
of  strength  in  proportional  representation  is  the 
power  it  gives  to  voters  to  defeat  obnoxious  can- 
didates of  their  own  party  without  endangering 
the  success  of  the  party  as  a  whole.  This  may  be 
illustrated  by  another  example,  such  as  may  often 
be  found  in  a  State  at  large,  where  there  is  no  in- 
dependent organization  like  the  Municipal  League, 
ready  to  anticipate  the  party  nominations.  Sup- 
pose in  such  a  case  that  the  parties  with  the  rela- 
tive strength  of  500  Republicans,  400  Democrats, 
100  Laborites,  place  the  following  tickets  in 
nomination :  — 

REPUBLICANS.  DEMOCRATS.  LABOR. 

A  D  N 

B  E  O 

C  F 

H  L 

I  M 

K  R 

If  the  voting  were  as  usual,  the  Republicans 
would  have  5,000  votes,  electing  five  candidates  ; 
the  Democrats  4,000,  electing  four ;  and  the  La- 
borites 1,000  votes,  electing  one.  But  suppose 
the  party  organization  of  the  Republicans  has  fla- 
grantly disregarded  the  wishes  of  200  Republicans, 
and  nominated  no  candidate  representing  them. 
Under  the  present  system  of  plurality  election, 
these  200  Republicans  know  that  to  put  up  an  in- 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY.          151 

dependent  ticket  means  both  their  own  defeat  and 
that  of  the  Republican  party  as  a  whole,  with  the 
election  of  the  Democrat.  But  with  proportional 
representation  they  could  safely  nominate  an  inde- 
pendent ticket.  The  tickets  would  be  as  fol- 
lows :  — 


REPUBLICANS.  DEMOCRATS.  LABOR. 

A  D  N  AA 

B  E  O  BB 

C  F  CO 

H  L 

I  M 

K  K 

The  result  of  the  election  would  be  :  — 

Independent  Repub.,  2,000  votes,  electing  2  representatives. 

Republicans,  3,000  votes,  electing  3  representatives. 

Democrats,  4,000  votes,  electing  4  representatives. 

Labor,  1,000  votes,  electing  1  representative. 

We  see  here  a  striking  advantage  of  .proportional 
representation.  An  independent  movement  takes 
place  in  the  ranks  of  a  plurality  party,  and  does 
not  in  the  least  endanger  the  success  of  the  party 
as  a  whole.  The  Republicans  elect  as  many  repre- 
sentatives as  before  the  division,  so  that  on  party 
questions  they  retain  their  original  strength  in  the 
legislature;  but  the  individuals  elected  are  by  no 
means  the  same.  Two  of  the  five  are  wholly  inde- 
pendent of  the  machine  organization.  Of  course, 
if  the  independent  movement  increased,  as  it  could 


152        PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

readily  do,  if  the  candidates  of  the  regular  organiza- 
tion were  objectionable,  the  number  of  independent 
representatives  would  be  increased  proportionally 
at  the  expense  of  the  regular  nominees. 

It  is  easily  seen  that  this  increased  power  to 
reject  the  nominees  of  a  party  must  react  strongly 
upon  the  character  of  the  nominees.  The  latter 
are  nominated  to  be  elected.  Under  the  present 
system  very  inferior  men  may  be  elected,  because 
the  voters  have  no  other  choice.  Let  them  have, 
however,  the  wide  freedom  of  choice  which  pro- 
portional representation  gives,  and  the  party  mana- 
gers will  be  forced  to  place  before  them  a  much 
higher  grade  of  candidates,  who  will  be  suited  to 
their  wishes.  Thus  proportional  representation 
gives  the  voters  power  against  the  influence  of 
the  machine  to  control  nominations,  not  only  di- 
rectly, by  nominating  early  their  own  candidates 
for  a  later  indorsement  by  the  regular  organiza- 
tion, but  also  indirectly,  by  their  increased  power 
to  "bolt,"  and  defeat  obnoxious  candidates  who 
have  been  "regularly"  nominated. 

The  secret  of  these  combinations  and  recombi- 
nations, of  this  unparalleled  freedom  of  the  voter, 
springs  from  two  facts:  first,  instead  of  requiring 
a  majority  or  plurality  to  elect  a  candidate,  a  much 
smaller  fraction  can  do  so;  and  second,  a  wide 
territorial  area  is  given  for  combinations  of  voters 
of  the  same  opinions.  Instead  of  a  ward  we  have 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY.  153 

a  city;  instead  of  a  district  we  have  a  State. 
Under  the  present  system,  independent  voters  who 
actually  place  a  ticket  in  the  field  are  usually  in 
the  minority.  If,  however,  we  count  those  who 
stay  at  home,  as  we  should  do  to  a  large  extent, 
the  number  of  independents  is  very  great.  But 
they  have  only  a  choice  between  two  machines. 
They  are  penned  up  in  narrow  districts  under 
the  whip  of  the  party  bosses.  But  proportional 
representation  breaks  down  the  fences,  and  en- 
ables them  to  combine  throughout  the  city  or 
State.  And,  furthermore,  it  allows  them  to  com- 
bine within  their  own  party  organization  without 
promoting  the  success  of  the  opposing  party's 
machine. 

That  this  feature  of  proportional  representation 
strikes  at  the  radical  evil  of  present-day  politics,  is 
shown  abundantly  by  current  literature.  We  may 
notice  absenteeism  and  the  primaries. 

Surely  it  is  an  alarming  condition  when  the  in- 
telligent and  business  classes  everywhere  leave  the 
primaries  and  the  elections  to  the  "  heelers,"  the 
loafers,  and  the  ignorant.  The  extent  of  this  evil 
is  in  recent  years  well  understood,  but  its  causes 
are  unexplained.  Says  a  writer  in  an  article  favor- 
ing compulsory  voting:1  uln  the  State  of  New 
York  300,375  persons  who  voted  in  1888  remained 

1  F.  \Y.  Holls,  in  Annals  of  American  Academy  of  Political 
and  Social  Science,  April,  1891,  pp.  589,  590. 


154       PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

away  from  the  polls  in  1889;  and  286,278  did  so 
in  1890.  In  the  last  mayoralty  election  in  New 
York  City  (1890),  over  35,000  men  who  had  even 
registered  abstained  from  voting,  with  the  result 
that  the  city  was  once  more  turned  over  to  an 
organized  band  of  plunderers.  A  more  deliberate 
and  extensive  betrayal  of  trust  would  be  difficult 
to  find.  In  Massachusetts  -the  total  vote  of  328,- 
588  in  1888  fell  to  260,798  in  1890,  a  difference 
of  67,790.  In  Chicago  the  figures  are  even  more 
startling.  In  the  spring  election  of  1887  less  than 
72,000  out  of  a  possible  138,000  were  cast,— 
66,000  citizens  failing  in  their  duty,  —  while  in 
June  of  the  same  year,  at  the  judiciary  election 
for  the  choice  of  judges  for  a  city  of  almost  a  mil- 
lion of  souls,  the  total  vote  was  44,074,  less  than 
one-third  of  the  number  of  qualified  voters."  Pro- 
fessor A.  B.  Hart1  affirms  that  the  voting  popula- 
tion is  one-fourth  of  the  total  population,  and  that 
in  the  presidential  elections  five-sixths  of  this  vote 
is  cast.  In  New  York,  in  1880,  the  vote  was 
1,104,605,  being  23  per  cent  of  the  population,  and 
95  per  cent  of  the  legal  voters;  but  in  1891  it  was 
only  259,425.  In  New  York  City  in  1888,  the 
vote  was  18  per  cent  of  the  population;  in  1890  it 
was  11  per  cent,  and  in  1891  it  was  13|  per  cent. 
In  Massachusetts  the  census  of  1885  showed 

1  "Practical  Essays  on  American  Government,"  pp.  24,  30. 
New  York,  1893, 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY.          155 

442,616  voters;  but  the  vote  for  governor  in  that 
year  was  only  209,668,  and  in  1894  it  was  13  per 
cent  of  the  population.  For  president  in  1888  in 
that  State  it  was  344,243.  In  Boston,  says  Mr. 
S.  B.  Capen,  President  of  the  Municipal  League, 
the  assessed  polls  in  January,  1895,  were  143,435. 
Of  these  but  88,214  were  registered,  and  only 
70,191  —  less  than  one-half  of  the  eligibles  —  took 
the  trouble  to  vote.  Ward  11,  the  home  of  the 
rich,  shows  the  lowest  proportion  of  actual  votes, 
as  compared  with  registered  citizens.  The  full 
figures  are:  assessed  polls,  7,809;  registered, 
4,807:  votes  cast,  3,533.  Ward  9,  the  Beacon 
Hill  ward,  shows  assessed  polls,  3,838 ;  registered, 
2,260;  votes  cast,  1,687.  And  at  a  party  primary 
held  in  Ward  11,  there  were  but  81  votes  cast  in 
four  precincts  out  of  800  entitled  to  vote. 

Up  to  the  present  time  the  greater  part  of  the 
agitation  for  better  government  consists  in  bitterly 
criticising  the  intelligent  voters  who  stay  at  home, 
and  beseeching  them  to  meet  their  political  duties. 
It  is  assumed  that  their  only  reasons  are  bad 
weather,  dirty  politics,  business  engagements,  and 
lack  of  public  spirit.  Indeed,  such  reasons  come 
to  the  surface ;  but  even  when  these  classes  are 
aroused,  as  at  the  present  time,  and  ready  to  do 
their  share  of  work,  no  one  can  fail  to  see  that 
they  are  cowed  and  silenced  by  their  utter  help- 
lessness and  the  hopelessness  of  their  cause.  Sep- 


156       PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

arated  by  arbitrary  ward  lines  in  narrow  districts, 
they  cannot  get  together  throughout  the  city.  If 
they  have  a  record  of  independence,  the  party  pri- 
mary excludes  them;  and,  if  admitted,  they  are 
not  a  match  against  the  party  organization.  Poli- 
tics is  a  business.  It  requires  time  and  strength. 
The  politician  does  the  least  of  his  work  in  the 
primary.  The  real  work  is  done  beforehand,  and 
the  primary  registers  the  "  cut-and-dried  "  decrees. 
America  has  no  leisured  citizens  who  can  afford 
to  give  themselves  to  this  work.  They  must 
leave  it  to  the  professionals. 

With  proportional  representation  the  party  pri- 
mary loses  much  of  its  significance.  Nominations 
can  be  made  by  petition.  Municipal  leagues, 
civic  federations,  business  men's  associations, 
chambers  of  commerce,  labor  unions,  have  their 
completed  organizations.  These  can  nominate 
their  tickets  by  petition,  or  can  indorse  those 
already  nominated.  As  in  English  cities,  where 
it  requires  but  eight  signatures  to  nominate  a 
candidate  for  the  municipal  council,  the  matter 
would  adjust  itself,  and  there  would  be  no  danger 
from  a  multiplicity  of  candidates  and  tickets. 
With  such  facility  in  the  nomination  of  indepen- 
dent tickets,  and  with  independent  parties  holding 
the  balance  of  power,  the  party  primaries  would 
fall  into  disuse.  Politicians  would  not  struggle  to 
control  them,  seeing  that  even  if  successful,  yet  their 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY.          157 

party  could  not  elect  a  majority  of  the  assembly, 
and  so  make  it  worth  while  for  them  to  control  the 
primaries.  They  would  learn  also  to  nominate  by 
petition,  as  is  the  practice  in  other  countries. 

At  the  same  time  the  primaries  and  conventions 
must  be  recognized  at  present  as  the  sources  of 
power.  The  most  serious  evil  connected  with 
them,  and  the  one  which  gives  the  machine  its 
control,  is  the  practice  of  exclusive  majority  rule. 
Committees  and  delegates  are  elected  by  a  major- 
ity vote  on  the  principle  of  the  general  ticket,  or 
else  the  chairman  is  authorized  to  appoint  them, 
and  he  is  the  product  of  a  majority  vote.  The 
true  purpose  of  a  primary  or  convention,  as  repre- 
senting all  sections  of  a  party,  is  defeated.  It  is 
proper  that  the  majority  should  elect  the  chairman, 
or  nominate  single  candidates  ;  but  why  should  the 
majority  be  alone  represented  on  committees,  dele- 
gations, and  general  tickets  ?  Plainly,  here  is  need 
for  a  further  application  of  the  proportional  rule. 

Mr.  D.  S.  Remsen  of  the  New  York  bar,  in 
his  essay  on  "Primary  Elections,"  has  made  a 
careful  study  of  the  rules  governing  party  organ- 
izations, and  the  management  of  primaries  and 
conventions  in  the  United  States.  He  advocates 
a  plan  of  primary  election  similar  to  Mr.  Hare's 
single  transferable  vote  already  described  in  these 
pages.  It  is  probable  that  the  complexity  in- 
volved in  counting  the  votes  according  to  that 


158       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 


plan  would  cause  it  to  break  down  in  the  confu- 
sion of  a  mass-meeting  and  in  the  hands  of 
tellers  who  are  inexpert.  A  plan  is  required 
which  will  be  simple  and  quickly  worked.  Such 
a  one  has  been  proposed  by  Dr.  L.  B.  Tucker- 
man  of  Cleveland,  Ohio,  and  is  described  by  its 
author  under  the  title,  "Election  by  Preponder- 
ance of  Choice."1 

"1.  Each  voter  writes  on  his  ballot  as  many 
names  as  there  are  persons  to  be  chosen,  writing 
the  names  in  the  order  of  his  choice,  first  choice 
first,  second  choice  second,  and  so  on.  When 
nominations  are  made  before  balloting,  it  is  more 
convenient  to  write  them  on  a  board  where  all  can 
read  them. 

"2.  In, tallying  the  vote,  the  tellers  read  the  last 
name  on  each  ballot  first,  crediting  the  name  with 
one  tally ;  the  name  next  to  the  last,  second, 
crediting  the  same  with  two  tallies;  and  so  on, 
always  crediting  the  name  written  first  on  each 
ballot  with  as  many  tallies  as  there  are  names 
written  on  that  ballot.  Thus  a  ballot  written  :  — 


SMITH 

BROWN 
JONES 
FETZER 
COLEMAN 


Proportional  Representation  Review,  September,  1893. 


APPLICATION  OF  THE  REMEDY.  159 

would  be  read,  Coleman  1,  Fetzer  2,  Jones  3, 
Brown  4,  Smith  5. 

"3.  The  person  receiving  the  highest  number 
of  tallies  is  first  declared  elected ;  the  person  re- 
ceiving the  next  highest,  next;  and  so  on,  until  all 
the  vacancies  are  filled.  In  case  of  a  tie  with  but 
one  vacancy  to  be  filled,  the  incumbent  is  deter- 
mined by  lot. 

"  The  practical  working  of  this  rule  is  that 
every  element  in  the  electing  body  large  enough 
to  have  a  quota,  finds  itself  proportionately  repre- 
sented, and  by  its  own  first  choice  or  choices. 
Suppose,  for  instance,  a  caucus  in  a  ward  contain- 
ing one  hundred  voters.  They  are  to  choose 
delegates  to  a  convention.  Suppose  there  are 
two  factions,  one  counting  on  fifty-five  voters, 
the  other  on  forty-five,  and  the  contest  so  lively 
that  a  full  vote  is  polled.  Suppose,  further,  that 
the  first  faction  decides  to  support  A,  B,  C,  D, 
and  E,  in  the  order  named,  and  the  second  F, 
G,  H,  I,  and  K,  the  resulting  ballot  will  tally  as 
follows :  — 

A  55  x  5  =  275  F  45  x  5  =  225 

B  55  x  4  =  220  G  45  x  4  =  180 

C  55  x  3  =  165  H  45  x  3  =  135 

D  55  x  2  =  110  I  45  x  2  =    90 

E  55  x  1  =    55  K  45  x  1  =    45 

«  The  five  highest  are  A,  F,  B,  G,  and  C,  three 
of  the  majority  faction  and  two  of  the  minority  — 


160       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

the  first  choices,  the  representative  men  of  both 
parties.  The  advantage  of  this  method  in  a 
caucus  or  convention  is  that  it  reaches  the  result 
certainly,  directly,  and  quickly;  there  is  no  count- 
ing the  number  of  ballots  cast,  and  dividing  by 
the  number  of  persons  to  be  chosen,  to  find  what 
the  quota  is." 

This  plan  is  simple  and  effective,  and  can  be 
applied  to  primaries  and  conventions.  It  could 
be  introduced  into  the  bill  proposed  in  these  pages, 
by  providing  that  conventions  making  nominations 
of  congressmen  or  aldermen  should  be  required  to 
adopt  the  plan,  and  that  the  presidents  and  secre- 
taries of  such  conventions,  in  presenting  their 
tickets  to  election  commissioners,  should  certify 
that  the  nominations  have  been  made  in  accord- 
ance with  the  law.  They  should  certify,  too,  that 
primaries  and  other  conventions  sending  delegates 
to  the  nominating  convention  had  also  complied 
with  the  law. 

With  a  rule  of  this  kind  governing  primaries 
and  conventions,  we  should  accomplish  within 
party  lines  results  similar  to  those  to  be  ac- 
complished by  the  proposed  bill  between  parties. 
All  classes  within  a  party  would  be  represented, 
"  packed "  conventions  would  be  unknown,  the 
party  machine  would  be  shorn  of  much  of  its 
undeserved  power,  tickets  would  be  nominated 
with  candidates  acceptable  to  all  ranks  of  the 


APPLICATION  OF   THE  REMEDY.  161 

party,  the  necessity  for  independent  tickets  would 
be  largely  obviated,  and  citizens  would  be  more 
inclined  to  attend  their  party  primaries,  knowing 
that  their  wishes  would  find  expression. 

When  finally  we  come  to  the  elections,  propor- 
tional representation  would  go  far  towards  bring- 
ing out  a  full  vote.  There  would  be  none  of  the 
present  hopelessness.  "  It  is  only  the  fear  of 
wasting  their  votes  on  good  men  who  have  no 
chance  of  winning  which  deters  the  people  from 
voting  against  the  bad  candidates  who  are  forced 
upon  them  by  the  regular  machine."  1 

So  crude  a  measure  as  compulsory  voting  could 
not  change  the  results  of  the  present  system.  In 
two  recent  elections  in  the  Swiss  canton  of  Zu- 
rich, with  a  compulsory  voting  law  applying  to 
two  communes,  21  per  cent  to  24  per  cent  of  the 
ballots  were  blanks,  while  in  the  communes  with- 
out the  compulsory  law,  17  per  cent  and  20  per 
cent  were  blanks.2  Compulsory  voting  does  not 
furnish  an  outlet  for  independence.  It  would 
rather  tighten  the  control  of  the  party  managers.3 
We  have  seen  that  the  margin  of  mobile  voters 
who  change  from  one  party  to  another  is  seldom 
more  than  5  per  cent  of  the  maximum  total  vote 
in  a  presidential  year.  Compulsory  voting  might 

1  Chas.  Richardson  in  Annals  of  American  Academy  of  Politi- 
cal and  Social  Science,  March,  1892,  p.  86. 

2  See  Direct  Legislation  Record,  September,  1894,  p.  63. 
s  See  Hart,  "  Practical  Essays,"  p.  51. 


162         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

possibly  change  this  proportion  slightly,  but  it 
could  do  no  more  than  substitute  one  machine  for 
another.  The  real  problem  is  not  how  to  compel 
unwilling  electors  to  vote,  but  how  to  give  effect 
to  the  votes  of  those  who  are  willing. 


" PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY."  168 


CHAPTER   VII. 
"  PARTY   RESPONSIBILITY." 

THE  ideal  of  democratic  government  in  the 
United  States  has  centred  about  the  principle  of 
rule  by  the  majority  of  the  people.  Its  aim  is 
Bentham's  aphorism,  "the  greatest  good  of  the 
greatest  number."  The  means  whereby  in  practi- 
cal politics  this  greatest  good  is  to  be  secured  is  to 
divide  the  people  into  two  political  parties  based 
on  numbers  alone,  and  to  give  to  one  of  these 
parties  entire  control  of  government  in  at  least  its 
legislative  and  executive  departments.  If  the 
people  happen  not  to  be  divided  in  such  a  way  as 
to  gather  a  majority  into  a  single  party,  then  a 
plurality  is  to  be  permitted  to  choose  the  govern- 
ing officials.  By  this  process  it  is  maintained 
that  the  rule  of  the  majority  is  secured  through 
the  device  of  what  is  known  as  "  party  respon- 
sibility." 

It  must  be  noticed  that  the  word  "party"  in 
this  connection  has  a  double  meaning.  The  argu- 
ment begins  with  the  conception  of  a  popular 
party  composed  of  a  mass  of  voters ;  it  ends  with 
a  party  of  office-holders  and  law-makers  who  are 
elected  by  the  voters.  These  officials  are  commis- 


164         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

sioned  as  a  kind  of  extra-legal  corporation  to  con- 
duct the  government,  and  are  required  to  appeal 
often  to  the  voters  for  continuance  in  power. 

One  thing  overlooked  in  this  form  of  govern- 
ment is  the  quality  of  the  individual  men  who 
constitute  the  governing  corporation.  Individual 
statesmen  do  not  stand  out  as  leaders  of  the  party 
or  the  people.  They  all  are  merged  in  a  corporate 
mediocrity.  The  bosses  who  actually  control  the 
corporation  by  no  means  represent  the  popular 
party,  much  less  can  they  command  a  majority  of 
the  popular  vote.  They  are  irresponsible.  A 
party  and  not  a  man  becomes  responsible. 

Proportional  representation  is  advocated  as  a 
means  for  supplementing  party  responsibility  with 
the  individual  responsibility  of  law-makers  to  the 
people.  It  will  do  this,  first,  by  bringing  into 
legislative  assemblies  able  and  experienced  men, 
the  true  leaders  of  their  parties  and  the  people. 

The  assertion  is  often  made  that  our  public  of- 
ficers and  representatives  are  as  good  as  the  people 
who  elect  them;  that  they  are  representative  in 
the  sense  of  possessing  the  average  ability,  intelli- 
gence, and  integrity,  of  the  community ;  and  there- 
fore the  failures  of  our  governments  are  to  be 
found,  not  in  the  machinery,  but  in  the  voters. 

It  is  questionable  whether  this  assertion  is  true. 
Very  often  the  legislative  body  is  below  the  aver- 
age citizenship  of  the  community.  But  the  ques- 


"PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY"  165 

tion  comes,  Do  we  want  only  average  men  to 
govern  us  and  make  our  laws  ?  We  do  not  select 
average  physicians  to  save  our  lives,  average  law- 
yers to  protect  our  rights,  average  ministers  to 
interpret  the  gospel,  nor  average  tailors,  bakers, 
and  carpenters  to  clothe,  feed,  and  shelter  us. 
We  select  men  of  exceptional  native  ability,  who 
through  training  have  become  experts  and  profes- 
sionals, men  versed  in  their  callings.  So  in  this 
most  important  of  our  delegated  services,  this  re- 
vising and  framing  our  laws  which  regulate  the 
very  structure  of  society,  and  make  our  lives,  our 
rights,  our  religion,  and  our  enjoyments  possible,  in 
this  supreme  service,  why  should  we  not  select  men 
far  above  the  average?  Should  they  not  be  men 
who  are  grounded  in  jurisprudence,  sociology,  politi- 
cal economy,  comparative  legislation,  besides  pos- 
sessing that  infinite  tact  known  as  statesmanship  ? 
Indeed,  the  American  people  do  desire  such 
men.  They  have  long  been  dissatisfied  with  their 
law-making  bodies.  They  have  been  persistently 
depriving  them  of  power  because  they  are  both 
unrepresentative  and  inefficient.  The  people  sin- 
cerely wish  to  have  capable  legislators,  but  have 
not  been  able  to  enforce  their  wishes.  The  reason 
is  that  social  and  legal  institutions  of  themselves 
possess  a  certain  capacity  of  natural  selection. 
They  are  the  framework,  the  environment,  within 
which  individuals  and  classes  co-operate.  As  in 


166         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

the  biological  world,  those  individuals  survive  and 
prosper  who  are  best  able  to  utilize  the  passions, 
customs,  and  legal  regulations  of  their  fellow-men. 

But  society,  unlike  the  animals,  can  change 
its  customs  and  laws  within  certain  limits,  and 
thereby  can  change  the  environment  of  individ- 
uals. New  and  different  qualities  are  now  neces- 
sary for  survival  and  power.  Such  a  change 
is  the  secret  ballot,  which  handicaps  bribery;  or 
civil  service  reform,  which  evicts  spoilsmen;  or 
hundreds  of  those  political  devices  whereby  gov- 
ernment has  been  for  centuries  slowly  perfected. 
The  same  will  hold  for  legislatures.  If  the  people 
wish  to  bring  to  their  legislatures  intelligence,  ex- 
perience, ability,  probity,  and  sympathy  with  pop- 
ular aims,  they  should  first  develop  those  forms  of 
government  and  that  political  machinery  which 
will  insure  adequate  security,  support,  and  dignity 
to  such  qualities. 

Proportional  representation  would  be  an  im- 
provement of  this  kind.  In  the  first  place,  it 
would  secure  all  the  advantages  of  the  English 
and  Canadian  practice  of  non-residency.  Five- 
sixths  of  the  members  of  parliament  do  not  live  in 
the  districts  they  represent.  This  enables  a  polit- 
ical party  to  keep  its  leaders  always  in  power,  by 
selecting  for  them  a  sure  district  in  which  to  make 
their  canvass.  With  proportional  representation, 
as  with  a  general  ticket,  representatives  could  be 


"  PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY."  167 

selected  from  an  entire  State  or  city  without  refer- 
ence to  their  residence  in  a  limited  district  or  ward. 
The  area  of  choice  is  widened.  '•  A  party  leader, 
like  McKinley  or  Morrison,  need  no  longer  be  ex- 
cluded from  Congress  because  he  happens  to  live 
in  a  district  where  his  party  is  a  minority.  Gerry- 
manders could  not  be  constructed  to  exclude  him. 
All  the  money  and  influence  of  a  wealthy  opposing 
party  could  effect  nothing.  His  party  might  be 
a  minority  in  the  State,  yet,  if  it  could  poll  only 
a  single  quota  of  the  votes,  he  would  be  sure  of 
election.  Nothing  could  exclude  him  except  the 
disaffection  of  his  own  followers. 

Neither  could  factions  and  interests  holding  the 
balance  of  power  dictate  nominations,  and  thus  put 
unknown  and  opinionless  men  before  the  voters. 
Every  faction,  every  party,  every  interest,  could 
place  its  own  strongest  men  in  the  legislature ;  and 
compromise  candidates,  "  dark  horses,"  would  be 
unknown. 

Mr.  Albert  Stickney  has  found  in  frequent  elec- 
tions and  short  terms  the  root  of  corrupt  politics 
and  machine  rule.1  There  is  truth  in  his  conten- 
tion. A  representative  must  indeed  give  his  time 
to  carrying  elections.  He  must  placate  and  har- 
monize factions.  He  must  properly  distribute  the 
spoils,  and  must  not  break  with  the  machine.  Little 
time  is  left  to  study  legislation. 

1  See  "  A  True  Republic,"  New  York,  1879. 


168       PEOPOETIONAL  EEP RESENT ATION. 

But  with  proportional  representation,  frequent 
elections  would  be  combined  with  life-long  service, 
provided  the  representative  retained  the  confidence 
of  a  single  quota  of  the  voters.  The  manipulation 
of  elections  would  not  engross  him.  His  only 
thought  would  be  to  know  that  in  his  legislative 
duties  he  truly  represented  his  quota  of  supporters. 
Frequent  elections,  on  the  other  hand,  would  give 
the  people  power  quietly  to  drop  him  if  he  ceased 
to  represent  them.  They  would  simply  give  their 
preferences  to  others  on  their  party  ticket,  or  would 
nominate  a  new  ticket  which  would  draw  from  him. 
Frequent  elections  under  the  district  system  are 
dangerous  to  both  the  good  and  the  bad.  Under 
proportional  representation  they  would  endanger 
only  the  bad. 

The  representatives  therefore  will  not  only  be 
capable ;  they  will  be  responsible  directly  to  the 
people.  The  objection  against  proportional  repre- 
sentation on  the  ground  that  it  abandons  what  is 
called  "  party  responsibility,"  proceeds  from  the 
assertion  that  it  gives  no  party  a  clear  majority 
in  the  legislature  ;  that  ours  is  a  government  by 
political  parties,  and  parties  must  therefore  be 
permitted  to  make  a  record  in  the  legislature  or 
Congress,  upon  which  they  can  go  before  the  people 
for  approval  or  rejection. 

This  objection  will  be  considered  later  when 
speaking  of  minority  parties,  In  this  place  let 


"PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY."  169 

us  notice  the  nature  of  "party  responsibility." 
It  is  multiple  and  corporate.  The  people  can 
select  no  individual  upon  whom  to  centre  respon- 
sibility. A  party,  like  a  corporation,  can  be  held 
accountable  only  through  its  individual  agents. 
For  this  reason,  cities  in  the  United  States  are 
transferring  legislative  and  administrative  func- 
tions from  boards  and  councils  to  the  mayor. 
Thus  responsibility  is  fixed.  But  when  a  national 
party  of  four  hundred  representatives  and  sena- 
tors, besides  hundreds  of  State  and  local  officers, 
is  defeated  at  the  polls,  both  the  good  and  the  bad 
are  defeated  together.  Why  should  a  representa- 
tive rise  above  party  expediency  when  he  knows 
that  the  deeds  of  his  colleagues  will  drag  him 
down  with  them? 

There  are  two  features  of  proportional  repre- 
sentation which  permit  the  voters  to  hold  individual 
representatives,  instead  of  parties,  responsible.  The 
first  is  the  fact  that  parties,  if  defeated,  would  lose 
but  a  small  proportion  of  their  representatives.  No 
matter  how  close  the  votes  of  parties  in  any  State, 
a  popular  rebuke  would  usually  lessen  its  vote 
not  more  than  five  per  cent,  except  in  cases  where 
disaffection  within  the  party  has  brought  out  an 
independent  ticket.  A  party  having  eight  repre- 
sentatives in  a  delegation  of  fifteen  would  thereby 
lose  not  more  than  one.  Under  the  district  system, 
as  has  been  shown,  a  reversal  of  five  per  cent  is 


170       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

catastrophic ;  and  an  entire  party,  good  and  bad,  go 
down  together.  Thus  the  idea  is  unduly  promi- 
nent that  the  people  reject  the  party  as  a  whole, 
and  the  fiction  is  fostered  of  "  party  responsibility." 
But  with  proportional  representation  only  a  very 
few  of  the  party  candidates  would  be  defeated. 

Now,  if  the  voters  have  the  power  to  select 
those  candidates  who  are  to  be  doieated,  and  to 
continue  the  others,  shall  we  not  have  the  essence 
of  individual  responsibility  ?  The  second  feature 
of  proportional  representation  gives  them  this 
power.  Not  only  may  electors  vote  for  "  tick- 
ets," they  may  also  indicate  their  preferences  for 
individual  candidates  upon  their  party  ticket. 
Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  party  expecting  to  elect 
eight  representatives,  and  therefore  nominating 
nine,  but  in  the  final  count  electing  only  seven, 
the  voters  by  their  preferences  will  have  dropped 
at  least  two  who  have  not  met  their  responsibility. 
And,  again,  in  the  provisions  for  nominating  inde- 
pendent tickets,  and  thus  drawing  off  from  a  polit- 
ical party  all  those  voters  who  are  dissatisfied  with 
the  candidates  it  has  nominated,  and  in  the  pro- 
visions for  scattering  individual  votes  among  can- 
didates of  several  tickets,  the  electors  have  the 
widest  freedom  for  distinguishing  between  can- 
didates, and  holding  each  one  personally  respon- 
sible. Consequently,  bad  candidates  cannot  ride 
into  power  on  a  wave  of  party  prosperity,  nor  can 


"PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY."  171 

good  candidates  be  swamped  in  the  ebb  of  party 
adversity.  Each  candidate  stands  upon  his  own 
merits  and  record,  and  by  these  is  he  judged, 
apart  from  the  judgment  upon  his  party  as  a 
whole. 

With  all  parties  fairly  represented  by  their 
ablest  leaders,  legislatures  would  become  delibera- 
tive assemblies,  instead  of  arenas  for  party  strife. 
The  objection  against  proportional  representation 
has  just  been  cited,  that  it  would  nullify  party 
responsibility.  It  is  said  that  it  would  do  this 
by  giving  a  small  minority  the  balance  of  power 
and  enabling  it  to  dictate  legislation.  This  would 
weake'n  the  government  and  prevent  a  consistent 
policy.  We  have  frequently  noticed  the  very- 
close  popular  vote  as  between  the  two  great  par- 
ties, neither  of  them  receiving  a  majority.  Third 
and  fourth  parties,  therefore,  if  given  their  propor- 
tionate weight  in  legislation,  would  often  hold  the 
balance.  Of  course,  with  the  existing  system  they 
already  often  have  this  advantage,  but  with  pro- 
portional representation  the  same  would  more 
frequently  happen. 

The  weight  of  this  objection,  the  most  serious 
yet  presented  against  proportional  representation, 
varies  in  different  grades  of  government.  Polit- 
ical parties  are  divided  on  national  questions. 
City  and  State  politics  do  not  (or  should  not) 
follow  the  same  alignment.  Leaving  the  consid- 


172         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

eration  of  city  politics  to  another  chapter,  we  may 
at  this  point  examine  the  objection  as  applied  to 
Congress  (and  incidentally  to  the  State  legisla- 
tures), where  it  has  its  greatest  force,  and  where 
pre-eminently  party  responsibility  may  be  ex- 
pected to  be  decisive. 

In  the  first  place,  the  objection  overlooks  the 
principle  of  equality  and  justice  in  representation. 
It  may  prove  here,  as  elsewhere,  that  justice  is 
the  wisest  expediency.  It  is  a  curious  anomaly, 
showing  confusion  of  thought  regarding  democ- 
racy, that  a  people  who  insist  on  universal  suf- 
frage, and  who  go  to  ludicrous  limits  in  granting 
it,  should  deny  the  right  of  representation  to  those 
minor  political  parties  whose  existence  is  the  nat- 
ural fruit  of  this  suffrage.  The  argument  against 
proportional  representation  is  made  that  it  would 
enable  the  degraded  and  corrupt  elements  of  the 
community  to  keep  a  bad  man  in  the  legislature 
against  the  wishes  of  all  the  honest  and  patriotic 
classes;  that  it  would  give  saloon-keepers  and 
gamblers  representation ;  that  it  would  give  too 
great  influence  to  the  socialists  and  other  "dan- 
gerous "  elements. 

Possibly  universal  suffrage  is  unwise,  and  the 
franchise  should  be  restricted ;  but,  having  granted 
lit,  the  dangerous  elements  become  more  danger- 
vous   if   they  are   denied  that   hearing  which  the 
suffrage  promises.     Vice  and  corruption  thrive  by 


"PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY."  173 

secrecy.  Nothing  is  so  mortal  to  them  as  expo- 
sure. It  is  suicidal  to  come  out  in  the  open,  and 
defend  themselves  in  their  nakedness.  The  seri- 
ous fault  with  the  present  system  is  its  rich  oppor- 
tunities for  under-handed  work  on  the  part  of  the 
corrupt  classes.  They  alone  have  no  political 
principles,  and  can  therefore  take  sharp  advantage 
of  the  party  divisions  of  the  people.  By  their 
very  corruption  they  have  far  more  than  their  pro- 
portionate representation.  ]~~Itis  a  serious  evil  of 
the  existing  system  that  the  two  industries  most 
largely  represented  in  municipal  councils  are  those 
of  the  saloon-keepers  and  the  gamblers.  Far  bet- 
ter would  be  a  system  which  reduces  their  rep- 
resentation to  the  same  proportions  which  their 
numbers  bear  to  the  whole  community.  The 
corrupt  and  dangerous  classes  are  a  very  small 
minority  of  the  people,  but  by  their  well-chosen 
methods  they  get  majorities  in  our  legislative 
bodies.  Proportional  representation  would  give 
them  a  hearing,  for  they  are  entitled  to  it,  but  it 
would  deny  them  supremacy.  ! 

The  argument,  however,  of  those  who  fear  that 
third  parties  will  hold  the  balance  of  power  is  not 
based  solely  on  a  dread  of  the  corrupt  classes,  but 
rather  of  the  idealists,  the  reformers,  "  faddists  " 
and  "  cranks  "  so-called.  They  would  retain  ex- 
clusive majority  rule  and  party  responsibility  in 
order  to  prevent  the  disproportionate  influence  of 


1T4       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

these  petty  groups.  They  overlook,  of  course, 
the  weight  of  the  argument  already  made,  that 
individual  responsibility  is  more  important  for  the 
people  than  the  corporate  responsibility  of  parties. 
They  overlook  also  other  considerations. 

A  significant  fact  in  American  national  politics 
is  the  actual  break-down  of  this  presumed  party 
responsibility.  In  our  system  of  co-ordinate  pow- 
ers, there  can  be  no  party  responsibility  for  legis- 
lation unless  the  Senate,  the  House,  and  the  Pres- 
ident agree  in  politics.  Yet  since  the  election 
of  1876  there  have  been  but  six  years  of  such 
agreement,  namely,  in  the  Forty-seventh,  Fifty- 
first,  and  Fifty-third  Congresses.  And  in  the 
Forty-seventh  Congress  the  Senate  was  tied,  and 
in  the  Fifty-third  the  Senate,  with  a  Democratic 
majority,  was  constantly  opposed  to  the  Demo- 
cratic House  and  President.  For  less  than  one- 
third  of  the  time,  therefore,  can  we  be  said  to 
enjoy  party  responsibility.  Only  where  a  single 
party  for  a  long  series  of  years  has  possession  of 
government,  as  was  the  case  during  and  follow- 
ing the  Civil  War,  is  it  likely  to  get  control  of 
all  branches,  so  that  party  responsibility  can  be 
located.  And  even  in  such  a  period  internal  dis- 
sensions between  the  President  and  Congress  con- 
fuse the  public. 

Again,  a  strong  government,  so-called,  is  needed 
mainly  in  the  administration  of  foreign  affairs. 


"  PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY.11  175 

In  the  American  and  German  systems,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  English  and  French,  in  which 
the  executive  is  independent  of  the  legislature, 
such  a  government  is  secured  regardless  of  party 
revolutions.  If  this  were  not  so,  the  deadlocks  of 
the  past  twenty  years  would  have  rendered  our 
system  intolerable.  At  the  same  time  there  is  no 
public  question  which  so  thoroughly  extinguishes 
party  lines  as  a  serious  foreign  complication. 

But  there  are  deeper  reasons  than  these  for 
believing  that  a  just  representation  of  the  people 
by  their  recognized  leaders  would  guarantee  an 
efficient  and  stable  government,  freed  from  the 
dictation  of  extremists  who  hold  the  balance  of 
power. 

There  are  but  two  classes  of  questions  in 
American  politics  which  are  characteristically 
party  questions,  —  these  are  questions  of  the  suf- 
frage, such  as  force  bills  and  gerrymanders,  which 
threaten  to  deprive  one  party  of  its  votes ;  and 
questions  of  legislative  election  or  civil  service 
appointment  to  office.  It  must  be  admitted  that 
on  these  two  classes  of  questions  a  clear  party 
majority  is  necessary.  But  other  questions  can 
be  compromised.  The  legislature  of  Nebraska 
of  1893  adjourned  with  probably  the  best  record 
achieved  by  any  State  legislature  in  several  years. 
Yet  it  was  composed  of  three  parties  about  equally 
divided.  The  legislature  spent  six  weeks  out  of 


176       PEOPOETIONAL  EEPEESENTATION. 

the  legal  twelve  in  a  deadlock  over  the  election 
of  United  States  senator.  Such  a  matter  cannot 
be  compromised  except  by  electing  an  unknown 
man.  This  the  legislature  did,  and  then  pro- 
ceeded to  law-making.  It  enacted  good  laws  on 
important  matters,  such  as  railways  and  indebted- 
ness, which  were  exciting  popular  feeling  at  the 
time ;  but  these  laws  were  neither  confiscatory  nor 
reactionary.  They  were  just  to  all  concerned. 
There  were  no  deadlocks.  Every  measure  was  a 
fair  compromise. 

Proportional  representation  could  not  exist  with 
a  spoils  system,  and  probably  not  with  the  elec- 
tion of  United  States  senators  by  legislatures.  It 
would  end  in  deadlocks  and  incapacity.  But  this 
surely  cannot  be  a  serious  objection  to  the  reform. 
On  other  grounds  the  country  would  gain  if  merit 
were  substituted  for  spoils,  and  senators  elected 
by  the  people. 

With  these  two  occasions  of  difference  removed 
from  legislative  halls,  the  possibilities  of  compro- 
mise would  soon  appear.  They  proceed  from  the 
fact  that  the  majority  of  the  people  are  not  ex- 
tremists. They  will  not  consent  to  radical  depar- 
tures from  existing  institutions.  The  points  of 
agreement  between  political  parties  on  principles 
and  measures  are  therefore  far  more  numerous 
than  those  of  divergence.  Parties  differ  only  on 
the  fringe  of  policies.  Their  battles  are  usually 


"PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY."  177 

mock  battles  inspired  by  spoils  instead  of  policies. 
When  the  outs  come  ^X  they  do  not  radically  re- 
verse the  policy  of  their  predecessors.  Even  the 
tariff,  on  which  they  fight  their  battles,  resolves 
iself  into  a  matter  of  a  very  high  tariff,  or  one  not 
quite  so  high.  The  country  will  not  permit  a 
return  to  no-tariff.  Other  questions,  such  as  free 
silver  and  anti-options,  are  settled  by  divisions 
which  run  across  party  lines.  Upon  pensions  both 
parties  bring  out  emulous  majorities.  River  and 
harbor  bills  are  bargained  through  by  individual 
"  log-rolling,"  and  exchange  of  favors.  On  so 
many  of  the  vital  questions  do  representatives  in 
Congress  disregard  party  lines,  that  one  is  led  to 
suspect  that  the  tariff  is  merely  a  "  war  scare  " 
to  keep  the  voters  in  line. 

The  fundamental  nature  of  legislation  is  not 
party  victory,  but  compromise.  Compromise  is 
expediency.  Expediency  is  nothing  more  nor  less 
than  ideal  principles  and  institutions  in  process 
of  realization.  Compromise  rests  on  the  fact  of 
growth.  Society  is  developing  out  of  a  primitive 
barbaric  state,  where  human  rights  were  unknown, 
towards  an  era  when  the  ideal  rights  of  man  shall 
be  recognized  and  obtained  for  every  individual. 
One  by  one  the  burdens  of  the  past  are  being 
discarded  in  the  march  towards  the  goal.  And 
this  is  expediency  —  compromise.  Enthusiasts 
appeal  to  the  higher  law,  and  demand  that  all 


178       PEOPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

obstructions  be  overthrown  at  once.  This  is  im- 
possible. These  obstructions  are  not  mere  coats  of 
mail  and  trunks  and  luggage.  They  are  human 
beliefs,  habits,  passions,  prejudices,  necessities. 
They  exist  in  the  very  souls  of  men.  It  requires 
time  and  death  to  remove  them.  No  more  can 
the  physical  body  separate  itself  suddenly  from 
immature  childhood,  and,  omitting  the  period 
of  youth,  suddenly  leap  into  ripened  manhood, 
than  can  the  social  body  abruptly  break  from  its 
past. 

But  the  social  body  grows  through  modifi- 
cations of  social  institutions.  The  family,  the 
church,  the  State,  private  property,  are  all  being 
changed  in  the  direction  of  social  ideals.  These 
changes  are  made  unconsciously,  as  in  primitive 
times,  also  consciously,  as  in  modern  times  by 
legislation.  Here  arise  the  two  primary  divisions 
of  society,  which,  shifting  slightly,  according  to 
the  issues  in  hand,  appear  in  general  as  the  con- 
servative and  liberal  parties,  the  former  holding 
to  the  things  already  achieved,  the  latter  /urging 
change. 

These  different  classes  and  interests  come  to- 
gether in  the  legislative  halls.  The  circumstances 
of  the  time  compel  change.  The  radicals  demand 
extreme  measures.  The  conservatives  resist.  If, 
now,  the  system  of  representation  is  such  that 
neither  has  a  majority  in  the  legislature,  but  the 


"PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY."  179 

overwhelming  majority  of  the  people  who  hold 
moderate  views  is  adequately  represented  and  holds 
the  balance  of  power,  compromises  will  result. 
Measures  will  be  examined,  debated,  amended, 
until  they  reach  the  shape  which  will  command  a 
majority  of  the  votes. 

There  is  no  measure  in  politics  which  cannot 
be  thus  modified.  Even  the  question  of  slavery 
could  have  been  compounded.  There  are  a  hun- 
dred intermediate  positions  between  immediate 
emancipation  and  permanent  slavery.  Had  a  law 
been  enacted  in  the  '40's  or  '50's  providing  for 
gradual  emancipation,  even  upon  the  basis  pro- 
posed by  Abraham  Lincoln,  of  a  hundred  years, 
the  Civil  War  might  have  been  averted.  But  the 
district  system  had  excluded  from  Congress  Demo- 
crats from  the  North,  and  Whigs  from  the  South, 
men  who  occupied  a  middle  ground,  and  the  antag- 
onism between  the  sections  was  thereby  exagger- 
ated. Especially  was  it  affirmed  by  a  committee 
of  the  United  States  Senate  in  1869,  and  it  is  well 
known  to  students  of  history  that  the  South  was 
not  fairly  represented  in  Congress.  A  large  mi- 
nority of  the  whites  were  in  favor  of  the  Union, 
and  doubtless  they  could  have  been  brought  to 
gradual  emancipation.  But  they  were  excluded 
from  the  State  legislatures  and  from  the  halls  of 
Congress.  The  slave-holding  oligarchy  precipi- 
tated the  South  into  rebellion ;  and  when  the 


180       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

die  was  cast,  the  people  were  forced  to  follow.1 
Would  not  compromise  have  been  better  than  war? 
Would  not  the  Negroes  to-day  be  in  a  better  con- 
dition? 

Compromise  seems  to  compound  with  evil.  "  No 
question  is  settled  until  it  is  settled  right."  True 
indeed.  There  is  a  base  compromise  born  of  pusil- 
lanimity. It  fortifies  and  strengthens  the  evil. 
But  true  expediency  plans  for  the  ultimate  extinc- 
tion of  hoary  wrong.  It  recognizes,  however,  that 
right  is  not  all  on  one  side.  Historical  conditions, 
inherited  privileges,  legal  enactments,  of  them- 
selves create  rights.  Slave-owners  should  have 
been  compensated,  as  in  the  West  Indies,  or  else 
been  granted  time  to  prepare  for  emancipation,  as 
in  Brazil.  The  district  system  prevents  this  kind 
of  compromise.  It  keeps  new  parties  out  of  rep- 
resentation. Their  leaders  have  no  influence  on 
legislation,  whereby  they  might  force  a  compro- 
mise looking  to  the  future.  Thus  the  anti-slavery 
movement  had  no  strength  in  Congress  commen- 
surate with  its  strength  among  the  people.  It  was 
choked  and  suppressed  until  it  became  irrepres- 
sible. It  ended  in  civil  war,  immediate  emancipa- 
tion, and  no  compensation. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  therefore,  that  pro- 

1  See  Report  of  the  Select  Committee  of  the  United  States 
Senate,  on  Representative  Reform,  Senate  Document  Fortieth 
Congress,  Third  Session,  No.  271,  March,  1869. 


"PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY."  181 

portional  representation,  by  increasing  compromise, 
would  prevent  reform.  Indeed,  it  would  bring  for- 
ward the  day  of  genuine  reform.  And  this  not  by 
erratic  jumps  or  civil  war,  but  like  the  steady  pro- 
cesses of  nature.  Reform  movements  would  have 
a  hearing  in  their  beginnings.  Legislation  would 
prepare  for  them.  The  minds  of  men  would  ripen 
for  them.  Only  in  this  way  could  they  prevent 
reactions.  Those  anti-slavery  agitators  who  saw 
in  Lincoln's  proclamation  the  final  triumph  of  their 
work,  and  those  extremists  who  gave  the  new- 
fledged  freeman  the  ballot,  may  well  to-day  look 
back  with  chagrin  on  those  exultant  measures. 
The  slave  is  not  yet  free.  He  was  not  ready  for 
the  ballot.  He  has  even  been  openly  disfran- 
chised. And  the  South  is  a  land  of  smothered 
anarchy.  Surely  gradual  emancipation  and  pro- 
gressive enfranchisement  would  not  have  been 
slower  in  final  results  than  were  those  uncom- 
promising reforms. 

So  it  is  with  present-day  reforms.  By  means 
of  proportional  representation  they  would  show 
themselves  inside  party  organizations.  At  present 
our  parties  are  grown  over  with  a  crust  of  tradi- 
tion. They  do  not  respond  to  the  growing  body 
within.  There  is  a  false  feeling  of  security  on 
the  part  of  managers.  New  movements  being  un- 
represented, the  leaders  run  to  extremes.  These 
have  not  the  advantages  of  responsibility,  of  con- 


182       PROPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

ference  and  friction  with  the  representatives  of 
existing  conditions.  Hence  they  become  visiona- 
ries instead  of  practical  reformers,  and  the  public 
learns  to  distrust  them. 

Mr.  Wm.  Dudley  Foulke,  president  of  the  Pro- 
portional Representation  League,  has  said  : 1  — 

"  The  result  of  nearly  all  political  action  is  compromise. 
In  the  present  system  this  compromise  is  made  when  the 
great  parties  are  organized.  It  is  made  amid  the  excite- 
ment of  a  political  convention.  When  proportional  repre- 
sentation is  adopted  those  compromises  will  be  made  in  the 
legislative  body,  where  all  can  see  more  clearly  the  strong 
and  the  weak  points  of  every  claim.  Suppose  you  are  in 
favor  of  some  particular  reform  —  civil  service  reform,  for 
instance  —  will  you  Have  a  better  chance  of  success  when 
you  urge  your  claims  upon  one  of  the  two  great  parties  in 
the  turmoil  of  a  political  contest,  or  where  these  claims  can 
be  freely  presented  by  your  own  representatives  in  the 
legislative  body?  Let  us  suppose,  for  instance,  that  we 
have  a  number  of  prohibitionists  in  a  legislative  body,  suf- 
ficient perhaps  to  control  the  balance  of  power,  what  will 
be  the  probable  result  of  legislation  ?  A  prohibitory  law 
will  hardly  be  adopted  —  for  this  would  be  in  opposition  to 
the  great  majority ;  but  stronger  temperance  legislation 
will  be  enacted  —  local  option,  for  instance,  or  more  strin- 
gent excise  laws.  It  is  by  such  compromises  as  these  that 
civilization  makes  its  safest  and  most  effective  strides. 
Small  factions  which  control  the  balance  of  power  may 
occasionally  get  more  than  they  are  entitled  to,  but  this 
will  only  be  the  case  where  there  is  some  greater  issue 
between  the  larger  parties  which  compels  the  relinquish- 

1  Proportional  Representation  Review,  December,  1895. 


"PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY."  183 

ment  of  something  for  the  sake  of  obtaining  something  of 
greater  importance.  Compromise  is  of  the  essence  of  pop- 
ular government,  and  the  fairest  compromises  are  most 
likely  to  be  made  when  all  phases  of  popular  thought  are 
proportionally  represented." 

The  first  effects  of  every  innovation  are  always 
viewed  with  alarm.  So  accustomed  are  we  to 
the  workings  of  existing  institutions,  that,  though 
we  acknowledge  their  imperfections  and  injustice, 
we  rather  cling  to  them  than  risk  the  imagined 
incidental  results  that  may  flow  from  the  triumph 
of  justice  and  fairness.  Our  principal  difficulty 
is  our  failure  to  perceive  that  a  far-reaching  re- 
form, which  strikes  at  the  root  of  existing  evils, 
brings'  with  it  a  series  of  changes  which  harmonize 
with  it.  We  assume  that  under  the  new  system 
all  conditions,  except  the  mere  mechanical  im- 
provement, will  remain  the  same  as  they  are 
before.  At  first,  indeed,  the  people  might  not 
fully  understand  the  innovation,  and  shrewd 
schemers  might  take  advantage  of  their  ignorance ; 
but  soon  they  will  comprehend  it,  and  will  adjust 
their  actions  to  it.  It  does  not  follow  that,  with 
proportional  representation,  third  parties,  composed 
of  so-called  "cranks,"  "faddists,"  impracticables, 
"  anti-vaccinationists,"  repudiationists,  or  what 
not,  would  increase  in  size,  and  continuously  hold 
the  balance  of  power.  A  few  able  men  of  noble 
humanitarian,  though  "visionary,"  ideas,  in  every 


184       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

assembly,  would  be  an  actual  gain.  But  if  their 
views  are  truly  impracticable  and  unjust,  nothing 
will  so  demonstrate  the  fact  to  them  and  their 
followers  as  the  responsibility  for  practicable  legis- 
lation, and  the  hard  contact  with  other  views 
upheld  by  men  of  ability  in  legislative  halls. 
Idealist  reformers  would  send  their  ablest  spokes- 
men. Other  parties  in  self-defence  would  be 
compelled  to  do  the  same.  The  representative 
assembly  would  become  the  great  forum  of  the 
people.  Its  debates  would  command  attention. 
It  would  educate  the  nation.  Reformers  would 
see  that  their  cause  is  strengthened,  not  by  send- 
ing eccentrics  to  Congress,  but  by  sending  ca- 
pable, all-round  men.  At  present,  having  no 
representation  whatever,  only  their  extremists  can 
attract  attention.  The  very  nature  of  reform 
movements  would  change.  There  are  many  sen- 
sible citizens  who  to-day  would  gladly  see  politi- 
cal and  industrial  conditions  improved,  but  who 
find  no  place  in  the  dominant  party  organizations, 
and  are  distrustful  of  the  extreme  reform  organ- 
izations, and  are  therefore  enrolled  in  that  army 
of  often  nearly  half  the  voters  who  stay  at  home. 
These  men  would  take  an  active  interest  in  poli- 
tics, and  would  modify  by  their  new-found  influ- 
ence the  personnel  of  both  the  new  parties  and 
the  old.  In  these  ways  the  balance  of  power 
would  be  held,  not  by  "faddists,"  but  by  the 


"  PAETT  RESPONSIBILITY.1  185 

solid,  patriotic,  disinterested  citizenship  of  the 
country. 

Proportional  representation  was  advocated  thirty 
years  ago  in  the  interests  of  the  minority.  It  was 
thought  to  be  a  promising  corrective  of  the  newly 
widened  suffrage.  The  franchise  in  England  was 
extended  in  1867  to  the  artisans,  and  in  1884  to 
the  agricultural  laborers.  In  the  United  States  it 
was  granted  in  1869  to  the  Negroes.  Conserva- 
tives thought  minority  representation  was  neces- 
sary to  protect  the  rich  against  the  confiscation  of 
these  mobs.  This  was  partly  the  thought  of  John 
Stuart  Mill,  in  his  classical  work,  "  On  Represen- 
tative Government."  But  to-day  it  is  advocated 
in  the  interests  of  the  masses.  John  Stuart  Mill 
knew  nothing  of  the  power  of  the  lobby  as  against 
an  extended  franchise.  One  man  of  wealth  has 
the  influence  of  a  thousand  farmers,  storekeepers, 
arid  laborers.  But  the  lobby  is  a  dangerous  ma- 
chine in  legislation.  It  protects  the  unscrupulous 
for  a  while,  but  stirs  those  vindictive  passions 
which  finally  lead  to  indiscriminate  spoliation. 
Far  better  for  one  and  all  would  be  fair  and  open 
compromise  !  If  legislatures  were  deliberative 
assemblies,  bringing  together  the  leaders  of  all 
classes  and  interests,  this  would  be  secured;  arid 
the  progress  of  enduring  social  and  industrial 
reform  would  be  quickened. 

These  considerations  have  a  bearing  upon  the 


186        PEOPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

arguments  far  the  so-called  "Direct  Legislation" 
by  the  peopb.  Direct  legislation  exists  at  present 
in  various  forms  in  every  canton  of  Switzerland. 
Three  of  them  have  no  legislature,  retaining  the 
primitive  primary  assembly  of  all  the  voters.  Di- 
rect legislation  applies  to  cantonal  and  municipal 
questions,  and  has  been  extended  to  federal  legis- 
lation. It  exists  in  two  principal  forms,  the  Initi- 
ative and  Referendum. 

The  Referendum  is  the  right  of  the  people  to 
vote  upon  a  law  which  originates  in  the  legisla- 
ture. This  exists  in  two  forms,  the  optional  and 
the  obligatory.  In  the  optional  referendum  the 
proposed  law  is  referred  to  the  people  only  when 
a  certain  proportion  of  the  citizens,  usually  one- 
sixth  to  one-fourth,  demand  it  by  formal  petition. 
It  exists  in  eight  cantons,  and  in  the  federal  legis- 
lature. The  obligatory  referendum  permits  no 
law  to  be  passed,  or  expenditures  beyond  a  stip- 
ulated sum  to  be  made,  by  the  legislature,  without 
a  vote  of  the  people.  It  exists  in  eight  cantons, 
including  the  two  most  populous  —  Zurich  and 
Berne.  The  tendency  in  Switzerland  has  been  to 
pass  to  the  initiative  and  the  obligatory  referen- 
dum as  the  complete  and  only  satisfactory  form  of 
"  legislation  by  the  people." 

As  applied  in  America,  the  referendum  prom- 
ises decided  advantages  over  delegated  legislation. 
It  would  take  important  questions  out  of  party 


44  PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY.1  187 

politics.  Legislatures  already  use  it  for  this  pur- 
pose, especially  in  liquor  and  local-option  legis- 
lation. It  would  educate  the  people  on  public 
questions.  The  press  in  Switzerland  to-day  "  has 
a  rdle  more  preponderant  than  formerly."  But 
its  principal  advantage  is  as  a  check  upon  corrupt, 
incapable,  and  unrepresentative  legislatures.  It 
utterly  deprives  them  of  power.  It  has  banished 
the  lobby  from  Swiss  legislation.  Representatives 
cannot  sell  out,  simply  because  they  cannot  "  de- 
liver the  goods."  The  people  alone  decide.  The 
referendum  is  a  club  of  Hercules  in  the  hands  of 
the  people.  But  it  does  not  create ;  it  destroys. 

This  is  shown  in  various  ways.  The  people  can 
vote  only  on  certain,  large,  simple,  well-defined 
measures,  such  as  loans,  public  improvements, 
saloon  license,  etc.  The  details  of  legislation  in 
these  days  are  far  more  important  than  ever  be- 
fore. This  gives  abundant  opportunity  in  the 
legislatures  to  introduce  "ambiguous  phraseology 
or  provisions  which  would  neutralize  the  purpose 
of  the  bill,  or  make  it  unconstitutional  or  obnox- 
ious." l  Consequently  the  people  are  better  able 
to  vote  for  men  than  for  measures.  This  is  shown 
by  the  following  examples :  - 

In  New  York,  in  1894,  the  vote  on  the  revised 
Constitution  was  only  57  per  cent  of  the  vote  cast 
for  governor  at  the  same  election;  the  vote  on 

i  Alfred  Cridge,  in  "Hope  and  Homo." 


188       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

apportionment  (gerrymander)  was  59  per  cent ;  and 
the  vote  on  canal  improvement  was  60  per  cent. 

In  California,  in  1892,  the  vote  on  five  amend- 
ments to  the  Constitution  and  four  propositions 
ranged  from  53  per  cent  to  80  per  cent  of  the 
votes  cast  at  the  same  election  for  members  of  the 
assembly.  (Popular  election  of  senators  80  per 
cent;  educational  voting  qualification  77  per  cent.) 

In  Ohio  a  Constitutional  amendment  to  tax  fran- 
chises of  corporations  was  lost  three  times,  although 
the  majorities  in  its  favor  were  large,  simply  be- 
cause the  total  vote  on  the  question  was  less  than 
75  per  cent  of  the  total  vote  cast  at  the  same 
elections  for  state  officers,  as  required  by  the  Con- 
stitution. 

In  Switzerland,  of  the  twenty  federal  referenda 
during  1879-1891,  the  average  vote  was  58.5  per 
cent  of  the  total  number  of  voters,  ranging  from 
40  per  cent  to  67  per  cent.  Upon  the  "Right 
to  Employment"  it  was  56  per  cent.1 

In  Zurich  a  larger  percentage  of  votes  is  cast, 
owing  to  the  compulsory  voting  law ;  the  average 
on  133  cantonal  propositions  of  all  kinds  being 
74  per  cent  of  the  eligible  voters.  26  per  cent  of 
the  votes  were  blanks,  while  in  two  recent  elec- 
tions of  candidates  21  per  cent  and  24  per  cent 
were  blanks.2 

1  A.  B.  Hart,  "The  Referendum  in  Switzerland,"  in   The 
Nation,  September  14,  1894. 

2  J.  W.  Sullivan,  Direct  Legislation  Record,  September,  1894. 


"  PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY."  189 

In  Switzerland  it  turns  out  that  many  bills  are 
approved  or  rejected  in  the  referendum  not  on 
their  merits,  but  on  the  questions  "Confidence" 
or  "  No  Confidence  "  in  the  legislature  which  sub- 
mitted them.  In  federal  legislation,  twenty-seven 
laws  and  constitutional  amendments  were  sub- 
mitted to  the  referendum  (optional)  during  the 
years  1874  to  1894 ;  and  of  these  fifteen  were  re- 
jected and  twelve  approved.  In  Zurich,  with  the 
compulsory  referendum,  there  were  128  legislative 
acts  voted  upon  between  1869  and  1893.  The 
people  ratified  ninety-seven,  and  rejected  thirty- 
one.1  A  few  laws  at  first  rejected  by  the  people 
wereJater  adopted;  and  although  Zurich  is  en- 
gaged in  manufacturing  and  has  a  large  working- 
class  vote,  it  has  rejected  laws  reducing  the  period 
of  work  in  factories  to  twelve  hours  a  day,  pro- 
tecting female  operatives,  making  employers  liable 
for  accidents  to  employees,  increasing  the  amount 
of  education  in  the  public  schools,  and  providing 
free  text-books.2  These  votes  do  not  mean  always 
that  the  people  are  more  conservative  than  their 
representatives,  but  that  the  particular  form  in 
which  the  legislature  drew  up  the  measures  and 
the  personnel  of  the  legislature  itself  were  not 
satisfactory  to  the  people.  These  adverse  votes 

1  See  A.  Lawrence  Lowell,  "  The  Referendum  and  Initia- 
tive," International  Journal  of  Ethics,  October,  1895. 

2  See  Lowell  as  above. 


190       PEOPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

on  advanced  measures  should  be  compared  with 
the  votes  when  the  referendum  was  first  estab- 
lished in  1869.  Says  Herr  Burkli,  "The  Father 
of  the  Referendum :  " l  "  The  plutocratic  govern- 
ment and  the  Grand  Council  of  Zurich,  which  had 
connived  with  the  private  banks  and  railroads, 
were  pulled  down  in  one  great  voting  swoop.  The 
people  had  grown  tired  of  being  beheaded  by  the 
office-holders  after  every  election." 

The  unrepresentative  character  of  the  legisla- 
tures has  led  to  the  Initiative,  whereby  the  people 
purpose  to  draw  up  their  own  measures,  and  have 
them  voted  upon  without  the  interference  of  the 
legislature.  A  petition  signed  by  six  to  eight  per 
cent  of  the  voting  constituency  submits  the  bill 
to  the  legislature,  which  must  in  turn  promptly 
submit  it  unchanged  to  the  people,  though  it  may 
express  an  opinion  or  submit  also  an  alternative 
proposition,  if  it  wishes.  The  cantonal  initiative 
exists  in  fourteen  of  the  twenty-two  cantons,  and 
was  introduced  into  federal  legislation  in  1891. 

But  the  initiative  is  almost  valueless  as  a  means 
of  legislation.  It,  indeed,  educates  the  people  and 
shows  the  weakness  of  extremists,  as  when  the  in- 
itiative federal  bill,  guaranteeing  "  right  of  em- 
ployment "  to  every  citizen,  was  rejected  by  a  vote 
of  four  to  one;  but  it  does  not  enact  good  laws. 
In  Zurich,  from  1869  to  1893,  nineteen  initiatives 

1  Quoted  by  Sullivan,  "Direct  Legislation,"  New  York,  1893. 


"  PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY."  191 

were  voted  upon.  "  Four  of  them  the  legislature 
advised  the  people  to  adopt,  and  of  these  two  were 
ratified  at  the  popular  vote,  and  two  were  rejected ; 
but  of  the  other  fifteen  proposals  which  were  dis- 
approved by  the  legislature,  only  three  were  en- 
acted by  the  people.  One  of  these  set  up  houses 
of  correction  for  tramps,  a  measure  the  wisdom  of 
which  was  much  doubted ;  a  second  re-established 
the  death  penalty,  but  this  came  to  nothing,  for 
the  people  rejected,  at  the  referendum,  the  law 
which  was  prepared  to  carry  it  into  effect;  the 
third  abolished  compulsory  vaccination."1 

The  initiative  is  weak  for  the  reasons  already 
given  as  to  the  true  nature  of  legislation.  It  pre- 
vents compromise  and  mutual  concession.  Meas- 
ures are  drawn  up,  not  by  a  body  representing  all 
interests,  which  would  therefore  be  fair  to  all,  but 
by  a  faction  or  group  of  extremists.  It  by  no 
means  embodies  the  joint  wisdom  and  sense  of  jus- 
tice of  the  community.  It  therefore  cannot  often 
command  a  majority  of  the  votes ;  and  if  it  does, 
the  animus  is  likely  to  be  not  a  generous  spirit 
of  tolerance,  but  a  petty  hatred  of  a  small  minor- 
ity. This  is  shown  by  the  recent  federal  refer- 
endum forbidding  the  slaughter  of  animals  by 
bleeding,  which  was  adopted  mainly  to  persecute 
the  Jews* 

The  referendum,  on  the  other  hand,  exhibits 
i  See  Lowell,  as  above. 


192       PEOPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

strikingly  the  unrepresentative  character  of  the 
legislatures.  The  people  reject  both  measures 
patently  vicious  and  others  whose  details  they  sus- 
pect, merely  on  the  question  of  confidence  in  the 
legislature. 

Unquestionably  direct  legislation  in  the  form 
of  the  referendum  would  serve  an  important  pur- 
pose in  the  present  condition  of  American  politics. 
It  would  promptly  bring  all  legislative  assemblies 
to  a  standstill.  But,  as  in  Switzerland,  it  would 
make  them  no  more  attractive  than  now  to  the 
ability  and  statesmanship  of  the  country.  They 
would  be  simply  advisory  committees  on  legisla- 
tion, with  no  responsibility,  attracting  neither  the 
political  leaders,  nor  enlisting  the  popular  vote  at 
elections.  But  the  political  atmosphere  would  be 
cleared.  The  people  would  have  relief  from  the 
surfeit  of  partisanship  and  corrupt  influences. 
They  could  calmly  contemplate  the  obstacles  to 
popular  government.  In  Switzerland,  direct  legis- 
lation is  being  followed  by  proportional  represen- 
tation. Five  cantons  have  adopted  it  since  1891, 
through  the  referendum.  Four  have  rejected  it 
by  referendum,  in  some  cases  because  it  was  con- 
fused by  partisan  legislatures  with  other  issues.1 
But  in  two  cases  an  initiative  is  demanding  a  new 
vote.  The  opinion  is  expressed  that  "  in  less  than 

1  See  Bulletin  des  Schweiz.  Wahlreform-Vereins  fur  Propor- 
tionate, Volksvertretung,  No.  8  and  9,  Mai,  1894. 


"PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY."  193 

ten  years  the  whole  of  Switzerland  will  have  pro- 
portional representation  carried  out  peaceably,  with- 
out revolution  and  bloodshed."1  Thus  direct 
legislation  proves  to  be  an  efficient  instrument, 
not  so  much  for  legislation,  as  for  reforming  the 
legislatures.  If  the  arguments  presented  in  the 
foregoing  pages  are  valid,  and  proportional  repre- 
sentation brings  into  the  legislatures  the  political 
leaders  of  the  people,  transforming  them  from  par- 
tisan organs  into  deliberative  bodies  accurately 
representing  the  public,  we  may  expect  that  the 
referendum  and  the  initiative  in  Switzerland  will 
be  gradually  discontinued,  but  not  until  they  have 
made  J  possible  a  genuinely  representative  democ- 
racy. 

The  preceding  discussion  is  concerned  only  with 
the  legislative  department  of  government.  How- 
ever the  executive  may  be  chosen,  he  is  properly 
only  the  agent  of  the  legislature.  As  such  he  is 
not  called  upon  to  exercise  discretion,  which  is 
the  prerogative  of  legislators,  but  to  execute  laws 
exactly  as  their  framers  contemplated.  He  is 
therefore,  strictly  speaking,  not  a  party  official, 
but  a  non-partisan  agent.  As  a  matter  of  effi- 
ciency, he  should  be  in  sympathy  with  the  ruling 
policy  of  the  legislature.  There  is  therefore  no 
reason  why  minority  representation  should  be 

1  Charles  Burkli,  in  Proportional  Representation  Review,  Sep- 
tember, 1895. 


194       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

introduced  in  the  executive  department.  Where 
it  has  been  attempted,  as  in  the  executive  boards 
of  Switzerland,  the  results  are  unsatisfactory. 
Practical  efficiency  also  requires  that  the  execu- 
tive head  be  a  single  officer,  and  this  excludes 
the  principle  of  minority  representation. 

The  case  is  somewhat  different  with  the  judi- 
ciary. This  branch  of  government  interprets  the 
laws,  and  applies  them  to  particular  cases.  To  a 
considerable  extent  it  creates  new  laws  through 
its  application  of  recognized  principles  to  new 
conditions.  In  the  United  States  it  has  also  an 
important  political  function  through  its  control 
over  the  legislature.  Whether,  therefore,  judges 
should  be  appointed  or  elected  is  a  debatable 
question.  Undoubtedly,  if  the  courts  further 
extend  their  powers  over  legislation,  they  must, 
like  the  legislatures,  be  made  elective.  Any  other 
policy  would  be  destructive  to  democratic  ten- 
dencies. But  if  the  courts  are  to  come  under 
the  control  of  machine  politics  through  popular 
elections  on  party  tickets,  they,  too,  must  sooner 
or  later  become  degraded.  Already  supreme  court 
and  inferior  judges  in  various  States  are  known 
to  be  nominated  and  elected  by  saloon  and  cor- 
porate interests  with  a  view  to  their  action  on  the 
constitutionality  of  important  statutes. 

Possibly  proportional  representation  will  solve 
the  enigma  of  an  elective  judiciary.  Police  magis- 


"PARTY  RESPONSIBILITY."  195 

trates  in  Philadelphia  and  supreme  court  judges 
in  Pennsylvania  are  elected  by  the  "  limited  vote," 
a  form  of  minority  representation,  which,  as  al- 
ready explained,  makes  them  directly  the  agents 
of  party  politics.  The  principle,  however,  might 
be  employed  with  a  better  form  of  proportional 
representation,  which  would  tend  to  remove  the 
bench  from  partisan  control. 

The  problems  of  the  executive  and  judiciary 
are  subsidiary  ones.  They  have  appeared  im- 
portant only  because  the  failure  of  legislatures 
has  imposed  heavy  obligations  on  the  co-ordinate 
branches  of  government.  The  legislatures  have 
been  -unrepresentative  in  character  because  the 
theory  of  party  responsibility  has  prevented  re- 
form of  electoral  machinery.  More  important 
than  party  responsibility  is  such  a  perfection  of 
methods  as  will  maintain  individual  responsibility 
of  all  officials  directly  to  the  people.  By  propor- 
tional representation  this  would  be  secured,  arid 
with  it  would  appear  in  legislative  assemblies  the 
leading  men  of  the  city,  State,  and  nation  —  men 
who  would  possess  that  spirit  and  capacity  of 
just  compromise  which  proceed  only  from  wide 
experience,  distinguished  ability,  and  patriotism. 
With  such  men  in  power  it  would  no  longer  be 
necessary  to  hold  a  majority  of  the  legislature 
together  by  the  party  machine,  but  new  majori- 
ties could  be  trusted  to  be  formed  on  every  ques- 


196       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

tion  in  harmony  with,  the  wishes  and  interests 
of  all  the  people.  And  instead  of  idealizing  the 
rule  of  a  mere  numerical  majority  on  the  plea  of 
the  greatest  good  of  the  greatest  number,  we 
should  promote  mutual  concession  for  the  sake 
of  a  broader  ideal,  the  greatest  good  of  all  the 
people. 


V    or  TH: 

UXIVER? 


or 

fO 
cirr  GOVERNMENT.  197 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

CITY  GOVERNMENT. 

IT  is  admitted  that  a  portion  of  the  arguments 
in  the  preceding  chapter  is  in  advance  of  what 
the  public  is  ready  to  accept.  Jeremy  Bentham 
is'  quoted  as  saying  that  a  reform  may  be  so  en- 
tirely just  that  all  classes  will  forthwith  join 
together  to  defeat  it.  Not  only  must  it  be  just, 
it  must  be  practicable;  and  it  must  not  run 
counter  to  public  prejudice.  We  as  a  people  are 
not  yet  ready  to  abandon  the  notion  that  party 
responsibility  in  Federal  affairs  is  essential  for 
safety;  and  even  in  our  State  governments  the 
election  of  senators  by  State  legislatures,  and  the 
congressional  gerrymanders,  force  us  to  decide 
State  questions  by  Federal  parties. 

But  in  city  affairs  it  is  different.  ;  The  think- 
ing and  practical  public  is  consenting,  even  in- 
sisting, that  city  politics  must  be  separated  from 
State  and  Federal  politics ;  that  a  man's  views  on 
the  tariff  have  nothing  to  do  with  his  views  on 
special  assessments,  health  administration,  fran- 
chise-stealing, or  police.  It  is  also  agreed  that 
third  parties  in  cities  are  not  composed  of  vision- 
aries and  irresponsibles,  but  of  the  intelligent  and 


198      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

well-to-do  classes.  Consequently,  reformers  are 
appealing  to  citizens  to  abandon  their  political 
parties  in  city  elections,  and  to  vote  for  the  best 
man  on  business  principles.  Independence  in  city 
politics  is  coming  to  be  dignified  and  respected. 
Public  prejudice  may  soon  permit  the  necessary 
political  machinery  for  promoting  this  indepen- 
dence. But  up  to  the  present  time  what  has  been 
done  ? 

The  city  is  looked  upon  as  a  business  corpora- 
tion, instead  of  a  political  corporation,  to  be  man- 
aged in  a  business  manner.  It  must  therefore 
have  its  general  manager,  who  shall  appoint  all 
heads  of  departments,  and  become  clearly  responsi- 
ble for  its  administration.  Power  must  be  taken 
from  the  council  and  from  boards,  and  be  concen- 
trated in  the  mayor.  The  mayor  must  be  elected 
by  popular  vote. 

Mr.  James  Bryce  calls  this  a  "cure  or  kill" 
method  of  government.1  It  places  tremendous 
interests  at  stake  in  every  election  upon  the  turn 
of  a  few  votes.  When  the  people  are  thoroughly 
aroused  they  may  elect  a  good  mayor.  But  how  ? 
Usually,  as  recently  in  New  York  City,  one  of  the 
two  political  party  machines  must  be  recognized 
in  the  nomination.  A  compromise  candidate  must 
be  agreed  upon,  and  the  other  elective  officials 
must  be  properly  distributed  so  that  this  machine, 

1  "American  Commonwealth,"  vol.  i.,  p.  617. 


CITY  GOVERNMENT.  199 

usually  in  the  minority,  may  get  a  share  of  the 
spoils.  But  in  case  such  a  patchwork  ticket  can- 
not be  arranged,  the  independents  v  are  forced  to 
nominate  a  ticket  of  their  own.  Here  the  result 
is  familiar.  Three  candidates  are  in  the  field  for 
one  office.  The  great  majority  of  the  voters  ad- 
here to  their  party.  The  independents  cannot 
elect  their  man ;  they  can  only  draw  from  one 
machine  to  the  success  of  the  other.  And  it  is 
usually  found  that  the  two  machines  have  an 
agreement  both  to  keep  the  field  as  a  lesson  to  the 
reformers,  and  afterwards  to  share  the  offices. 

Thus  the  one-man  system  compels  the  very 
thing  Avhich  the  reformers  deprecate,  the  intro- 
duction of  Federal  politics.  It  does  not  permit 
the  introduction  of  a  third  element  wholly  disen- 
tangled from  any  alliances  with  the  two  dominant 
parties.  To  ascribe  the  failure  of  mayoralty  des- 
potism to  the  indifference  of  the  intelligent  and 
business  classes  is  to  overlook  the  fact  that  the 
system  of  majority  election,  all  the  way  from 
primaries  and  conventions  up  to  the  mayor, 
rigidly  excludes  those  classes.  They  may  be 
aroused  for  a  time,  may  abandon  their  Federal 
politics,  and  may  join  in  a  popular  uprising.  In 
that  case  the  independent  movement  may  show 
considerable  strength,  and  in  isolated  cases  may 
control  the  election.  But  popular  uprising  is  not 
the  normal  condition.  It  is  rebellion,  it  requires 


200       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

unusual  exertions  and  great  expenditures  of  time 
and  money  by  the  few  who  take  the  (lad.  ft 
depends  upon  impromptu  organization,  and  soon 
exhausts  itself.  One  or  two  mayors  may  be 
elected  through  its  influence ;  but  the  politicians 
know  that,  by  quietly  waiting,  their  turn  will 
come  again.  This  explains  why  the  advocates  of 
one-man  power,  in  looking  about  for  the  failure  of 
their  remedy,  are  beginning  to  ascribe  it  to  the 
short  term  of  the  mayor,  which  prevents  him  from 
developing  a  "  policy." 

This  last  explanation  of  failure  shows  tus  a  fault 
not  only  in  the  practice,  but  also  in  trie  theory,  of 
one-man  rule.  The  city  is  not  merely  a  voluntary 
business  corporation  organized  to  economize  the 
taxes  of  the  stockholders ;  it  is  a  compulsory 
corporation,  into  which  men  are  born.  It  is  a 
branch  of  the  State,  and  exercises  the  sovereign 
functions  of  eminent  domain,  taxation,  ordinance- 
making,  based  on  compulsion  rather  than  on  free 
cojitract.  In  a  private  corporation  the  interests 
of  the  stockholders  are  all  in  one  direction  —  the 
increase  of  dividends.  In  a  political  corporation 
different  classes  of  citizens  have  often  different 
interests.  Therefore  all  interests  and  classes 
should  be  represented  in  its  administration.  In 
what  direction  its  sovereign  powers  shall  be  em- 
ployed is  a  political  question,  involving  justice 
and  expediency  as  well  as  business.  Shall  taxes 


CITY  GOVERNMENT.  201 

be  levied  to  protect  health,  to  extend  free  schools, 
to  cleanse  the  slums,  to  buy  water-works  or  street- 
car lines  ?  —  these  are  a  few  of  the  political  ques- 
tions which  cities  must  consider.  Upon  these 
questions  there  is  room  for  an  alignment  of  politi- 
cal parties,  of  conservatives,  and  progressists,  as 
much  as  in  Federal  politics,  but  not  corresponding 
to  the  Federal  alignment.  The  mayor  represents 
only  the  majority.  If  he  has  a  "  policy,"  it  should 
affect  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  execution  of 
the  laws  and  ordinances;  and  these  a  representa- 
tive body  must  determine — if  not  the  municipal 
council,  y  then  the  State  legislature.  They  are  not 
matters  of  free  contract  to  be  agreed  upon  by  pri- 
vate individuals ;  they  are  coercive  enactments  to 
be  executed  by  the  mayor  and  the  police.  They 
cannot  be  determined  except  to  a  limited  extent 
by  the  initiative  and  referendum,  for  reasons 
already  given ;  and  if  municipal  home  rule  is  to  be 
extended  or  even  retained,  they  must  be  deter- 
mined by  local  legislation. 

But  "  the  council,"  says  Mr.  Seth  Low,  "  is  the 
great  unsolved  organic  problem  in  connection  with 
city  government  in  the  United  States."  Origi- 
nally given  complete  control  of  city  affairs,  it  has 
been  forced  to  share  its  power  with  other  branches. 
To  its  incapacity  and  gradual  subsidence  are  to  be 
ascribed  the  miserable  plight  of  our  cities. 

German  and  English  cities  retain  the  council  as 


202       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

the  all-important  and  only  elective  body  of  city 
officials.  But  it  is  doubtful  whether  American 
cities  can  learn  from  them.  European  cities  do 
not  have  a  heterogeneous  population  of  foreigners 
and  foreign  extraction  furnishing  one-half  the 
votes  or  more.  Neither  do  they  have  universal 
suffrage.  In  New  York  one  person  in  six  is  a 
voter;  in  Glasgow,  one  in  nine;  in  Berlin,  one  in 
eleven.  In  Berlin  the  voting  age  is  twenty-five; 
and  non-taxpayers,  numbering  10  to  15  per  cent 
of  the  men  of  voting  age,  have  no  vote  whatever. 
The  council  is  elected  by  an  ingenious  "three- 
class  "  system,  in  such  a  way  that  10  to  15  per 
cent  of  those  who  vote  —  including  only  the  very 
wealthiest  citizens,  numbering  not  more  than  7 
or  8  per  cent  of  the  total  male  population  above 
twenty-one  years  —  elect  two-thirds  of  the  coun- 
cil.1 In  Glasgow,  25,000  adult  males  —  equal  to 
one-fourth  of  the  population — are  disfranchised; 
while  the  influence  of  property  is  still  further 
emphasized  by  the  provisions  that  women  may 
vote  provided  they  are  taxpayers,  and  also  sub- 
urban merchants  and  property  owners  who  live 
within  seven  miles  of  the  city. 

The  restrictions  in  all  British  cities  on  regis- 
tration, the  requirements  of  two  years'  residence 
in  the  same  precinct,  and  the  exclusion  of  those 

1  See  Albert  Shaw,  "Municipal  Government  in  Continental 
Europe,"  p.  307,  ff. 


CITY  GOVERNMENT.  203 

who  receive  public  relief,  disfranchises  many 
thousands  of  the  poorest  classes  who  freely  vote 
in  America.1 

France,  with  a  wider  municipal  suffrage  than 
Germany  or  England,  nevertheless  disfranchises 
habitual  drunkards,  recipients  of  public  poor  relief, 
and  those  convicted  of  crime.  It  is  significant 
that  France,  with  her  comparatively  wide  muni- 
cipal suffrage,  elects  municipal  councilmen  below 
the  ability  of  those  in  England  and  Germany,  and 
that  city  government  in  that  country  has  been 
centralized  in  the  hands  of  the  mayor  who  appoints 
all  subordinates.  He  is  elected  by  the  council, 
but  can  be  removed  by  the  prefect  of  the  depart- 
ment. In  Paris  there  is  almost  no  home  rule; 
the  two  prefects  who  govern  the  city  being  ap- 
pointed by  the  president  of  the  Republic.2 

It  is  generally  agreed  that  the  government  of 
English  and  German  cities  is  superior  to  that  of 
American  cities.  Public  officials  are  renowned 
for  their  honesty,  efficiency,  and  the  economy  of 
their  administration.  The  municipal  councils  in- 
clude the  best  and  most  intelligent  citizens,  who 
serve  without  salary.  And  yet  they  who  thus 
represent  the  wealth  of  the  community  have  pro- 
moted much  further  than  American  cities  many 
public  services  for  the  wants  of  the  unrepresented 

1  See  Albert  Shaw,  "  Municipal  Government  in  Great  Britain." 

2  ibid.,  p.  23  ff. 


204      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

masses,  such  as  parks,  baths,  gas  and  water  supply, 
cheap  car-fares,  and  many  others.  The  reason  for 
this  is  probably  to  be  found  in  the  very  purity 
and  efficiency  of  their  administration,  which  en- 
courages the  citizens  to  intrust  to  their  munici- 
palities many  functions  which  the  corruption  of 
American  cities  forces  them  to  remand  to  private 
corporations.  In  German  cities,  also,  the  com- 
pulsory enlistment  of  private  citizens  of  wealth 
and  influence  in  unpaid  co-operation  with  city 
authorities  in  the  details  of  administration,  ac- 
quaints them  thoroughly  with  the  needs  of  the 
people  and  stimulates  a  public  spirit.  In  Berlin 
10,000  taxpayers  are  thus  enrolled,  nearly  2,500 
being  in  the  department  of  charities.  That  a 
restricted  suffrage  would  bring  similar  results  in 
American  cities  is  not  to  be  expected.  In  the 
words  of  Mr.  Seth  Low,  "  In  a  country  where 
wealth  has  no  hereditary  sense  of  obligation  to  its 
neighbors,  it  is  hard  to  conceive  what  would  be 
the  condition  of  society  if  universal  suffrage  did 
not  compel  every  one  having  property  ( to  con- 
sider, to  some  extent  at  least,  the  well-being  of 
the  whole  community." 

Yet  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  the  failure 
of  American  cities  is  in  some  way  connected  with 
universal  suffrage.  The  fault,  however,  lies,  not 
with  the  extension  of  the  suffrage,  but  with  an 
obsolete  system  of  election  devised  for  aristo- 


CITY  GOVERNMENT.  205 

cratic  and  capitalistic  representation.  The  wealthy 
classes  of  Berlin,  who  elect  two-thirds  of  the  coun- 
cil, are  more  amenable  to  business  considerations 
than  are  the  masses  of  the  voters.  Just  as  little 
as  railway  stockholders  would  consider  the  Fed- 
eral politics  or  the  religious  belief  or  any  other 
quality  of  their  directors,  attorneys,  and  managers, 
except  their  business  capacity,  so  little  would  a 
capitalistic  suffrage  allow  these  qualities  to  in- 
fluence the  selection  of  councilman.  Were  the 
suffrage  restricted  to  any  other  single  class  in  the 
community,  little  difficulty  would  be  met  by  such 
class  in  selecting  its  ablest  and  typical  represen- 
tatives' for  important  positions.  School-teachers 
and  professors,  if  they  alone  held  the  franchise, 
would  select  the  leading  men  of  their  calling. 
Ministers  of  the  gospel  would  select  the  leading 
minister,  physicians  the  leading  physician,  mer- 
chants the  most  successful  merchant,  manufac- 
turers the  best  organizer  of  industry,  and  so  on. 
But  when  the  suffrage  is  extended  to  all  these 
classes,  and  they  are  thrown  together  in  a  mis- 
cellaneous grouping,  and  instructed  to  elect  a  sin- 
gle representative  who  stands  for  them  all,  they 
cannot  do  it.  The  typical  physician  does  not 
represent  the  merchants,  nor  the  most  successful 
merchant  the  ministers.  Compromise  candidates 
must  be  selected  who  do  not  stand  out  typically 
as  the  leaders  of  any  class.  Far  more  difficult  is 


20(5       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

the  problem  when  the  manual  working  classes, 
with  new  and  opposing  interests,  receive  the  fran- 
chise. Not  only  are  the  business  classes  them- 
selves, under  such  conditions,  unable  to  elect  their 
own  typical  representatives  and  councilmen,  but 
the  propertyless  laborers  and  the  small  home-own- 
ers are  likewise  handicapped.  The  ward  lines 
separate  them  all  into  artificial  groupings,  and  pre- 
vent those  natural  combinations  based  on  business 
and  social  interests  which  they  would  readily  adopt 
could  they  join  together  throughout  the  city,  ir- 
respective of  residence.  Neighborhood,  though 
more  compacted,  is  less  united  in  the  city  than 
in  the  country.  Friendship,  business  alliances, 
religious  co-operation,  social  enjoyments,  bind  to- 
gether people  of  different  wards  instead  of  those 
of  the  same  ward.  The  ward  system,  separating 
politically  those  whom  interest  would  join,  and  so 
preventing  their  natural  representation,  ends  in- 
evitably in  the  party  machine,  with  its  military 
and  fraternal  organization  of  the  voters  who  are 
otherwise  separated.  It  is  useful,  therefore,  only 
to  the  astute  schemer  and  wire-puller,  the  repre- 
sentative and  "  boss "  of  the  machine,  who  bal- 
ances skilfully  interest  against  interest,  faction 
against  faction,  party  against  party.  He  repre- 
sents nothing  but  his  own  shrewd  manipulation  of 
the  separated  fragments  of  the  body  politic.  His 
success  is  that  of  Napoleon,  "  divide  and  conquer." 


CITY  GOVERNMENT.  207 

It  is  admitted  that  government  by  the  mayor  in 
American  cities  is  better  than  government  by  the 
common  council  elected  by  wards.  It  centralizes 
the  administration  in  one  head,  which  is  more  easily 
decapitated  by  a  popular  uprising  than  the  hydra- 
headed  council.  But  its  limitations  and  dangerous 
tendencies  have  been  indicated.  The  council,  how- 
ever, elected  upon  the  proportional  basis,  promises 
more  for  municipal  reform  than  the  mayor.  In 
the  first  place  it  would  soon  remove  the  govern- 
ment from  Federal  politics,  simply  because  it  would 
introduce  representation  of  business  interests,  good 
citizenship  interests,  labor  interests,  and  various 
interests  other  than  partisan,  which  would  hold 
the  balance  of  power,  and  prevent  every  partisan 
action. 

The  appeal  to  voters  to  abandon  their  Federal 
politics  in  city  elections  must  in  the  long  run  be 
fruitless  under  a  system  of  majority  or  plurality 
rule,  where  one  party  by  the  election  of  a  mayor 
can  capture  the  entire  city  government.  '  The 
prize  is  too  great  to  be  neglected  by  partisan  inter- 
ests. Party  machinery  must  be  constantly  active, 
or  else  be  weakened.  To  exert  influence  on  na- 
tional issues,  the  local  organization  must  find  co- 
hesion in  local  issues.  Local  victory  strengthens 
its  hold  on  the  State  and  national  organizations. 
The  only  way  to  prevent  national  parties  from 
struggling  to  control  city  politics  is  to  introduce  a 


208       PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

system  which  prevents  any  one  party  from  securing 
majority  control  of  the  city  government.  If  third 
or  fourth  parties  hold  the  balance  of  power,  they 
can  check  the  domination  of  either  national  party 
in  city  affairs,  and  so  reduce  them  both  to  a  mini- 
mum. And  here  again,  since  the  public  looks  on 
third  parties  in  city  affairs  with  a  favor  which  it 
does  not  vouchsafe  to  third  parties  in  Federal  affairs, 
the  time  is  ripe  for  a  system  of  city  government 
with  proportional  representation  which  will  frankly 
give  these  third  parties  the  balance  of  power,  and, 
indeed,  encourage  them  to  increase  in  numbers, 
variety,  and  vigor.  At  the  same  time,  by  electing 
a  council  of,  say,  thirty,  in  annual  groups  of  ten, 
the  quota  of  representation  would  be  large  enough 
to  exclude  petty  and  factious  interests,  but  small 
enough  to  represent  all  interests  of  municipal  sig- 
nificance. 

Proportional  representation  would  bring  able 
and  public-spirited  men  into  the  service  of  the  city. 
As  a  legislative  body  meeting  once  a  week  or 
fortnight,  and  supervising  through  their  commit- 
tees, but  not  administering  the  city  departments, 
the  councilmen  would  receive  no  ^salaries,  as  in 
German  and  English  cities  ;  but  they  would  be 
glad  to  serve.  It  is  a  mistake  to  assume  that  the 
best  business  men  are  so  engrossed  with  their  pri- 
vate affairs  that  they  would  not  act  as  councilmen. 
Such  men  already  give  their  unpaid  services  as 


CITY  GOVERNMENT.  209 

trustees  of  institutions,  as  members  of  State  boards 
of  charities,  as  school,  park,  and  sinking-fund  com- 
missioners, and  in  many  public  positions  where 
they  are  not  compelled  to  seek  appointment  by 
questionable  means.  So  would  they  serve  in  the 
city  council  if  chosen  on  the  proportional  plan  in 
such  a  way  as  to  be  free  from  humiliating  bar- 
gains. "  Elected  in  this  way,"  says  Charles  Fran- 
cis Adams,1  "  who  could  refuse  to  serve  ?  Consider 
the  prestige,  the  weight  of  authority  and  influence, 
with  which  any  man  could  walk  into  a  council 
chamber,  who  entered  it  at  the  head  of  the  poll 
under  such  a  system  as  this.  No  citizen,  whether 
in  New  York  or  Boston,  so  elected,  could  or  would 
refuse  to  obey  the  mandate  of  his  fellow-citizens. 
And  so  it  would  be  in  the  power  of  any  consider- 
able body  of  voters  to  lay  a  hand  on  the  shoulder 
of  any  man,  no  matter  how  eminent  or  how  busy 
he  might  be,  and  call  upon  him  to  perform  his 
tour  of  municipal  duty." 

Such  citizens,  too,  would  be  elected  from  the 
different  sections  of  the  city.  Proportional  repre- 
sentation in  cities  would  not  abolish  local  repre- 
sentation. In  some  cases  where  a  river  or  a 
railway  system  divides  the  city  into  two  widely 
different  sections,  it  might  be  well  to  provide  for 
two  tickets,  one  for  each  section.  But  even  with- 
out such  provision,  the  parties  nominating  candi- 

i  "Proportional  Representation  Review,"  March,  1894. 


210       PEOPOETIONAL  EEPEESENTATION. 

dates  could  bring  out  a  full  vote  for  their  tickets 
only  on  condition  that  they  distributed  the  candi- 
dates among  the  sections.  And  if  the  voters  as  a 
matter  of  fact  attach  weight  to  sectional  repre- 
sentation, they  can  readily  cast  that  weight  in  their 
ballots  by  voting  for  such  candidates  as  repre- 
sent their  sections.  Thus  sectional  interest  must 
come  forward  under  such  a  system  in  its  true 
proportions  along  with  other  interests,  though 
it  is  prevented  from  becoming  the  exclusive  in- 
terest. 

With  a  reformed  city  council  removed  from 
Federal  politics,  the  city  administration  would  as- 
sume a  new  efficiency.  The  council  is  not  only  a 
legislative  body ;  if  it  truly  represents  the  people, 
it  must  be  also  an  administrative  body.  Therein 
it  differs  from  the  State  and  Federal  legislatures 
in  that  the  latter  are  sovereign  in  every  regard 
over  their  respective  fields.  But  the  city  govern- 
ment is  only  a  branch  of  the  State  government,  its 
powers  are  delegated,  and  it  possesses  only  those 
granted  by  the  legislature  or  the  Constitution  of 
the  State.  Matters  of  general  legislation,  such  as 
health,  administration  of  justice,  property,  and 
personal  rights,  in  all  their  manifold  forms,  are 
withheld  from  it.  The  council,  representing  the 
delegated  sovereignty  of  the  city,  has  but  limited 
legislative  duties,  even  under  the  most  generous 
grant  of  home  rule.  It  remains,  therefore,  to  in- 


CITY  GOVERNMENT.  211 

quire  how  far  it  should  be  intrusted  with  adminis- 
trative duties. 

At  the  present  time,  civil  service  reform  in  the 
United  States  has  advanced  no  farther  than  the 
control  of  subordinate  positions.  It  is  not  even 
proposed  by  the  ardent  advocates  of  this  reform 
that  either  in  city,  State,  or  nation,  it  should  in- 
clude the  heads  of  departments.  The  conse- 
quence is  that,  in  the  cities  where  civil  service 
rules  apply,  there  is  a  double  head  to  each  depart- 
ment ; .  a  political  head,  appointed  by  the  mayor  for 
his  own  term  of  office,  and  a  professional  or  expert 
head,  holding  under  civil  service  rules  during 
efficiency.  The  latter  has  the  entire  administra- 
tion of  the  details  of  the  service,  and  the  super- 
vision of  subordinates  ;  he  is  an  expert  who  has 
usually  come  up  from  the  ranks,  and  is  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  every  feature  of  his  department. 
The  political  head  comes  and  goes  with  the  mayor, 
and  is  supposed  to  represent  his  "policy."  The 
actual  administration,  however,  he  is  compelled 
from  very  inefficiency  to  leave  to  the  expert  head. 
Now,  civil  service  reform  comes  in  as  a  mechan- 
ical arrangement  to  prevent  the  political  heads  of 
departments  from  applying  to  subordinates  the 
same  rules  of  appointment  and  removal  as  those 
which  are  applied  to  themselves.  So  far  it  has 
best  accomplished  its  aim  when  administered  by  a 
commission  appointed  independently  of  the  city 


212      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

authorities,  as  in  Massachusetts  by  the  governor. 
This  commission,  after  competitive  and  non-com- 
petitive examinations,  can  alone  "  certify  "  candi- 
dates for  subordinate  appointments  to  the  heads 
of  departments,  upon  requisitions  from  the  latter. 
Usually,  when  one  appointment  is  to  be  made,  the 
three  candidates  who  stand  highest  on  examina- 
tion are  certified,  and  the  head  of  the  department 
must  select  one  of  these.  Promotions,  too,  must 
be  made  according  to  fixed  rules  of  precedence. 
The  object  here  is  to  restrict  the  freedom  of  the 
political  heads  of  departments,  so  that  they  will 
not  dismiss  subordinates  in  order  to  appoint  their 
own  political  adherents. 

Undoubtedly,  with  the  existing  methods  of  se- 
lecting heads,  these  rules  are  indispensable.  They 
give  employees  security  of  tenure,  they  promote 
efficiency  and  economy,  but  above  all  they  prevent 
the  demoralization  of  the  voters,  a  surprisingly 
large  number  of  whom  are  controlled  by  the  hope 
of  office  for  themselves  or  their  friends. 

But  civil  service  reform  as  thus  administered  is 
strikingly  inadequate  in  municipal  government. 
The  general  testimony  is  that  it  succeeds  well 
when  the  heads  of  departments  are  in  sympathy 
with  it;  but  if  they  are  not,  they  can  defeat  its 
aims.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  heads  are  perma- 
nent expert  officials,  as  is  often  the  case  in  the  fire 
department,  they  do  not  need  the  services  of  an 


CITY  GOVERNMENT.  213 

outside  commission,  and  are  awkwardly  hampered 
by  it.  The  appointment  and  promotion  of  subor- 
dinates is  not  a  mere  mechanical  matter  of  ex- 
aminations, measurements  and  averages,  which 
can  be  done  by  a  commission  having  no  profes- 
sional and  expert  knowledge  of  the  services  re- 
quired. Rather  is  it  a  work  of  tact  and  insight 
into  character,  a  work  requiring  that  sound  judg- 
ment, that  thorough  experience  in  the  service,  and 
that  full  knowledge  of  those  subtle  qualities  which 
bring  success  in  the  particular  duties  required, 
—  a  judgment,  an  experience,  and  a  knowledge 
which  can  be  found  only  in  the  resourceful  head 
of  a  department,  who  has  served  in  subordinate 
positions,  and  who  has  at  heart  the  success  and 
honor  of  his  department.  The  weakness  of  civil 
service  reform  is  that  it  does  not  reach  the  foun- 
tain and  source  of  efficient  civil  service,  the  heads 
of  departments. 

A  thorough  reform  of  the  civil  service  in  city 
affairs  cannot  be  expected  until  the  political  heads 
of  departments  are  abolished  altogether,  and  the 
entire  administration  intrusted  to  the  expert  pro- 
fessional headsj  In  German  and  English  cities 
the  civil  service  commission  as  an  independent 
organization  is  unknown.  Heads  of  departments 
are  selected  by  the  council,  sometimes  from  the 
subordinates  by  promotion,  but  usually  from  the 
lists  of  those  who  have  achieved  success  and 


214      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

reputation  as  heads  in  smaller  cities,  having  be- 
gun their  careers  as  subordinates  in  both  large 
and  small  ones.  Upon  these  heads  is  laid  the 
complete  responsibility  for  the  administration  of 
their  departments,  and,  as  an  indispensable  con- 
dition of  such  responsibility,  the  unrestricted  ap- 
pointment and  removal  of  all  subordinates.1  The 
council,  of  course,  legally  and  formally  ratines 
the  action  of  its  heads  of  departments  through  its 
own  committees,  though  not  interfering  in  the 
election  of  subordinates. 

In  the  United  States  an  essential  feature  of 
government  by  the  mayor,  both  as  practised  and 
advocated,  is  his  unchecked  freedom  in  appoint- 
ing his  so-called  "cabinet,"  the  heads  of  depart- 
ments. They  are  his  personal  representatives  in 
the  city  administration.  But  the  mayor,  as  al- 
ready shown,  must  necessarily  be  elected,  except 
in  sporadic  cases,  on  the  basis  of  Federal  politics. 
His  personal  representatives,  therefore,  must  re- 
flect his  political  complexion.  They  must  come 
and  go  with  him.  They  are  appointed  and 
removed,  not  on  account  of  their  intimate  knowl- 
edge of  the  departments  and  their  eminently  suc- 
cessful administration  therein,  but  solely  for  those 
political  reasons  which  may,  for  the  time  being, 

1  Illustrations  of  this  and  other  statements  regarding  foreign 
cities  are  found  in  Albert  Shaw's  "  Municipal  Government  in 
Great  Britain "  and  "  Municipal  Government  in  Continental 
Europe,"  New  York,  1895. 


CITY  GOVERNMENT.  215 

strengthen  the  popular  hold  of  the  mayor.  As 
long  as  the  mayor,  elected  by  popular  vote,  ap- 
points them,  such  must  be  their  character.  They 
are  at  the  best  a  useless  encumbrance,  and  in  all 
cases  a  serious  danger  to  the  administration  of 
city  affairs. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  a  reformed  and  strictly 
non-partisan  council  of  the  foremost  citizens, 
wherein  no  single  political  party  held  the  major- 
ity, should  appoint  the  heads  of  departments, 
these  would  not  be  chosen  for  political  reasons, 
but  simply  to  carry  out  the  wishes  of  the  council. 
The  latter  would  determine  its  own  "  policy,"  as 
far  as  the  city  government  is  empowered  to  do 
so;  and  the  heads  of  departments  would  be  its 
professional,  expert  administrators  for  developing 
that  policy.  The  civil  service  commission  could 
be  abolished  as  a  wasteful  obstruction;  and  the 
department  chiefs,  whose  only  claim  to  perma- 
nency would  be  the  efficiency  of  their  administra- 
tion, could  be  intrusted  with  entire  responsibility 
in  all  the  details  of  appointments,  promotions, 
and  removals. 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  proportional  represen- 
tation in  American  cities  will  achieve  its  marked 
success  not  merely  in  the  legislative  field,  but  in 
the  more  important  administrative  field.  There 
is,  in  fact,  no  half-way  position  between  rule  by 
(  mayor  and  rule  by  council.  If  Americans  accept 


216       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

the  present  tendency,  they  cannot  stop  short  of 
the  abolition  of  the  council.  Following  that  must 
come  longer  terms  for  the  mayor;  next,  removal 
from  office  by  the  governor,  not  only  for  mal- 
feasance, but  for  political  reasons,  as  in  France. 
Home  rule,  democratic  self-government,  civic 
pride,  municipal  patriotism,  must  gradually  dis- 
appear in  the  face  of  advancing  centralization. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  council  elected  from  the 
best  citizens  by  the  free  choice  of  the  voters,  as 
guaranteed  by  proportional  representation,  would 
gradually  absorb  into  its  hands  the  control  of  city 
administration.  Beginning  with  the  control  of 
taxation,  the  legislature  would  remove  from  it 
those  restrictions  against  granting  franchises  and 
making  loans,  and  those  financial  limitations  im- 
posed by  independent  boards  of  estimate  and 
apportionment,  which  now  render  even  the  legis- 
lative functions  of  the  council  in  our  large  cities 
a  mere  formality.  Then  the  council  would  be 
able  to  control  the  mayor,  and  to  state  the  terms 
of  financial  support.  And  finally,  proceeding 
from  one  success  to  another,  the  mayor  would 
again  be  reduced  to  the  position  of  chairman 
and  dignitary,  while  the  grand  committee  of  the 
people,  representing  them  wholly  and  in  part, 
freed  from  machines,  bosses,  and  spoilsmen,  would 
restore  to  our  cities  a  genuine  representative 
democracy. 


CITY  GOVERNMENT.  217 

Practical  illustrations  of  the  line  of  reasoning 
pursued  in  the  foregoing  pages  might  be  found 
in  any  American  city.  I  will  select  the  campaign 
of  1895  for  the  election  of  mayor  and  council- 
men  in  the  city  of  Syracuse.  The  Republican  or- 
ganization had  been  in  control  of  the  city  for 
several  years.  After  both  the  Republican  and 
Democratic  parties  had  made  their  nominations 
for  mayor,  there  was  considerable  dissatisfaction. 
A  Citizens'  Reform  party  was  organized,  com- 
posed mainly  of  Republicans.  This  party  offered 
the  mayoralty  nomination  successively  to  three 
well-known  and  capable  citizens,  two  of  whom 
declined,  and  the  third  accepted.  Thus  three 
candidates  were  in  the  field.  As  a  result,  the 
Democrats  elected  their  nominee  on  the  follow- 
ing vote :  Democrats,  9,184 ;  Citizens,  6,018 ; 
Republicans,  5,831.  At  the  same  election  19 
councilmen  were  elected  by  wards.  Had  the 
councilmanic  election  been  based  on  proportional 
representation,  according  to  the  vote  for  mayor, 
the  council  would  have  stood,  8  Democrats,  6 
Citizens,  5  Republicans.  Neither  party  would 
have  secured  a  majority.  At  the  same  time  the 
Citizens'  party  would  have  met  no  difficulty  in 
finding  eminent  candidates.  The  two  men  who 
refused  to  run  for  mayor  would  willingly  have 
accepted  a  place  on  a  proportional  ticket,  be- 
cause a  nomination  would  have  been  equivalent 


218       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

to  an  election.  They  would  not  have  been 
forced  to  undergo  the  bitter  personal  attacks 
which  spring  from  the  supreme  importance  of  a 
single  candidate,  upon  whom  depend  all  the  ap- 
pointments and  the  distribution  of  patronage. 
There  would  have  been  no  fight  whatever  over 
the  four  or  five  principal  candidates  nominated 
by  the  Citizens'  party.  Then,  when  elected,  such 
men  would  not  have  been  compelled  to  drop  their 
private  business,  at  great  loss  to  themselves,  their 
partners,  and  their  families,  only  to  return  to  it 
after  two  years  of  harassing  struggle  with  spoils- 
men. Serving  without  salaries,  meeting  once  a 
week,  supervising  through  committees  the  heads 
of  departments,  to  whom  the  actual  administration 
is  intrusted,  they  would  have  time  for  their  pri- 
vate affairs.  Under  such  conditions,  there  is  no 
reason  why  the  best  men  of  American  cities,  as  of 
European  cities,  should  not  find  the  honor  and 
opportunities  of  an  aldermanic  seat  greatly  to  be 
desired.  When  once  elected,  and  their  records 
made,  they  would  be  returned  again  and  again 
to  the  council,  with  no  effort,  no  political  wire- 
pulling, simply  through  nomination  by  petition 
and  the  untrammelled  suffrage  of  their  fellow- 
citizens.  In  the  council  they  would  hold  the 
balance  of  power  between  the  two  dominant 
parties.  They  would  prevent  all  partisan  legis- 
lation and  appointments,  would  be  the  spokes- 


CITY  GOVERNMENT.  219 

men  for  the  public  opinion  of  the  community,  and 
a  rallying-point  against  corruption  in  the  city 
affairs. 

Here  the  objection  naturally  arises,  granting 
that  the  Citizens'  Reform  party  would  be  able 
to  guarantee  election  to  its  principal  candidates, 
would  not  the  same  be  true  for  the  regular  parties 
and  their  nominees  ?  Therefore,  would  not  the 
proportional  plan  strengthen  instead  of  weaken' 
the  hold  of  the  machines  ?  Could  they  not  elect 
the  very  worst  candidates  whom  they  might 
choose?  And  when  elected,  could  not  these  rep- 
resentatives of  both  party  organizations  combine 
to  defeat  the  Citizens'  party  and  then  divide  the 
appointments  and  share  the  corruption  funds  be- 
tween themselves  ?  After  all,  does  not  muni- 
cipal reform  depend  solely  upon  the  renewed 
interest  and  independence  of  citizens  in  municipal 
affairs  rather  than  in  any  mere  revision  of  political 
machinery  ? 

Unquestionably,  the  first  requisite  of  any  reform 
is  the  public  spirit,  intelligence,  and  independence 
of  the  voters.  A  corrupt  and  ignorant  electorate 
can  never  produce  good  government.  At  the  same 
time,  the  history  of  the  secret  ballot  legislation 
in  the  United  States  the  past  five  years  demon- 
strates beyond  doubt  the  importance  of  reform 
in  political  machinery.  The  ballot  laws  did  not 
create  patriotism,  public  spirit,  intelligence,  inde- 


220       PEOPOETIONAL   EEPEESENTATION. 

pendence ;  but  they  have  given  these  qualities  an 
advantage  which  they  never  before  possessed  in 
the  electoral  contest  with  bribers.  Proportional 
representation  goes  farther  in  the  same  direction. 
It  offers  to  would-be  independent  voters  the  guar- 
anty that  they  will  not  throw  their  votes  away  if 
they  cast  them  for  third-party  candidates.  In  the 
Syracuse  election  hundreds  of  voters  were  influ- 
enced by  this  consideration.  A  bolt  from  the 
Republican  ticket  to  the  Citizens'  ticket  on  the 
mayoralty  election  was  quite  generally  understood 
to  be  simply  a  vote  for  the  Democratic  candidate. 
But  with  proportional  representation  every  1,100 
votes  turned  over  to  the  Citizens'  ticket  carries 
the  assurance  of  electing  one  candidate  on  that 
ticket ;  whereas  in  the  election  of  mayor  it  would 
have  required  nearly  10,000  votes.  So  easy  and 
safe  is  the  bolting  from  the  regular  nominees 
under  the  proportional  plan  that  the  political  or- 
ganizations would  see  the  necessity  of  nominating 
at  least  prominent  men  instead  of  mere  tools  and 
figure-heads.  Otherwise  the  Citizens'  ticket  could 
easily  increase  its  share  of  representation  from  a 
third  to  a  half  or  more  of  the  aldermen.  In  either 
case  there  would  be  a  decided  gain.  If  only  the 
men  who  engineer  the  political  machines,  but 
who  usually  hold  no  offices,  could  be  placed 
in  the  municipal  council,  they  would  be  in  a 
position  where  the  people  could  condemn  them. 


CITY  GOVERNMENT.  221 

And  succeeding  elections,  with  the  habit  of  in- 
dependence encouraged  among  the  voters,  would 
gradually  weed  out  even  the  least  corrupt  of 
aldermen.  The  voters  in  American  cities  are 
already  independent  enough  to  bring  about  these 
results.  Our  cities  are  not  now  in  need  of 
greater  independence  among  the  citizens,  but 
of  better  machinery  for  expressing  their  actual 
independence. 

City  government  in  the  United  States  is  at  once  . 
the  direst  failure  and  the  brightest  hope  of  our  r 
politics.  It  is  based  upon  the  ward,  —  the  pettiest 
extreme  of  the  district  system  of  representation,  — 
and  wa'rd  politics  is  recognized  as  the  worst  pol- 
itics. This  is  the  hopeful  feature,  that  the  people 
acknowledge  the  failure,  and  are  looking  for  rem- 
edies. What  these  remedies  shall  be  is  not  yet 
clear  nor  agreed.  A  great  many  must  be  tried 
and  tested,  and  their  defects  noted,  and  finally 
by  experimental  selection  the  fittest  will  survive. 
With  three  thousand  cities  and  villages,  America 
has  the  widest  variety  of  municipal  experiments 
in  the  world.  Small  governments  can  be  reformed 
more  readily  than  large  ones.  To  experiment 
upon  Congress  jeopardizes  the  nation;  to  exper- 
iment upon  cities  risks  but  a  fraction.  And  no 
experiment  scarcely  can  aggravate  the  actual  sit- 
uation. From  one  city  to  another  the  successful 
reform  will  extend,  and  finally,  like  other  reforms 


222       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

in  America,  proceed  to  State  and  national  adop- 
tion. If  proportional  representation  can  be  fairly 
introduced  and  tested,  it  is  believed  that  the  fore- 
going pages  have  indicated  the  hope  of  its  uni- 
versal success. 


SOCIAL  REFORM.  223 


CHAPTER  IX. 
SOCIAL  REFORM. 

THE  motive  of  political  reform  is  not  a  mere 
academic  delight  in  symmetrical  and  clean  govern- 
ment. It  goes  much  farther.  Political  reform  is 
only  the  preliminary  to  social  reform.  The  most 
serious  objections  urged  against  the  interference 
of  the  State  or  the  city  in  promoting  social  welfare 
are  grounded  on  the  incapacity  of  administrative 
officials.'  The  experience  of  foreign  cities  has 
demonstrated  the  value  of  municipal  ownership 
and  operation  of  all  public  services,  such  as  water, 
gas,  electric  lighting,  and  street  railways.  The 
efficient  municipal  governments  of  Europe  have 
done  much  more.  They  have  erected  municipal 
dwellings  with  the  best  equipments,  to  be  leased 
at  moderate  rentals  to  working  people.  They 
have  conducted  municipal  farms,  slaughter-houses, 
savings  banks,  pawnshops,  baths,  laundries,  ball- 
grounds,  technical  schools,  with  the  purpose  to 
improve  the  condition  of  the  poorest  working  pop- 
ulation, and  to  elevate  the  life  of  every  class. 
In  American  cities  it  would  seem  absurd  to  in- 
trust such  important  enterprises  to  the  authorities 
as  at  present  constituted.  Generally,  where  watei> 


224       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

works,  gas,  or  electric  lighting  is  taken  up  by  a 
municipality,  it  is  placed  in  the  hands,  not  of  the 
council,  but  of  a  board  or  commission  newly  cre- 
ated for  the  purpose,  and  elected  by  the  people  or 
appointed  by  the  mayor.  This  does  not  bring 
satisfactory  results.  It  unnecessarily  splits  the 
government,  divides  responsibility,  involves  waste- 
ful administration.  Yet,  where  the  council  cannot 
be  trusted,  it  is  the  only  practicable  plan.  At  the 
same  time,  it  is  so  objectionable  that  it  affords 
little  encouragement  to  those  who  desire  the  exten- 
sion of  municipal  functions.  With  a  reformed 
council,  however,  the  way  would  be  open  to  a 
business-like  administration  of  all  new  enterprises 
which  the  public  might  wish  the  municipality  to 
undertake.  The  reform  of  the  government  of 
London,  through  the  County  Government  Act  of 
1888,  which  created  a  council  of  able  and  repre- 
sentative citizens,  was  followed  immediately  by 
energetic  work  in  the  direction  of  municipal  dwell- 
ings, street  and  dock  improvements,  abolition  of 
contract  work,  and  purchase  of  street-railway  lines. 
The  latter,  throughout  the  whole  area  of  London, 
will  be  owned  and  operated  by  the  council,  and 
consolidated  into  a  single  system  within  fifteen 
years. 

The  people  who  suffer  most  from  inefficient  and 
corrupt  government  in  the  United  States  are  the 
wage-earning  classes.  Their  streets  are  ill  kept ; 


SOCIAL  EEFOEM.  225 

sanitary  and  building  regulations  are  unenf orced ; 
heavy  charges  are  imposed  for  car-fares  and  gas; 
parks,  playgrounds,  and  schools  are  inadequate. 
So  little  does  the  city  do  for  the  classes  who  have 
no  property,  that  they  lose  their  interest  in  muni- 
cipal government,  and  readily  follow  the  politician 
who  appeals  to  their  prejudices.  This  becomes  a 
serious  matter  as  these  classes  grow  in  self-con- 
sciousness, as  they  begin  to  learn  their  political 
power,  and  to  feel  that  the  motive  of  municipal 
government  is  not  to  promote  their  welfare,  but  to 
restrict  their  liberty.  They  have  a  majority  of  the 
votes,  and  they  tend  to  combine  under  machine 
leadership  for  what  they  consider  their  class  inter- 
ests. Municipal  reform  must  consider  the  welfare^ 
of  the  masses  of  the  working  classes.  But  it  is  a 
mistake  to  suppose  that  their  welfare  will  be  pro-| 
moted  by  giving  them  exclusive  majority  rule,  as 
with  the  present  system.  ;  Tammany  Hall  secures 
their  votes,  but  neglects  their  homes  and  schools. 
A  corrupt  government,  with  weak  officials,  managed 
by  private  bosses,  can  never  introduce  social  re- 
forms. It  must  first  have  a  share  of  the  business 
integrity  and  leadership  of  the  community.  There 
are  many  men  of  this  type  in  every  city  who  would 
gladly  enter  upon  reforms  for  the  people  could 
they  be  placed  in  power.  If  the  working  classes 
were  free  to  vote  as  they  pleased,  they  would  soon 
learn  to  stand  by  such  men  and  to  keep  them  in 


226      PEOPOETIONAL  EEPEESENTATION. 

the  municipal  council  against  all  the  influences  of 
machines  and  corporations.  At  present  these  men 
are  excluded  by  the  very  qualities  which  would 
make  them  of  service.  Proportional  representa- 
tion is  the  only  political  reform  yet  proposed 
which  will  guarantee  them  continued  election,  and 
thereby  bring  about  that  interest  of  the  working 
classes  in  good  city  government  and  that  harmony 
of  all  classes  which  is  becoming  indispensable. 

Thoughtful  persons  who  contemplate  the  social 
conditions  of  to-day  are  oppressed  by  anxiety.  So 
suddenly  have  a  multitude  of  strange  evils  sprung 
into  sight  that  the  observer  is  bewildered,  —  on 
one  side,  an  unprecedented  concentration  of  wealth 
in  the  control  of  a  few  syndicates ;  on  the  other,  a 
growing  restlessness  and  frantic  attempts  at  organ- 
ization on  the  part  of  the  wage-earning  classes.  As 
phases  of  these  changes,  there  are  also  the  rapid 
rise  of  cities  where  capital  and  labor  meet  face  to 
face  in  secret  and  open  battle ;  the  mobilization 
of  the  army  near  these  cities,  and  the  equipment 
of  armories;  the  increase  of  the  unemployed,  of 
crime,  intemperance,  and  vice  ;  the  purchase  of 
legislation  and  the  degradation  of  politics.  But 
more  serious  than  all  is  the  cynical  recognition  of 
these  facts  in  the  club-room,  the  bitter  emphasis 
of  them  in  the  back  alley  and  the  tenement  and 
among  the  small  farmers,  and  the  hopelessness  of 


SOCIAL  REFORM.  227 

millions  of  workers.  Forty  years  ago  the  farmer 
and  his  sons  worked  early  and  late,  opening  up  the 
wilderness,  but  they  went  and  came  with  songs. 
To-day  they  cannot  endure  it;  sons  abandon  the 
farms  for  the  cities,  work  is  irksome  and  a  curse ; 
they  hurry  through  it  to  reach  the  saloon.  Have 
the  people  become  individually  and  severally  de- 
generate, or  are  they  distorted  by  social  condi- 
tions ? 

Whatever  the  causes,  the  problems  are  here. 
And  the  array  of  solutions  is  more  bewildering 
than  the  multitude  of  problems.  Here  are  iso- 
lated groups  of  visionaries  and  enthusiasts,  ready 
to  sacrifice  themselves  for  their  several  panaceas. 
Here  are  timid  souls  anxious  to  smooth  the  ele- 
ments by  charity,  and  beseeching  competitors  to 
show  brotherly  kindness.  Here  are  hard  intellects, 
demanding  the  police. 

The  situation  cannot  remain.  It  rests  on  a  pro- 
found contradiction.  On  one  side  is  a  religion 
quoted  and  invoked  at  school,  in  the  pulpit,  by 
the  press,  by  socialists,  even  by  atheists,  which  ex- 
alts an  ideal  of  human  brotherhood  and  equality; 
on  the  other  side,  an  industrial  condition  fast  so- 
lidifying class  distinctions,  and  a  political  philoso- 
phy teaching  the  infallibility  of  the  majority. 

The  conviction  is  growing  that  in  some  way  the 
government,  as  city,  State,  or  nation,  is  to  have  an 
important  place  in  solving  these  contradictions.  It 


228      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

is  seen  that  the  church  has  lost  its  hold  —  in  the 
Middle  Ages  it  might  have  sufficed.  Education 
is  not  enough  —  it,  with  religion,  intensifies  the 
unrest.  Public  opinion  grows  and  accomplishes 
much,  but  it  is  limited.  Feelings  of  brotherhood 
and  a  spirit  of  concession  soften  antagonism  in 
individual  cases,  but  they  are  not  comprehensive. 
The  state  alone  includes  all  the  other  elements ; 
it  alone  is  coterminous  with  society.  Without  it 
education  is  not  universal.  Religion  and  brother- 
hood do  not  reach  criminals,  degenerates,  nor 
tyrants,  but  the  state  lays  its  hand  upon  them. 
Society  acts  through  the  state  —  it  is  society's 
organ.  Public  opinion,  as  modified  by  religion, 
education,  and  brotherhood,  effects  its  main  pur- 
poses through  legislation. 

But  the  state  is  too  much  considered  as  merely 
coercive.  It  is  primarily  co-operative.  Coercion 
is  needed  only  for  anti-social  individuals  and  emer- 
gencies. The  state  seems  to  be  coercive  because  it 
does  not  represent  all  the  people ;  it  is  not  yet  a 
perfect  organ  for  expressing  their  wishes.  Many 
who  are  not  truly  anti-social  are  crushed  by  it. 
Were  its  laws  and  administration  accurately  just  to 
all  classes,  and  did  it  promote  the  general  rather 
than  influential  private  welfare,  public  opinion 
would  exact  such  close  obedience  that  coercion 
would  almost  disappear. 


SOCIAL   REFORM.  229 

No  social  doctrine  can  long  be  held  by  a  consid- 
erable body  of  people  if  it  does  not  include  a  side 
of  truth.  It  may  not  be  intelligently  held,  nor  be 
intelligible  to  others,  and  may  be  grounded  mainly 
on  feelings;  but  it  is  the  expression  of  feelings 
which  are  themselves  products  of  social  conditions, 
and  so  has  a  place  in  social  organization.  Such 
are  the  profound  conservative  instincts  which  sus- 
tain private  property,  the  family,  political  parties, 
and  the  state.  Less  so,  and  modified  more  or  less 
by  intelligence,  are  the  instincts  which  demand 
change,  such  as  abolition  of  slavery  and  the  sa- 
loon, or  which  seek  socialism,  anarchism,  single 
tax,  co-operation,  or  other  innovations.  Out  of 
the  proper  and  just  balancing  of  all  these  interests 
and  doctrines,  and  their  proportionate  realization 
in  social  structure,  proceeds  that  "  moving  equilib- 
rium "  which  is  the  life  of  society. 

It  is  the  province  of  the  science  of  sociology  to 
discover  what  is  this  just  balancing  of  social  forces 
which  will  harmonize  antagonisms  and  make  for 
progress.  Science  should  indicate  those  lines  of 
development  and  social  experiment  which  will 
economize  the  life  of  society,  and  secure  the  good 
of  every  individual. 

But  science  alone  is  inadequate.  It  is  merely 
academic  and  preliminary.  Its  honor  is  that  it 
leads  to  invention,  and  invention  in  society  is 
legislation.  Legislation,  comprehending  the  en- 


230      PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

tire  range  of  human  social  existence,  lays  the 
foundation  for  individual  development  and  pri- 
vate co-operation.  Law-makers,  then,  are  socio- 
logical inventors,  and  require  the  aid  of  sociology 
as  electricians  require  the  aid  of  physics.1 

Social  invention,  however,  differs  from  mechan- 
ical invention  in  one  most  important  character. 
Society  is  not  dead  matter  to  be  ruthlessly  ad- 
justed. It  is  a  vital,  historical  growth,  composed 
of  human  lives,  feelings,  and  interests.  These 
interests  must  be  consulted.  Monarchy  was  abol- 
ished because  royal  inventors  did  not  consult 
social  classes.  Likewise  every  system  of  govern- 
ment which  is  partial  and  unrepresentative  will  be 
left  behind,  wrhether  it  be  conducted  by  aristoc- 
racy, plutocracy,  or  political  machines. 

But  if  a  system  of  government  can  be  perfected 
where  all  classes  and  interests  shall  be  represented 
by  their  leading  spokesmen,  social  invention  will 
proceed,  not  by  the  coercive  arm  of  the  state,  but 
by  mutual  concession.  Labor  and  capital  to-day 
have  no  recognized  common  ground  or  meeting- 
place,  neither  in  shop,  factory,  church,  college,  nor 
state.  It  is  left  for  demagogues,  the  representa- 
tives of  neither,  to  bring  them  together.  But  a 
city  council,  having  the  responsibility  of  the  city 
in  its  hands,  and  containing  in  its  membership  the 
acknowledged  leaders  of  capital  and  labor,  would 

1  See  Ward,  "  Dynamic  Sociology,"  2  vols.  New  York,  1886. 


/"- 


SOCIAL  REFORM  231 

be,  within  its  jurisdiction,  the  most  efficient  in- 
strument yet  discovered  for  harmonizing  the  two. 
It  would  be  a  perpetual  board  of  arbitration,  pos- 
sessing many  powers  of  sovereignty,  but  not  com- 
pelled to  use  them.  Strikes  and  boycotts  would 
be  settled  by  mutual  agreement  between  author- 
ized negotiators.  And  for  the  wider  interests  of 
States  and  nation  the  legislatures  and  Congress 
would  fill  the  same  office. 

Such  a  representative  assembly  would  be  com- 
posed of  moderate,  sensible,  earnest  men,  because 
the  people  are  moderate  and  earnest.  There 
would  be  extremists  and  idealists,  but  their  vis- 
ions would  be  controlled  by  hard  contact  with  the 
practical  difficulties  of  ideal  legislation  and  with 
the  overwhelming  majority  of  moderates.  And 
the  latter,  too,  would  be  forced  to  see  that  ideal 
conditions  must  have  consideration  as  well  as  the 
rude  facts  of  the  present. 

From  such  assemblies  of  leaders  in  all  the  cities 
and  States  and  the  Congress  of  the  Union  would 
proceed  such  well-considered,  straightforward,  and 
simple  laws,  without  the  coercion  of  partisan  ma- 
jorities or  the  injustice  of  partial  representation, 
that  the  people  would  learn  to  respect  their  gov- 
ernment, and  to  fall  in  line  heartily  with  its  laws 
and  ordinances.  Such  assemblies,  instead  of  shoot- 
ing back  and  forth  between  revolution  and  re-  / 
action,  would  march  steadily  forward  in  the  line  I 


232      PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

of  social  reform^]  They  would  call  science  and 
comparative'  legislation  and  history  to  their  aid. 
They  would  establish  by  mutual  concession  the 
essential  conditions  for  the  brpthjerhaoji,_ol^aLpitai 
and  labor,  and  with  these  conditions  would  lay 
^the  foundations  for  the  gradual  solution  of  the 
main  problems  of  social  organization.  And  the 
state,  instead  of  being  a  coercive  policeman  to 
force  degenerates  into  line,  would  become  the 
honored  instrument  of  social  co-operation. 

It  might  then  be  expected  that  the  legislature 
would  resume  its  rightful  place  as  the  sovereign 
branch  of  government.  Unquestionably,  its  posi- 
tion is  such  that,  no  matter  how  degraded  its 
character,  unless  restricted  by  the  Constitution,  it 
gradually  absorbs  supreme  control  of  the  other 
departments.  It  alone  can  grant  and  withhold 
financial  support;  and  sooner  or  later  this  power 
subordinates  the  executive,  the  judicial,  and  the 
administrative  branches.  The  national  Congress, 
notwithstanding  presidential  vetoes  and  popular 
distrust,  has  drawn  to  itself  the  management  of  the 
details  of  administration.  State  legislatures  and 
municipal  councils  would  have  done  the  same  but 
for  the  increasing  constitutional  restrictions  which 
have  subordinated  their  financial  powers  to  the 
judiciary  and  the  executive.  Could  the  Federal 
Constitution  be  readily  amended,  doubtless  similar 
restrictions  would  be  imposed  upon  Congress. 


SOCIAL   REFORM.  233 

If  government  is  to  be  an  agent  for  social  re- 
form, it  must  have  first  the  confidence  of  the  peo- 
ple. This  can  come  only  as  it  commands  the  best 
ability  of  the  community,  and  is  representative 
in  character.  The  executives  and  judges  do  not 
answer  these  requisites.  They  cannot  represent 
all  the  people.  They  are  single  officers  elected 
by  a  majority,  or  appointed  by  the  agent  of  the 
majority,  and  they  do  not  inspire  universal  confi- 
dence. Generally,  indeed,  they  do  not  represent 
even  a  majority  of  the  people,  but  only  a  plu- 
rality ;  and  even  in  that  plurality  a  small  faction 
of  astute  politicians  and  influential  capitalists  in- 
terested in  legislation  or  contracts  and  franchises, 
has  dictated  the  nominations  and  the  appoint 
ments.  It  cannot  be  expected  that  the  people, 
who  are  only  awaiting  a  new  election  to  bring  in 
a  new  executive  hostile  to  the  incumbent  one, 
will  trust  such  a  government  with  the  delicate 
and  portentous  problems  of  social  reform.  In  the 
legislature,  however,  elected  upon  the  propor- 
tional basis,  by  the  free  choice  of  all  classes  of 
voters,  and  uncontrolled  by  a  partisan  majority, 
the  people  would  find  that  ability,  that  extended 
experience,  that  representative  character,  and  that 
continuous  policy,  which  would  command  their 
confidence. 

With  the  confidence  of  the  people  assured,  the 
legislature  must  become  solely  responsible  for  the 


234       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

policy  and  administration  of  government.  It  is 
becoming  plain  that,  in  times  of  urgency,  the 
American  idea  of  "  checks  and  balances  "  is  falla- 
cious. A  government  in  which  departments  are 
pitted  against  each  other  cannot  be  consistent  and 
harmonious,  much  less  efficient.  The  idea  is  al- 
ready nearly  abandoned  in  municipal  government, 
where  the  mayor  is  made  alone  responsible  for  the 
administration.  There  must,  indeed,  be  checks 
and  balances  in  government,  else  one  class  will 
override  the  others.  But  these  checks  should  not 
be  founded  upon  the  antagonism  of  independent 
departments ;  rather  should  they  be  provided  for 
within  a  single  sovereign  department.  By  a  pro- 
portional election  of  law-makers  this  is  secured. 
Within  the  legislative  body  itself,  controlling  all 
other  departments,  would  be  found  such  a  bal- 
ancing of  interests  and  classes  that,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  despotism  which  our  constitution-makers 
feared  would  be  obviated,  and,  on  the  other,  the 
indispensable  harmony  and  unity  of  government 
would  be  guaranteed. 

The  legislature  could  then  safely  be  made  the 
sovereign  organ  of  the  government  and  the  promo- 
ter of  social  reform.  The  executive  would  sink  to 
its  true  position,  that  of  an  agent  for  carrying  out 
the  policy  of  legislation ;  and  the  judiciary,  instead 
of  annulling  the  laws,  would  simply  apply  them  to 
concrete  cases. 


SOCIAL  REFORM.  235 

All  this,  of  course,  involves  a  change  in  the 
character  of  our  representative  assemblies  difficult 
for  the  American  citizen  to  comprehend.  It  im- 
plies not  merely  a  constitutional  supremacy  of  the 
law-making  body  over  the  other  departments,  but 
primarily  a  popular  supremacy  in  the  hearts  of  the 
people.  Proportional  representation  is  not  ad- 
vocated only  to  give  the  minority  a  hearing,  but 
mainly  to  give  all  the  people  confidence  in  their 
rulers  and  in  one  another.  And  unless  the  rising 
demand  for  social  reform  now  urging  forward  all 
classes  can  bring  them  all  together  into  harmoni- 
ous, progressive,  and  just  legal  relations  through 
the  law-making  agencies,  the  outlook  for  these 
movements  is  indeed  ominous. 


236      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  PROGRESS  OF  PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTA- 
TION. 

IN  its  English  and  colonial  origins,  representa- 
tive government  was  an  almost  unconscious 
growth.  No  philosophical  dissertations  preceded 
it.  The  masses-  of  the  people,  with  slavery  and 
serfdom  their  lot,  were  ignorant  and  without  voice 
in  the  government.  Representation  at  that  time 
was  an  instrument  in  the  contest  between  mon- 
archy on  the  one  hand,  and  aristocracy  and  wealth 
on  the  other.  The  first  outcome  was  the  success 
of  representation  and  the  limitation  of  monarchy. 
The  problems  of  government  which  attracted  at- 
tention down  to  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury turned  upon  the  relative  weight  of  the 
monarchical  as  against  the  representative  principle. 
Consequently,  the  philosophical  works  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  and  the  written  constitutions 
from  178T  to  1848,  were  concerned  with  the  dis- 
tribution of  powers,  and  the  balancing  of  execu- 
tive, legislative,  and  judicial  branches.  In  all  of 
these  discussions,  the  unpropertied  classes  had  no 
immediate  interest,  and  were  not  consulted.  The 
final  result  of  this  constitution-making  has  been 
the  destruction  or  the  constitutional  limitation  of 


ITS  PROGRESS.  237 

monarchy  and  aristocracy  based  on  birth,  and  the 
increased  influence  of  plutocracy  based  upon  prop- 
erty. 

In  the  third  and  fourth  decades  of  the  present 
century,  a  remarkable  wave  of  democracy  culmi- 
nated in  our  Western  civilization.  In  the  United 
States,  property  and  educational  qualifications 
were  very  generally  removed  from  the  suffrage. 
In  France,  and  more  especially  in  Switzerland,  the 
franchise  was  made  nearly  universal .  In  England 
and  Germany,  while  the  suffrage  was  not  extended 
to  the  wage-receiving  classes,  yet  the  spirit  of 
the  times  liberalized  the  constitutions  through  the 
Reform  Bills  of  1832  and  1854  in  England,  and 
the  representative  parliaments  of  1848  in  Ger- 
many. 

The  modern  political  parties  date  from  those 
decades.  Popular  suffrage  introduced  a  radical 
change  in  the  nature  of  the  representative  system. 
Politicians  began  to  bid  for  the  labor  vote.  A 
few  pioneering  minds  saw  the  inevitable  outcome, 
and  set  about  a  philosophical  study  of  the  founda- 
tions of  representation.  It  was  not  accidental 
that  the  years  1844  in  America  and  1846  in 
Switzerland  mark  the  first  attempts  of  individual 
minds  to  inquire  into  the  true  basis  of  representa- 
tion. Mr.  Thomas  Gilpin  published  at  Philadel- 
phia, in  the  former  year,  his  prophetic  work, 
of  which  little  notice  was  then  taken,  "On  the 


238      PROPOETIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

Representation  of  Minorities  of  Electors  to  act 
with  the  Majority  in  Elected  Assemblies."  In 
1846  Victor  Considerant,  the  distinguished  leader 
of  the  socialist  school  of  Fourier,  addressed  an 
open  letter  to  the  Grand  Council  of  Geneva,  en- 
titled, "  De  la  Siiicerite  du  Gouvernement  Re- 
presentatif,  ou  Exposition  de  1'Election  Veridique." 
In  this  brochure  M.  Considerant  proposed  inde- 
pendently a  plan  of  election  almost  identical  with 
that  of  Thomas  Gilpin.  Each  voter  was  to  cast 
one  vote  for  a  party,  and  then  to  indicate  the 
names  of  the  candidates  of  his  party  whom  he 
preferred.  The  proportion  of  representatives  to 
which  each  party  should  be  entitled  was  to  be 
determined  by  the  rule  of  three,  and  the  success- 
ful candidates  by  the  order  of  their  preferences. 
Something  akin  to  this  plan  had  been  suggested 
some  twelve  years  before  by  Considerant's  master, 
Charles  Fourier;  and  its  publication  in  1846  pre- 
ceded by  one  year  the  wide  extension  of  the  suf- 
frage in  Geneva.  There  was  as  yet  no  feeling  of 
serious  need  for  it,  and  it  therefore  lay  dormant 
for  fifteen  years.  In  1861  it  was  revived  by  M. 
Antoin  Morin  in  two  pamphlets.1 

In  1864,  at  the  August  election,  the  city  of  Gen- 
eva was  the  scene  of  violent  outbreaks  and  blood- 
shed, resulting  from  the  political  strife  of  the 

i  Un  Nouveau  Systeme  Electoral.    Geneve,  1861.    De  la  Repre- 
sentation des  Minorites.    Geneve,  1862. 


ITS  PROGRESS.  239 

Conservative  and  Radical  parties.  The  following 
September,  Professor  Ernest  Naville  published  his 
first  brochure 1  addressed  to  the  federal  council 
and  the  Swiss  people,  showing  that  the  violence 
of  the  elections  which  threatened  the  stability  of 
Swiss  institutions,  and  inspired  throughout  Europe 
a  dread  of  the  new  democracy  of  1848,  was  but 
the  natural  outcome  of  the  general  ticket  and  ex- 
clusive majority  rule.  Professor  Naville  from  that 
date  has  been  the  recognized  leader  of  the  re- 
form in  Switzerland;  and  his  numerous  publica- 
tions, besides  presenting  cogent  arguments,  afford 
a  complete  history  of  proportional  representation 
to  the  present  time. 

In  1867  was  formed  1' Association  reformiste  de 
Geneve,  composed  of  Professor  Naville  and  six 
associates.  But  the  time  was  not  yet  ripe  for  a 
popular  appreciation  of  the  principles  of  propor- 
tional representation  ;  nor,  indeed,  had  a  plan  been 
perfected  which  would  appeal  to  the  public.  The 
movement  for  the  referendum  and  initiative  as  a 
decidedly  practical  and  thorough-going  deadlock 
upon  their  unrepresentative  assemblies  absorbed 
the  thought  of  the  people.  Another  twenty-five 
years  passed  without  appreciable  advance  in  popu- 
lar approAial.  A  small  group  of  students  contin- 
ued at  work  improving  the  plan  of  reform  which 

1  Les  Elections  de  Geneve,  Memoire  prcsente  au  Conseil  fe'de'ral 
et  au  Peuple  Suisse,  par  Ernest  Naville ;  Lausanne  et  Geneve, 
1864,  p.  59. 


Y> 


240       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

they  would  present  to  the  people.  In  the  year 
1876  the  national  Association  Suisse  pour  la  Re- 
presentation Proportionelle  was  organized,  with 
branches  at  Berne  and  Geneva.  Hearings  were 
obtained  from  time  to  time  before  legislative  and 
constitutional  assemblies.  But  it  required  a  crisis 
to  force  public  attention  upon  the  reform. 

The  crisis  came  in  1890  in  the  Italian  canton  of 
Ticino.  The  Conservative  party  in  1889,  with 
12,653  votes,  elected  77  of  the  112  members  of 
the  Grand  Council,  while  the  Liberals,  with  12,008 
(a  handful  less),  elected  only  35.  Out  of  a  total 
vote  of  24,671,  it  was  calculated  that  9,157  were 
•unrepresented.1  Finally,  in  1890,  an  insurrec- 
tion broke  out.  The  Liberals  seized  upon  the  arse- 
nal, and  overthrew  the  Conservative  government. 
Federal  troops  were  despatched  to  put  down  the 
revolt.  Then  it  was  that  the  federal  government 
recommended  to  the  canton  the  adoption  of  pro- 
portional representation.  The  suggestion  was 
acted  upon,  a  commission  was  created,  and  in  1891 
the  Free  List  was  adopted  in  the  form  approved 
by  the  Swiss  Association.  Says  Professor  Louis 
Wuarin  of  the  University  of  Geneva:2  — 

"  Had  not  the  system  of  proportional  representation  been 
carefully  worked  out  by  men  who,  believing  in  the  correct- 

1  W.  D.  McCracken,  Proportional   Representation   Review, 
September,  1893,  p.  12. 

2  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social 
Science,  November,  1895, 


ITS  PROGRESS  241 

ness  of  the  principle,  were  desirous  of  changing  the  basis 
of  the  electoral  law,  the  great  achievement  in  the  cause  of 
justice  and  peace  we  now  rejoice  at,  in  Switzerland,  would 
not  have  been  effected.  Is  not  this  an  eloquent  encourage- 
ment to  every  man  to  look  for  the  truth  and  prepare  its 
advent,  no  matter  if  the  feeling  of  the  people  should  even 
be  strongly  adverse  or  sceptical  at  the  beginning?  The 
reformers,  a  small  handful  of  workers,  met  with  but  little 
encouragement  at  first ;  they  were  opposed  by  almost  all 
the  men  playing  some  part  in  politics,  and  who  enjoyed  the 
reputation  of  being  practical.  But  an  hour  came  when 
the  stone  intended  to  be  put  at  the  corner  of  the  edifice  of 
democracy  was  found  useful,  and  was  used.  In  the  organ- 
ization of  free  government,  there  is  something  which  is 
left  to  the  brain  and  the  spirit  of  research.  The  power  of 
thought  is  a  living  force,  and  no  department  of  the  world 
can  prosper  where  it  is  stagnant." 

From  Ticino  the  reform  has  spread  rapidly  to 
other  cantons.  The  initiative  and  referendum  have 
helped  it  very  much.  The  French  Protestant  can- 
ton Neuchatel  adopted  it  in  1891 ;  the  large  canton 
of  Geneva  in  1892;  the  Catholic  Fribourg,  for  mu- 
nicipal elections,  in  1894;  the  German  Catholic  Zug 
in  1894,  which  combined  the  "free  ticket"  with 
cumulative  voting ;  finally  the  German  Catholic 
Soluthurn  in  March,  1895,  the  first  to  introduce 
the  Droop  quota  (the  votes  divided  by  the  number 
of  representatives  increased  ly  one).  In  a  few 
cantons  and  cities  the  reform  has^been  rejected  by 
referendum.  The  city  of  Basle  rejected  it  a  few 
years  ago,  but  the  people  are  now  demanding  it 


242      PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

anew  by  initiative.  The  German  Catholic  Lucerne 
and  St.  Gall  rejected  it,  though  large  minorities 
were  for  it.  It  is  expected  that  "  they  will  soon 
follow,  and  take  it  up  like  Basle ;  so  that  in  less 
than  ten  years  the  whole  of  Switzerland  will  have 
proportional  representation  carried  out  without 
revolution  and  bloodshed."  * 

In  a  small  decentralized  country,  like  Switzer- 
land, a  political  reform  is  more  readily  accomplished 
than  in  a  large  one.  England  and  America,  how- 
ever, have  actually  preceded  Switzerland  by  twenty 
to  twenty-five  years  in  the  adoption  of  certain 
forms  of  minority  representation.  Doubtless  the 
crudity  and  comparative  failure  of  those  primitive 
forms  were  important  factors  in  blocking  their  pro- 
gress and  prejudicing  the  public  against  mere  doc- 
trinaire tinkering  without  a  practicable  basis. 
Similar  conditions,  however,  and  similar  problems, 
suggest  similar  solutions.  In  1854,  in  the  discus- 
sion of  the  second  Reform  Bill,  Lord  John  Russell 
moved  in  Parliament,  on  the  suggestion  of  Profes- 
sor Fawcett,  that,  in  the  newly  created  electoral 
districts  returning  three  members,  no  elector  should 
vote  for  more  than  two  candidates.  He  said  :  — 

"Now  it  appears  to  me  that  many  advantages  would 
attend  the  enabling  the  minority  to  have  a  part  in  these  re- 
turns. In  the  first  place,  there  is  apt  to  be  a  feeling  of  sore- 

1  See  article  by  Charles  Burkli,  "  Free  List  vs.  the  Hare  Sys- 
tem," in  Proportional  Representation  Review,  September,  1895. 


JTS  PROGRESS.  243 

ness  when  a  considerable  number  of  electors,  such  as  I  have 
mentioned,  are  completely  shut  out  from  a  share  in  the 
representation  of  one  place.  .  .  .  But,  in  the  next  place,  I 
think  that  the  more  you  have  your  representation  confined  to 
large  populations,  the  more  ought  you  to  take  care  that  there 
should  be  some  kind  of  balance,  and  that  the  large  places 
sending  members  to  this  House  should  send  those  who  rep- 
resent the  community  at  large.  But  when  there  is  a  very 
large  body  excluded,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  community 
is  fairly  represented."  l 

In  1854  Mr.  James  Garth  Marshall  published 
at  London  his  "  Majorities  and  Minorities ;  Their 
Relative  Rights,"  wherein  he  proposed  for  the  first 
time  the  cumulative  vote  which  has  been  so  popu- 
lar hr  English  and  American  reforms.  The  limited 
vote  of  Lord  Russell,  however,  did  not  find  legis- 
lative enactment  until  twenty-three  years  after  its 
first  proposal;  and  the  cumulative  vote  was  first 
employed  in  1870.  Two  events  prepared  the  way 
for  this  adoption.  The  first  was  the  discussion 
inaugurated  by  Mr.  Thomas  Hare  in  1859,  when 
he  published  his  volume  entitled  "  The  Election 
of  Representatives,  Parliamentary  and  Municipal," 
which  was  followed  in  1862  by  John  Stuart  Mill's 
profoundly  philosophical  "  Considerations  on  Rep- 
resentative Government."  Mr.  Mill  speaks  of 
Thomas  Hare  as  "  a  man  of  great  capacity,  fitted 
alike  for  large  general  views  and  for  the  contri- 

1  Quoted  by  Salem  Butcher,  "  Minority  or  Proportional  Rep- 
resentation," New  York,  1872,  p.  38. 


244      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

vance  of  practical  details ;  "  and  of  his  plan  as 
"  among  the  very  greatest  improvements  yet  made 
in  the  theory  and  practice  of  government."  l 

Certainly  no  discussions  have  equalled  these 
treatises  of  Mill  and  Hare  in  placing  before  the 
thinking  people  of  all  countries  the  true  nature  of 
representation  under  universal  suffrage  and  politi- 
cal parties.  The  very  extreme  to  which  Mr.  Hare 
carried  his  plan,  proposing  as  he  did  to  abolish  all 
districts,  and  to  make  one  great  constituency,  en- 
abled him  and  Mr.  Mill  to  develop  fully  the  philo- 
sophical principles  underlying  personal  rather  than 
party  or  sectional  representation./^The  unit  of 
representation  was  to  be  determined  by  dividing 
the  whole  number  of  votes  in  the  entire  kingdom 
by  the  number  of  seats  in  the  House.  Every  can- 
didate who  obtained  a  quota  would  be  returned, 
from  however  great  a  number  of  local  constitu- 
encies his  votes  might  be  gathered.  The  elector 
would  indicate  his  first  and  second  choices,  and  so 
on ;  so  that  his  single  vote  might  be  transferred 
from  elected  or  defeated  candidates  to  some  one 
whom  it  might  assist  in  electing.2  The  mechanical 
details  for  counting,  calculating  the  quota,  and 

1  "  Considerations  on  Representative  Government,"  American 
edition,  New  York,  1875,  pp.  153, 156. 

2  In  Appendix  II.  will  be  found  a  bill  drawn  up  according  to 
Mr.  Hare's  plan  for  municipal  councils,  and  in  Appendix  III.  a 
modification  of  the  Hare  plan  devised  by  Mr.  "W.  H.  Gove,  of 
Sale*m,  Mass. 


ITS  PROGRESS.  245 

transferring  the  votes,  are  given  by  Mr.  Hare  in 
great  detail.  So  complicated  did  the  plan  appear 
when  presented  on  a  national  scale,  yet  so  power- 
ful were  the  considerations  urged  in  favor  of  its 
underlying  principle,  that  for  ten  years  in  England 
and  America  the  simpler  forms  of  the  limited  and 
the  cumulative  votes  received  earnest  attention 
and  occasional  enactment  into  law. 

At  the  same  time  the  suffrage  was  again  being 
widely  extended  in  both  countries.  In  1867,  when 
the  Reform  Bill  which  granted  the  ballot  to  the 
artisans  in  towns  was  being  adopted  by  Parliament, 
Mr.  Mill,  as  member  for  Westminster,  moved  an 
amendment  embodying  the  essential  features  of 
Mr.  Hare's  scheme.  The  motion  did  not  prevail ; 
but  at  a  later  session  the  limited  vote  of  Lord  John 
Russell  was  adopted  for  all  parliamentary  constitu- 
encies returning  three  members,  known  as  "  three- 
cornered  constituencies."  It  will  not  be  surprising 
to  the  reader  who  has  followed  the  description  of 
the  limited  and  cumulative  votes  in  the  foregoing 
pages  to  learn  that  it  was  the  manipulation  of  this 
limited  vote  which  first  introduced  into  England 
the  American  political  machine.  Mr.  Joseph 
Chamberlain  and  the  Liberals  of  Birmingham  pro- 
ceeded to  organize  thoroughly  their  following,  in 
order  to  secure  not  merely  two  but  the  three  can- 
didates of  their  constituency. 

In  1870,  when  the  English  government  began 


246       PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

its  wide  extension  of  free  schools,  the  cumulative 
vote  was  introduced  in  the  election  of  the  new 
local  boards  of  education.  This  was  by  way  of 
concession  to  the  supporters  of  private  and  secta- 
rian schools,  who  wished  to  retain  their  hold  in~ 
the  distribution  of  public  funds,  and  in  the  admin- 
istration of  their  schools. 

With  this  Act  the  progress  of  proportional 
representation  in  England  ceased.  When  the 
suffrage  was  extended  in  1884  to  agricultural 
laborers,  an  attempt  was  again  made  to  introduce 
the  reform,  but  after  considerable  discussion  the 
amendment  was  defeated.  The  next  year  was 
organized  the  English  Proportional  Representa- 
tion Society,  of  which  Sir  John  Lubbock  is  presi- 
dent, and  several  of  the  members  of  Parliament 
are  members.  The  society  advocates  the  Hare 
system  in  constituencies  electing  five  to  fifteen 
representatives. 

yXjn  the  United  States,  the  work  of  Thomas  Gil- 
pin  followed  close  upon  the  Act  of  Congress  of 
1842,  which  for  the  first  time  took  the  control 
of  elections  for  congressmen  from  the  several 
States,  and  provided,  among  other  things,  that 
the  single-membered  district  should  be  universal. 
This  was  an  attempt  to  give  representation  in 
Congress  to  the  minority,  who  were  practically  dis- 
franchised by  the  laws  of  certain  States  wherein 
congressmen  were  elected  on  a  general  ticket. 


ITS  PEOGBESS.  247 

Gnpm  s  essay  grew  out  of  the  discussion  upon 
this  measure.1 

Not  until  the  period  following  the  Civil  War 
was  public  opinion  ready  to  discuss  the  principles 
of  representation,  nor,  indeed,  was  there  any  press- 
ing occasioniL,  The  writings  of  Mr.  Hare  and 
Mr.  Mill  were  widely  read  in  the  United  States ; 
and  the  pending  reconstruction  of  the  States  lately 
in  rebellion,  and  the  agitation  for  the  enfranchise- 
ment of  the  freedmen,  brought  the  problems  of  rep- 
resentation suddenly  to  a  focus.  There  were  only 
two  plans  which  reached  practical  adoption,  the 
limited  vote  and  the  cumulative  vote.  The  legis- 
lature of  New  York,  in  1867,  in  providing  for  a 
constitutional  convention,  required  that  thirty-two 
of  the  delegates  to  be  chosen  should  be  from  the 
State  at  large ;  no  voter  to  vote  for  more  than  six- 
teen candidates.  In  this  way,  though  the  political 
bias  of  the  delegates  elected  to  the  convention 
from  single  districts  stood  81  Republicans  to  47 
Democrats,  the  delegates  from  the  State  at  large 
stood  16  to  16.2 

In  the  same  year  the  Congress  of  the  .United 
States  considered  a  supplementary  reconstruction 
bill,  to  which  Hon.  C.  R.  Buckalew,  the  Democratic 
senator  from  Pennsylvania,  offered  an  amendment 
providing  for  the  cumulative  vote.  A  sub-com- 
mittee, of  which  Senator  Buckalew  was  chairman, 

1  Dutcher,  p.  41.  2  jbid.,  p.  42. 


248      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

reported  to  the  Senate  in  1869  a  bill  providing 
for  the  cumulative  vote.  Senator  Buckalew  sup- 
ported his  amendment  with  great  ability.  Two 
extended  debates  occurred  in  the  House  in  1870 
and  1871,  on  the  motion  of  Mr.  Marshall  of  Illi- 
nois to  apply  the  cumulative  vote  to  the  new 
members  of  Congress,  provided  for  in  the  new 
apportionment  Act  of  those  years.  But  both  in 
the  Senate  and  in  the  House  the  amendments 
were  defeated.  Congress  was  in  no  mood  to  grant 
this  concession  to  the  minority. 

The  significance  of  proportional  representation 
in  the  event  of  Negro  enfranchisement,  and  the 
reasons  why  it  did  not  at  that  time  appeal  to  the 
party  in  control  of  Congress,  are  strikingly  por- 
trayed by  the  proceedings  of  a  convention  of  tax- 
payers of  South  Carolina,  assembled  at  Columbia 
in  May,  1871X  The  convention  adopted  the  re- 
port of  a  committee  favoring  the  cumulative  vote 
for  the  State  legislature.  Among  the  speakers 
was  Mr.  D.  H.  Chamberlain,  attorney-general  of 
the  State,  who  said  :  — 

"  In  the  first  place,  gentlemen,  it  is  necessary  to  modify 
the  absolute  control  which  a  mere  numerical  majority  has 
obtained  over  the  State,  and  to  secure  for  intelligence  and 
property  a  proper  representation  in  the  affairs  of  the  gov- 
ernment. And  looking  about  for  some  device  which,  with- 
out violence  to  the  fundamental  principle  on  which  our 
government  rests,  will  bring  relief  from  the  grievances 


ITS  PROGRESS.  249 

which  afflict  our  people,  I  have  fixed  upon  this  system  of 
cumulative  voting,  because  it  is  not  only  just  in  its  theory, 
but  it  will  prove  itself  right  in  its  results.  It  takes  noth- 
ing from  the  rights  of  the  majority.  It  gives  them  a  pre- 
dominating control,  but  not  an  absolute  disposition  of  the 
entire  fortunes  of  the  State.  Do  you  believe  for  a  moment, 
then,  when  you  put  into  an  ignorant  assembly,  many  of 
whom  •  can  neither  read  nor  write,  forty-seven  gentlemen 
whom  I  might  select  in  this  body,  that  you  would  not  shame 
them  into  decency,  or  frighten  them  from  crime?  Who 
does  not  know  that  the  presence  of  one  honest  man  puts  to 
flight  a  band  of  robbers  ?  Now,  according  to  this  system, 
you  deny  nothing  which  belongs  to  the  majority,  but  from 
the  moment  you  place  in  the  lower  house  forty-seven  of 
your  ablest  citizens,  bad  legislation  will  cease,  and  good 
legislatiqn  will  begin."  J 

Although  rejected  by  Congress,  the  cumulative 
or  limited  vote  was  adopted,  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent,  in  various  States.  The  most  important 
action  was  that  taken  by  the  constitutional  con- 
vention of  the  State  of  Illinois,  which  met  Decem- 
ber, 1869.  The  convention  adopted  the  report 
of  a  committee  of  which  Mr.  James  Medill  was 
chairman,  dividing  the  State  into  51  senatorial 
districts,  each  electing  a  single  senator,  but  creat- 
ing a  lower  house  of  153  members,  to  be  elected 
in  the  senatorial  districts  by  threes  by  the  cumu- 
lative vote.  This  section  was  voted  upon  sepa- 
rately by  the  people,  July  2,  1870,  and  carried 
by  a  vote  99,022  in  favor,  and  70,080  against. 

1  Dutcher,  p.  62, 


s/r 


250       PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

High  expectations  were  entertained  of  the  re- 
form. Mr.  Medill  in  convention  said :  — 

"Perhaps  no  proposition  has  come  before  this  conven- 
tion that  has  more  fully  taken  possession  of  my  mind,  be- 
cause I  believe  it  is  one  of  the  greatest  and  most  valuable 
improvements  in  a  free  government  ever  devised  by  the 
wisdom  of  man  since  representative  government  has  been 
established.  I  believe  it  is  only  a  question  of  time  when 
the  principle  of  minority  representation  will  be  applied  to 
all  legislative  elections  in  Europe  and  America,  from  Par- 
liament or  Congress  down,  to  village  aldermen,  and  in  all 
other  cases  when  two  or  more  officers  are  to  be  voted  upon 
at  the  same  time,  for  the  same  office.  By  this  plan,  and 
this  only,  can  the  democratic  equality  of  the  citizen  be 
asserted,  and  carried  into  practice  in  public  life.  .  .  .  The 
whole  people,  instead  of  a  plurality  or  majority,  will  be 
represented  by  this  plan ;  and  it  is  as  much  superior  to  the 
old  method  of  representation  as  the  whole  is  greater  than 
the  half.  It  does  not  attempt  to  take  away  any  of  the 
rights  of  the  majority.  The  majority,  under  this  system, 
will  still  rule,  having  full  and  ample  control,  and  still  being 
responsible  for  the  laws  made.  But  this  gives  the  dis- 
franchised minority,  who  may  amount  to  almost  one-half 
the  community,  some  voice,  some  representation  in  govern- 
ment, some  chance  to  be  heard.  It  secures  representation 
with  taxation,  which  the  existing  one-sided  system  does 
not.  It  gives  the  minority  some  opportunity  to  present 
their  views,  and  defend  their  principles  and  interests,  in  the 
halls  of  legislation.  What  can  be  more  just  than  that,  or 
more  correct  in  principle  ?  "  1 

How  these  bright  hopes  have  been  disappointed 
is  shown  by  the  previous  discussions  of  this  book. 

i  Dutcher,  p.  55. 


ITS  PROGRESS.  251 

The  action  of  the  New  York  legislature  and 
the  veto  by  Governor  Hoffman  in  April,  1872, 
of  the  bill  providing  for  the  cumulative  vote  in 
the  election  of  aldermen  in  New  York  City, 
mark  the  highest  point  attained  in  America  in 
the  discussion  of  minority  representation.  The 
Personal  Representation  Society  of  New  York 
had  appeared  before  the  constitutional  conven- 
tion of  186T,  to  urge  the  adoption  of  the  Hare 
plan.  Mr.  Horace  Greeley,  as  a  member  of  that 
convention,  had  moved  an  amendment  requiring 
the  cumulative  vote  in  the  election  of  senators 
and  representatives.  After  considerable  discussion 
it  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  93  to  20.  Later  an 
amendment  requiring  minority  representation  in 
the  election  of  directors  of  private  corporations 
was  defeated  by  71  to  32.  It  remained  for  a 
Republican  legislature,  desirous  of  breaking  the 
hitherto  impregnable  Tammany  majority  in  New 
York  City,  in  1872  to  provide,  in  an  Act  creating 
a  new  charter  for  that  city,  that  the  board  of  al- 
dermen should  be  elected  by  the  cumulative  vote 
in  five  districts  of  nine  aldermen  each.  The  dis- 
cussion in  the  legislature  and  in  the  press  attracted 
national  attention.  Without  previous  experience, 
it  was  impossible  to  foresee  all  its  consequences. 
Yet  with  districts  as  large  as  the  bill  provided  for, 
there  would  have  been  opportunity  for  the  rep- 
resentation of  minor  parties,  though  the  waste  of 


252       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

votes  would  have  prevented  their  greatest  influ- 
ence. The  arguments  of  Governor  Hoffman  in 
his  veto  message  present  such  a  mixture  of  spe- 
cious falsity  and  shrewd  knowledge  of  the  situa- 
tion, and  the  document  is  of  so  great  historic 
importance  in  the  movement  for  true  representa- 
tion, that  it  is  here  given  in  full :  l  — 

"  EXECUTIVE  CHAMBER,  ALBANY,  April  30,  1872. 

"  To  the  Assembly,  —  I  return,  without  approval,  Assembly 
Bill  No.  118,  entitled,  *  An  Act  to  reorganize  the  Local 
Government  of  the  City  of  New  York.' 

The  bill  provides  a  new  charter  for  the  City  of  New 
York,  the  main  features  of  which  are  these  :  One  board  of 
forty-five  aldermen,  elected  nine  in  each  senate  district, 
by  a  novel  method  called  the  cumulative  vote,  under  which 
one  man  may  vote  nine  times  for  one  candidate,  and 
whereby  a  minority  can  elect  its  candidate  or  candidates, 
against  the  will  of  the  majority  in  the  district ;  this  board 
of  aldermen  to  appoint  (by  the  same  vote)  four  out  of  the 
five  heads  which  are  given  to  each  of  the  administrative 
departments.  .  .  . 

The  remedy  which  is  relied  on  against  the  evils  of  mis- 
government  under  this  charter  is  the  cumulative  system  of 
voting,  which  it  introduces  in  order  to  secure  fuller  repre- 
sentation of  the  minority.  It  is  claimed  that  this  will  re- 
sult, not  only  in  a  better  class  of  representatives,  but  in 
greater  power  on  the  part  of  the  minority  to  restrain  the 
majority.  Nine  aldermen  are  to  be  elected  in  each  district ; 
and  every  elector  is  authorized,  instead  of  voting  once  for 
each  of  nine  candidates,  to  cast,  if  he  chooses  so  to  do,  nine 
votes  for  any  one  candidate,  or  to  cast  three  votes  each  for 

1  Quoted  by  Dutcher,  pp.  158-161. 


ITS  PBOGKESS.  253 

any  three  candidates,  and  so  on.  This  plan  seeks  to  let  the 
party  which  is  in  a  minority  in  any  political  subdivision 
put  into  office  its  candidate,  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of 
the  political  majority.  Experiments  are  now  being  tried  in 
one  or  two  of  the  other  States,  of  this  cumulative  method 
of  voting  as  to  some  of  their  local  elections ;  but  these  have 
been  inaugurated  so  recently  that  they  afford  us  no  guide 
to  sound  judgment  derived  from  actual  practice  and  expe- 
rience. It  is  proposed  by  this  bill  that  we  shall  try  the  ex- 
periment in  the  chief  city  of  the  continent,  with  its  vast 
and  complicated  interests  exposed  to  great  injury  if  this 
new  theory  prove  to  be  a  failure.  A  city  of  a  million  in- 
habitants is  not  the  place  for  trying  experiments  in  govern- 
ment, especially  an  experiment  which  many  of  the  most 
thoughtful  of  our  people  believe  to  be  visionary,  impracti- 
cable, and  unconstitutional.  It  would  be  much  wiser  for 
us  to  await  the  result  of  the  trials  now  going  on  elsewhere. 
This  would  not  be  the  first  time  that  a  scheme  to  allow  the 
minority  to  put  men  into  office,  in  spite  of  the  opposition 
of  the  majority,  has  been  tried  in  this  State.  For  many 
years  the  Board  of  Supervisors  in  New  York  was  elected 
upon  this  principle.  In  that  instance  the  minority  were 
allowed,  practically,  to  choose  just  half  the  Board.  This 
experiment,  warmly  and  earnestly  advocated  at  its  intro- 
duction as  a  valuable  improvement,  resulted,  as  all  admit 
now,  in  a  disastrous  failure,  and  was  abandoned  with  gen- 
eral consent.  There  is  this  difference  between  that  instance 
and  the  method  now  proposed  —  that  there  the  minority 
were  secured  an  equal  share  of  power,  while  here  it  is  ex- 
pected that  they  will  obtain  only  a  share  proportioned  to 
their  actual  numbers. 

A  very  serious  question  arises  whether  this  method  of 
voting  is  in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of  the  Con- 
stitution. Many  of  the  ablest  lawyers  of  the  State  have 


254      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

not  hesitated  to  express  their  convictions  that  it  must  be 
held  to  be  unconstitutional.  It  is  said,  and  with  great 
force,  that  the  election,  as  regulated  by  this  charter,  is  not 
an  election  in  the  sense  in  which  that  word  was  understood 
at  the  time  the  Constitution  was  made,  and  in  the  sense  in 
which  it  has  always  been  understood  among  us.  An  elec- 
tion is  the  choice  of  a  public  officer  by  his  receiving  a 
larger  number  of  votes  than  any  other  candidate  in  the 
district  entitled  to  fill  the  office,  all  the  electors  being  en- 
titled to  vote  once  at  such  election  for  a  candidate  for 
the  place  to  be  filled.  It  is  suggested  also  that  the  Con- 
stitution guarantees  that  all  electors  shall  be  entitled  to 
vote  for  all  officers  who  are  to  be  elected  by  the  people, 
and  that  if  any  elector  exercises  his  right  to  vote  once 
for  each  of  the  nine  aldermen  to  be  chosen  for  his  dis- 
trict, his  single  vote  as  to  any  one  of  the  candidates  can- 
not be  overridden  by  one  of  his  neighbors  voting  nine 
times  for  some  one  man  for  the  same  place  without  an  in- 
fraction of  his  equal  right  of  suffrage  as  an  elector  under 
the  Constitution.  .  .  . 

The  fundamental  principle  of  our  government,  familiar 
to  the  people,  is  that  elective  officers  shall  be  chosen  by  a 
majority  of  the  votes  of  the  people  entitled  to  take  part  in 
the  choice.  In  all  cases  submitted  to  the  people,  the  major- 
ity decides.  When  any  other  principle  is  sought  to  be  in- 
troduced, a  revolutionary  change  of  great  magnitude  is 
proposed,  which  ought  not  to  be  tried  under  the  sanction 
of  an  Act  of  the  legislature  only;  if  so  great  a  change  is  to 
be  made  at  all,  it  should  be  done  only  with  the  careful  de- 
liberation which  pertains  to  revisions  of  the  Constitution. 
Independent  of  the  constitutional  question  is  that  of  the 
expediency  of  this  change  in  the  method  of  choosing  repre- 
sentatives. I  am  not  disposed  to  take  the  ground  that 
some  form  of  minority  representation  may  not  prove  to  be 


ITS  PROGRESS.  255 

an  improvement.    This  has  nowhere  been  tried  long  enough 
to  prove  anything. 

In  all  free  government  the  people  divide  themselves  into 
two  great  parties.  This  tendency  is  so  universal  that  it  is 
not  statesmanship  to  ignore  it.  Enactments  will  not  over- 
come it.  It  is  a  natural,  useful,  and  wholesome  division ; 
it  insures  a  large  body  of  men  among  the  people  interested 
in  and  intent  upon  fault  finding  with  the  party  in  power, 
and  struggling  by  means  of  exposure  of  their  errors  to 
bring  over  to  the  side  of  the  minority  enough  of  the  elec- 
tors to  convert  it  into  a  majority,  and  so  to  take  over  the 
government.  In  politics,  as  in  other  things,  it  is  agitation 
which  purifies.  Under  this  proposed  new  system  of  voting, 
the  minority  carry  in  their  candidates  without  effort.  The 
majority  do  the  same.  In  a  district  where  it  is  known  that 
the  political  majority  usually  casts  about  two-thirds  of  the 
whole  vote,  there  being  nine  aldermen  to  be  elected,  the 
caucus  or  nominating  convention  of  the  political  majority 
will  naturally  concentrate  all  their  votes  upon  six  can- 
didates ;  the  caucus  of  the  minority  will  concentrate  on 
three.  There  will  be  no  actual  contest  before  the  people. 
The  decrees  of  the  party  caucus  will  be  absolute.  Neither 
side  will  be  in  fear,  lest,  by  putting  forward  unfit  candi- 
dates, it  may  lose  the  election.  For  the  two  parties  will  be 
acting  at  the  polls,  not  against  each  other,  but  independent 
each  of  the  other.  This  condition  of  things,  where  the  de- 
crees of  the  party  caucuses  on  both  sides  are  final,  naturally 
gives  rise  to  secret  combinations  between  the  leaders  on 
both  sides  for  an  agreed-upon  division  of  power,  against 
which  combinations  the  mass  of  the  voters  might,  under 
this  system,  struggle  in  vain.  It  is  true  that  there  is  an 
opportunity  for  a  combination  in  favor  of  one  or  two  candi- 
dates of  independent  voters,  who  may  be  regardless  of  party 
associations.  But  when  the  power  of  the  regular  party  or* 


256       PROPOETIONAL  EEPEESENTATION. 

ganization  is  considered,  will  not  this  influence  of  combina- 
tions of  independent  voters  make  itself  felt  to  a  very  limited 
extent,  and  very  rarely?  Will  it  be  equal  to  the  power 
which  voters,  disposed  to  disregard  their  party  associations 
on  any  occasion,  can  now  exert,  by  temporarily  voting 
with  the  opposing  party,  by  way  of  rebuke  to  their  own  ? 

It  may  be  a  fatal  mistake  for  us  to  be  overconfident  that 
the  effect  of  this  method  of  voting  will  be  merely  to  add 
to  the  influence  and  power  in  politics  of  the  more  unselfish 
and  more  virtuous  among  the  electors.  The  professional 
politicians  may  use  it  more  skilfully  and  effectually  than 
others,  and  it  may  intrench  them  in  power  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  popular  majority  or  of  popular  condemnation. 
This  system  must  tend  to  increase  very  largely  the  power 
in  politics  of  men  who  have  a  personal  following,  in  the 
shape  of  clubs  and  associations,  formed  to  promote  the  suc- 
cess of  one  man  in  local  politics.  The  weight  of  a  club  of 
this  kind  will  be  increased  ninefold,  a  club  of  1,000  wield- 
ing 9,000  votes.  NOT  is  it  to  be  overlooked  that  this  cumu- 
lative method  of  voting  confers  a  higher  money  value  on 
the  ballot  of  any  man  who  is  corrupt  enough  to  sell  it.  He 
can  make  his  vote  worth  to  any  one  candidate  nine  times 
as  much  as  it  is  now.  The  inducement  to  pay  and  the 
inducement  to  take  bribes  will  both  be  greater  than  now. 
The  legislature  must  itself  have  looked  upon  this  method 
of  voting  as  nothing  better  than  an  experiment.  If  it  had 
been  satisfied  of  its  merits,  and  had  had  confidence  in  its 
working  well,  it  would  have  applied  the  principle  generally, 
wherever  it  could  be  applied,  to  local  elections  at  least, 
throughout  the  State. 

It  is  right  that  the  minority  should  be  represented  in  all 
public  deliberative  bodies  ;  and  the  American  system  of  gov- 
ernment makes  provision  for  its  representation.  Every 


ITS  PROGRESS.  257 

political  subdivision  sends  a  representative  of  its  own  choice 
to  the  general  representative  body,  congressional  districts 
to  Congress,  assembly  districts  to  the  Assembly,  towns  to 
the  boards  of  supervisors,  wards  to  village  and  city  coun- 
cils ;  and  thus  the  minority  in  the  State  at  large,  being 
nevertheless  the  majority  in  many  of  the  political  subdi- 
visions of  the  State,  is  able  to  secure  its  approximate  share 
in  the  public  councils. 

I  have  dwelt  at  so  much  length  upon  this  question  of 
minority  representation,  because  it  is  the  distinguishing 
feature  of  the  charter,  both  in  the  election  of  the  legisla- 
tive branch  of  the  city  government  and  in  the  choice  by 
it  of  heads  of  executive  departments ;  and  this  feature  its 
advocates  claim  as  its  chief  merit. 

The  bill  does  not  limit  itself  in  applying  the  minority 
doctrine,  so-called,  to  the  election  of  representatives  of  the 
people  in  the  public  councils.  It  proposes  to  give  the  mi- 
nority of  the  members  of  the  common  council  the  same 
power  of  selecting,  independent  of  the  majority  in  that 
body,  a  portion  of  the  men  who  are  to  administer  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  city  in  its  various  departments. 

THE    RIGHTS    OF    THE    MAJORITY. 

The  minority  ought  to  be  represented  as  fully  as  pos- 
sible, in  proportion  to  its  numbers,  in  the  public  councils. 
But  the  minority  has  not  the  right  to  govern.  It  is  not 
wise  that  it  should  share  in  any  degree  in  the  actual  ad- 
ministration of  affairs.  The  majority  must  govern.  The 
useful  sphere  of  duty  for  the  minority  is  to  watch  the  gov- 
erning party,  to  expose  its  wrong-doing,  if  any,  to  restrain 
it  by  this  vigilance  and  exposure.  Just  so  far  as  the  mi- 
nority is  admitted  to  a  share  in  the  actual  administration 
of  government,  to  a  share  in  executive  duties,  just  so  far 


258        PEOPOETIONAL  BEPKESENTATION.  ] 

is  it  weakened  for  the  performance  of  its  proper  duty,  — 
that  of  vigilance  over  those  in  authority,  —  just  so  far  is  its 
inclination  to  be  vigilant  lessened.  It  is  only  a  minority 
out  of  power  that  will  be  faithful  to  the  duties  of  a  minor- 
ity. Every  member  of  the  minority  who  is  admitted  to 
take  part  in  the  actual  administration  of  public  affairs,  and 
all  of  his  party  whom  he  can  influence,  naturally  acquire  a 
tendency  to  defend  the  administration  of  which  he  forms 
a  part ;  and  where  they  ought  to  be  exercising  a  restrain- 
ing power  by  their  vigilance,  they  are  often  found  helping 
to  cover  up  things  that  need  exposure.  An  administration 
that  has  its  corps  of  defenders  in  both  political  parties  will 
be  much  more  likely  to  continue  improper  practices  than 
if  it  relies  for  its  defence  only  on  its  own  party  friends, 
and  feels  that  the  opposite  party  is  ready,  in  solid  ranks, 
promptly  to  assail  it  if  guilty  of  wrong-doing.  I  believe 
the  clear,  complete,  and  undivided  responsibility  of  one  oi 
other  of  the  political  parties  into  which  people  in  all  free 
communities  divide  themselves,  is  essential  to  good  govern 
ment.  For  vigilance  on  the  part  of  the  people  themselves, 
this  bill  proposes  to  substitute  the  services  of  a  few  indi- 
viduals put  into  partial  power  by  the  minority  as  watchers, 
which  will  tend  to  make  the  people  rely  on  these  few,  and 
indifferent  to  their  own  duty  of  vigilance  in  their  own 
affairs.  These  few  hired  watchers  may  become  screens  for 
errors  and  neglect  of  duty  on  the  part  of  their  associates 
and  themselves. 

The  government  of  the  majority  is  the  only  govern- 
ment recognized  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  State.  The  majority  controls,  and  must  con- 
trol, in  legislation,  and  ought  to  be  solely  responsible  for 
administration.  When  its  representatives  prove  recreant 
to  the  trusts  committed  to  them,  a  vigilant  minority  is 
quick  to  take  advantage  of  the  fact,  and  in  turn  it  becomes 


259 


the  majority.  The  existence  of  a  strong,  vigilant  minor- 
ity, which,  not  being  a  sharer  of  power,  has  no  motive  to 
defend  those  in  power,  but  every  motive  to  expose  them 
when  doing  wrong,  is  quite  as  essential  to  honest  and  faith- 
ful administration  of  the  affairs  of  the  republic,  as  is  the 
existence  of  the  majority  in  whose  hands  the  actual.  manage- 
ment of  public  affairs  is  placed.  This  cumulative  method 
for  appointing  heads  of  departments  may  have  the  effect 
of  fatally  lessening  at  once  the  sense  of  responsibility  on 
the  part  of  the  majority  and  the  vigilance  of  the  minority." 

There  are  three  features  of  the  foregoing  mes- 
sage which  will  be  noticed  here,  the  others  having 
been  mainly  anticipated  in  the  preceding  chapters. 
It  is  a  patent  fallacy  to  assert  that,  by  giving  to 
every  voter  nine  votes  instead  of  one,  thereby  the 
influence  of  venal  voters  and  bad  politicians  with 
a  personal  following  is  increased  ninefold.  If  the 
votes  of  the  corrupt  are  multiplied  by  nine,  so  also 
are  the  votes  of  the  good,  and  relatively  they  all 
retain  the  same  influence. 

Again,  the  provision  for  constituencies  electing 
nine  aldermen  makes  possible  the  representation 
of  third  and  fourth  parties  of  independents  and 
good  citizens,  though  with  a  great  waste  of  their 
votes.  They  could  not  be  entirely  excluded  as  in 
the  Illinois  "  three-cornered  "  constituencies. 

The  arguments  of  Governor  Hoffman  against 
minority  representation  in  the  board  of  aldermen 
are  not  altogether  invalid,  and  his  objections  to 
a  similar  representation  in  the  administrative 


260        PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

departments  are  well  considered.  Later  experi- 
ence has  shown  that  administrative  boards  are 
incompetent  as  compared  with  single  heads  of  de- 
partments, and  that  bi-partisan  .boards  are  not 
superior  to  those  composed  of  members  of  a  single 
party.  Minority  representation  in  an  executive 
department  dissipates  the  energy  and  responsibil- 
ity of  administration ;  but  minority  representation 
in  the  legislative  branch  is  necessary  to  enable  the 
minority  "  to  watch  the  governing  body,  to  expose 
its  wrong-doing,  if  any,  to  restrain  it  by  this  vigi- 
lance and  exposure." 

The  crude  cumulation  in  constituencies  elect- 
ing as  many  as  nine  members  might  possibly  have 
been  of  some  advantage  to  good  government  in 
New  York  City;  but  the  limited  vote,  which  was 
successfully  adopted  a  year  later,  was  no  better 
than  the  single  district.  This  law,  enacted  in 
1873,  provided  for  the  election  of  aldermen  in 
nine  districts  of  three  members  each,  no  voter 
to  cast  more  than  two  votes.  The  limited  vote 
is  apparently  in  contradiction  to  the  State  Consti- 
tution, by  which  every  elector  is  entitled  to  vote 
"  for  all  officers  that  now  are  or  hereafter  may  be 
elective  by  the  people."  At  any  rate,  it  of  course 
proved  unsatisfactory,  and  was  repealed  in  1882. 

The  State  of  Pennsylvania  has  experimented 
with  the  cumulative  and  limited  votes  in  various 
directions. 


ITS  PROGRESS.  261 

On  March  4,  1870,  the  legislature  provided  by 
special  act  for  the  cumulative  vote  in  the  town  of 
Bloomsburg,  the  home  of  Senator  Buckalew,  for 
all  offices  of  two  or  more  incumbents.  In  June, 
1871,  the  act  was  extended  to  all  elections  of 
members  of  town  councils  throughout  the  State. 
This  was  repealed  in  1873. 

By  a  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  1874,  the 
limited  vote  is  applied  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia 
to  the  election  of  police  magistrates.  The  legis- 
lature in  1875  created  twenty-four  courts  with  the 
same  number  of  magistrates,  who  are  elected  on  a 
general  ticket;  but  no  voter  can  vote  for  more 
than  two-thirds  of  the  number  to  be  chosen  at  a 
single  election.  The  same  Constitution  requires 
the  limited  vote  in  the  election  of  judges  of  the 
supreme  court  of  the  State.  There  are  seven 
judges  elected,  and  the  elector  votes  for  six. 

These  various  experiments  with  crude  forms  of 
minority  representation  furnish  in  part  an  expla- 
nation of  the  entire  subsidence  of  the  movement 
since  1874.  To  have  extended  the  cumulative  or 
limited  vote  after  the  exhibitions  of  their  short- 
comings in  three  States  was  not  to  be  expected. 
Indeed,  the  only  places  where  minority  representa- 
tion now  remains  are  in  the  States  of  Illinois  and 
Pennsylvania,  where  it  is  incorporated  in  the  Con- 
stitutions. Doubtless  at  the  first  general  revision 
of  these  Constitutions  it  will  be  dropped. 


262       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

There  are  also  other  reasons  why  the  speculative 
political  thought  of  the  country  has  not  turned 
to  the  problems  of  representation.  Other  pressing 
subjects,  growing  out  of  the  war,  such  as  the  tariff, 
the  greenback,  specie  payments,  have  engrossed  the 
public  mind.  The  attention  of  speculative  reform- 
ers has  been  occupied  with  the  civil  service,  and 
the  protection  of  those  subordinate  offices  which 
are  the  spoils  of  party  victory  and  the  demoraliza- 
tion of  the  people.  It  is  probable,  indeed,  that, 
in  the  practical  sequence,  civil  service  reform  was 
necessary  to  prepare  the  way  for  proportional  rep- 
resentation. The  American  people  needed  educa- 
tion upon  the  matter  of  rotation  in  office,  and, 
indeed,  upon  the  very  nature  of  government. 
They  did  not  want  a  system  of  bureaucracy,  with 
officials  holding  for  life.  They  felt  that  public 
offices  were  "  common  property ;  that  the  right  to 
hold  them,  like  the  right  to  pre-empt  government 
land,  is  a  natural  incident  of  citizenship,"  and  that 
government  service  is  an  asylum  for  the  unfortu- 
nate. They  lacked  "confidence  in  expert  knowl- 
edge of  every  kind."1 

Correct  views  on  these  points  could  practically 
be  first  impressed  upon  the  public  only  in  con- 
nection with  those  minor  civil  service  offices  of 
a  routine  character  which  do  not  carry  political 

1  A.  B.  Hart,  "Practical  Essays  on  American  Government," 
p.  91. 


ITS  PROGRESS.  263 

responsibility.  With  the  ground  clearrecTm  this 
way,  the  nature  of  other  higher  offices  can  more 
plainly  come  to  view,  and  thus  the  way  be  pre- 
pared for  substituting  appointive  heads  of  depart- 
ments for  elective  heads.  Finally,  with  the 
administrative  branches  of  government  accurately 
comprehended,  the  people  are  beginning  to  concen- 
trate thought  upon  the  legislative  branch,  to  in- 
quire into  the  principles  of  representation,  and  to 
perceive  the  need  of  abler  and  more  experienced 
men  with  life-long  service  in  legislative  halls. 
Even  now  the  weightiest  popular  objection  to  pro- 
portional representation  springs  from  that  partisan 
sympathy  with  the  spoils  system  which  denies  the 
right  of  representation  to  minor  groups  of  voters 
not  included  in  the  two  dominant  parties. 
./Another  political  reform  which  has  cleared  the 
way  for  proportional  representation  is  the  secret 
ballot,  with  all  the  party  tickets  printed  on  a 
single  large  sheet.  This  encourages  independence, 
and  facilitates  that  choice  of  individual  candidates 
on  various  tickets  which  is  an  important  feature  of 
the  bill  recommended  by  the  American  committee. 
After  these  important  preliminary  reforms  are 
accomplished,  it  can  be  more  clearly  seen  that  the 
very  citadel  of  political  power,  the  legislative  as- 
sembly, is  the  source  of  the  degradation  of  Ameri- 
can politics,  and  that  with  a  reformed  legislature 
all  other  reforms  can  be  perfected,  A  revival  of 


264        PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

interest  in  proportional  representation  has  begun 
within  the  past  five  years.  The  civil  service 
reformers  of  the  country  with  unanimity  have 
espoused  it.  This  interest  took  definite  shape  in 
1893,  through  the  organization  at  Chicago  of  the 
American  Proportional  Representation  League,  and 
the  launching  of  the  Proportional  Representation 
Review.  Magazine  articles  have  appeared,  two  or 
three  books  have  been  published,  bills  have  been 
introduced  into  legislatures  and  Congress,  and  an 
enthusiastic  and  capable  agitation  has  been  inaug- 
urate d.X. 

/  w 

In  1891  the  people  of  South  Dakota  voted  upon 
a  minority  representation  clause  to  their  Constitu- 
tion, copied  after  the  Illinois  system,  which  they 
rejected  by  a  vote  of  46,200  against  24,161. 

The  cumulative  vote  has  been  applied  by  the 
Constitutions  of  the  eleven  States  of  Illinois,  Ne- 
braska, California,  Pennsylvania,  West  Virginia, 
Missouri,  Mississippi,  Idaho,  Kentucky,  North  Da- 
kota, and  Montana,  to  the  election  of  directors  of 
private  corporations.  I  shall  not  enter  at  length 
into  this  and  other  minor  phases  of  its  application, 
but  shall  only  observe  that,  among  the  evils  at- 
tending the  rise  of  corporations  in  the  United 
States,  has  been  prominent  the  practice  known  as 
"freezing  out"  the  minority  stockholders.  Says 
a  well-informed  *  writer :  *  — 

1  Isaac  F.  Rice,  Forum,  vol.  xiv.,  p.  206, 


ITS  PKOGRESS.  265 


"  All  our  public  affairs  having  become  permeated  with 
the  poison  of  dishonesty,  it  necessarily  has  affected  our 
quasi-public  relations  as  well.  Indeed,  our  great  public  cor- 
porations, such  as  railroads,  are  in  themselves  species  of 
communities,  of  which  the  security  holders  are  the  citizens, 
and  in  these  communities  the  right  to  steal  under  certain 
legal  forms  and  sanctions  has  in  certain  directions  become 
fully  recognized. 

Whatever  frauds  are  perpetrated  under  advice  of  counsel, 
or  by  resolutions  duly  passed  by  a  majority  vote,  at  a  regu- 
larly constituted  meeting,  security  holders  have  long  since 
come  to  regard  as  unobjectionable,  or  at  least  beyond  the 
reach  of  successful  attack.^.  .  Indeed,  quite  frequently,  as 
soon  as  a  board  of  directors  is  elected,  it  considers  itself  the 
absolute  owners  of  the  property,  to  manage  or  mismanage, 
as  its  private  interests  may  dictate.  These  private  interests 
are  sometimes  in  such  direct  conflict  with  the  interests  of 
the  corporation  as  to  involve  it  in  bankruptcy." 

'Proportional  representation  in  private  corpora- 
tions would  partially  meet  the  evils  above  described, 
though  of  course  many  other  factors  are  involved 
in  the  problem. 

There  remains  to  be  noticed  the  constitutional 
aspects  of  proportional  representation.  Of  course, 
just  as  in  Switzerland,  the  American  people  can 
adopt  the  reform  by  a  referendum  vote,  by  way  of 
amendment  to  their  Constitutions ;  and  possibly  in 
many  States  a  constitutional  amendment  would 
be  required;  but  the  machinery  of  amendment 
is  so  very  cumbersome  and  dilatory  that  direct 


1 


266        PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

action  of  the  legislature  is  preferable  whenever 
legal.  Congress  unquestionably  has  power,  with- 
out constitutional  amendment,  to  adopt  the  system 
for  congressional  elections.  Indeed,  it  is  only  the 
Act  of  Congress  of  1842,  prescribing  the  present 
district  system,  which  legally  prevents  individual 
States  from  adopting  iWk^ 

In  the  election  of  State  legislatures,  there  are 
serious  difficulties  in  the  interpretation  of  Con- 
stitutions. So  strict  are  the  courts  in  holding 
legislatures  to  the  terms  of  the  Constitution,  that 
amendments  would  be  required,  probably,  in  nearly 
every  State.  Yet  the  following  considerations  are 
offered. 

The  first  condition  for  proportional  representa- 
tion is  a  consolidation  of  the  present  single- 
membered  districts  into  a  smaller  number,  each 
electing  several  members.  The  Constitutions  of 
all  the  States  require  that  State  senators  shall  be 
elected  by  districts.  In  only  nineteen  States,1 
however,  is  it  -specifically  asserted  in  one  way  or 
another,  that  but  one  senator  shall  be  elected  in 
each  district.  In  each  of  these  States  a  Consti- 
tutional Amendment  would  be  required  for  the 
Senate.  In  the  other  twenty-five  States,  so  far 
as  a  fair  interpretation  is  concerned,  counties  can 

1  Georgia,  Kentucky,  Maryland,  Massachusetts,  Michigan, 
Minnesota,  New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey,  North  Carolina,  North 
Dakota,  Ohio,  Oregon,  Pennsylvania,  Rhode  Island,  South  Caro- 
lina, South  Dakota,  Vermont,  Texas,  Wisconsin, 


ITS  PHOGEE88.  2G7 

be  grouped  together,  and  two  or  more  senators 
elected  from  each  district.  Furthermore,  there 
would  seem  to  be  no  constitutional  inhibition 
against  enlarging  these  groupings,  even  to  the 
extent  of  dividing  the  State  into  only  two  districts. 
These  could  then  either  elect  their  senators  at  the 
same  election  or  in  alternate  elections,  as  the  larger 
number  of  Constitutions  require. 

As  regards  the  lower  house,  seven  State  Consti- 
tutions l  require  that  members  shall  be  elected  by 
single  districts.  Counties  which  are  entitled  to 
more  than  one  representative  are  to  be  divided 
into  districts  by  either  the  legislature  or  the  county 
supervisors.2  Thirty  Constitutions  guarantee  at 
least  one  representative  to  each  county  or  town,  but 
permit  counties  entitled  to  more  than  one  to  elect 
them  on  a  general  ticket.  In  these  States,  the 
proportional  plan  could  be  adopted  without  consti- 
tutional amendment  only  in  the  counties  electing 
more  than  one  member. 

There  remain  six  States,  not  counting  Illinois, 
in  which  the  system  could  probably  be  adopted 
over  the  entire  State  without  amendment.  Dela- 
ware allots  seven  representatives  to  each  county, 
and  the  legislature  is  free  to  prescribe  either  the 
general  ticket  or  the  single  district.  Indiana, 

1  California,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  Maryland,  Michigan,  New 
York,  Wisconsin. 

2  New  York  and  Michigan. 


268        PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

Minnesota,  Nevada,  and  Washington  permit  their 
legislatures  to  create  districts  as  they  may  see  fit, 
only  requiring  that  representatives  shall  be  pro- 
portional to  the  population.1  Iowa  permits  four 
counties  to  be  combined  into  a  single  district. 

Whenever,  as  in  the  above  cases,  a  general 
ticket  is  permitted,  proportional  representation 
may  be  adopted  by  the  legislature.  There  is  a 
second  condition,  namely,  that  each  voter  may  be 
permitted  to  cast  as  many  votes  as  there  are  candi- 
dates to  be  elected,  which  he  may  also  distribute 
as  he  pleases.  Five  Constitutions  actually  require 
this  condition  in  the  provision  that  every  elector 
shall  be  entitled  to  vote  "  for  all  the  officers  that 
are  now  or  hereafter  may  be  elective  by  the 
people."  2  It  would  seem  that  this  provision  ex- 
cludes the  Hare  system  and  the  limited  vote,  but 
does  not  stand  in  the  way  of  the  Swiss  "free  list " 
or  the  cumulative  vote.  Other  Constitutions 
merely  provide  that  persons  of  the  proper  age, 
etc.,  shall  be  "entitled  to  vote  at  all  elections." 

The  third  condition  is  that  the  legislature  must 
be  free  to  provide  rules  for  the  canvass  of  the 
votes  and  the  apportionment  between  political 
parties.  Nearly  all  the  States  have  adopted  in 
their  Constitutions  the  plurality  rule,  by  which 

1  In  the  apportionment  Act  of  1895,  Indiana  has  actually  com- 
bined various  counties  into  districts  electing  two  representatives 
on  a  general  ticket. 

2  New  York,  Minnesota,  Montana,  Nevada,  New  Jersey. 


ITS  PfiOGfiESS.  269 

candidates  having  the  highest  number  of  votes 
are  declared  elected.  Applied  to  a  general  ticket, 
this  rule  would  exclude  minority  representation, 
except  in  the  case  of  the  simple  cumulative  vote. 
In  twenty-seven  States,  however,  the  Constitutions 
do  not  apply  this  rule  to  the  election  of  members 
of  the  legislature.1  The  legislatures  of  these 
States  are,  therefore,  free  to  change  their  plurality 
rule,  and  to  adopt  the  proportional  plan  of  the 
addition  and  transference  of  votes  within  party 
lines,  and  the  selection  of  candidates  according  to 
their  standing  on  their  respective  party  tickets. 

In  the  matter  of  local  government,  all  of  the 
Constitutions  give  the  legislature  almost  complete 
power  to  provide  for  the  organization  of  counties, 
cities,  incorporated  villages.  The  only  restrictions 
are  of  a  general  nature,  imposed  either  by  the 
prohibition  of  special  legislation,  or  by  the  collat- 
eral articles  of  the  Constitution.  This  sovereign 
power  of  the  legislature  carries  the  right  to  create, 
define,  and  abolish  offices,  and  to  determine  the 
method  of  selection,  either  by  appointment  or  elec- 
tion, at  large  or  by  wards.  Where  election  is 
determined  upon,  the  collateral  provisions  of  the 

1  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illi- 
nois, Michigan,  Wisconsin,  Iowa,  Kansas,  Nebraska,  Maryland, 
Delaware,  Virginia,  West  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  Kentucky, 
Tennessee,  Missouri,  Arkansas,  Texas,  California,  Nevada,  Colo- 
rado, Alabama,  Mississippi,  Georgia.  See  Stimson,  American 
"  Statue  Law,"  vol.  i.,  p.  56. 


270       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

Constitution  hold,  which  set  forth  the  qualifica- 
tions and  rights  of  voters,  and  the  manner  of 
conducting  elections  and  canvassing  the  returns. 
These  provisions  have  just  been  referred  to.  As 
they  apply  in  the  same  manner  to  city  and  county 
as  to  legislative  elections,  they  leave  all  the  legis- 
latures free  to  apply  the  Swiss  system  or  the  cumu- 
lative vote  to  the  municipal  council. 


APPENDIX  I.  271 


APPENDIX  I. 


THE  DISTRIBUTION  OP  SEATS. 

THE  significance  of  proportional  representation  in 
the  United  States  consists  not  so  much  in  a  mathe- 
matically accurate  assignment  of  representatives  to 
the  several  parties,  as  in  the  freedom  of  the  voter 
from  machine  rule,  and  the  introduction  of  leader- 
ship into  legislative  assemblies.  Yet  the  mathe- 
matical calculations  are  important.  Several  plans 
have  been  suggested  for  a  just  distribution  of  seats, 
but  fault  can  be  found  in  every  one. 

The  difficulty  of  the  problem  lies  in  the  fact  that, 
when  the  several  party  votes  are  divided  by  the 
unit  of  representation,  the  sum  of  the  quotients 
does  not  equal  the  number  of  representatives  to  be 
elected,  and  consequently  the  remaining  representa- 
tives must  be  assigned  to  parties  011  the  basis  of 
remainders.  Now,  these  remainders  may  be  scat- 
tered about  in  such  a  way  as  to  destroy  the  sym- 
metry of  the  result,  especially  where  they  fall  to 
minor  parties.  For  example,  in  the  Belgian  election, 
described  on  page  127,  the  unit  of  representation, 
found  by  dividing  the  number  of  votes  by  the  num- 
ber of  representatives,  is  11,523.  This  unit  pro- 
vides for  but  fifteen  seats,  and  the  other  three  are 
assigned  to  the  Flemish  Democrats,  the  Indepen- 


272       PEOPOETIONAL  BEPBESENTATION. 

dents,  and  the  Catholics,  on  remainders.  The  result 
is  an  advantage  to  the  smaller  parties,  and  a  disad- 
vantage to  the  larger.  The  Independents,  for  ex- 
ample, who  did  not  have  even  a  single  unit,  secured 
their  only  seat  on  a  remainder,  giving  one  represen- 
tative for  8,425  votes,  whereas  the  Socialists,  who 
receive  no  seat  on  a  remainder,  have  but  one  repre- 
sentative for  13,170  votes.1 

It  will  be  seen  that,  the  smaller  the  unit  of  repre- 
sentation, the  less  probability  will  there  be  of  re- 
mainders. If,  instead  of  dividing  the  total  vote  by 
the  exact  number  of  representatives  to  be  elected, 
we  divide  by  that  number  plus  one,  our  proceeding 
would  be  more  accurately  mathematical,  and  would 
produce  a  smaller  unit.  In  the  Belgian  election, 
instead  of  11,523,  it  would  be  10,917.  The  princi- 
ple here  involved  is  the  evident  one  that,  if  one  can- 
didate is  to  be  elected,  he  will  require  only  one-half 
the  votes  plus  one;  if  two  are  to  be  elected,  each 
one  will  require  but  one-third  plus  one,  and  so  on. 
That  is  to  say,  the  denominator  of  the  fraction 
which  elects  is  a  unit  larger  than  the  number  to  be 
elected. 

This  was  the  rule  adopted  by  the  Swiss  canton  of 
Solothurn  in  1895,  and  is  known  as  the  "  Droop  " 

1  Socialists 106,687 

Progressists 39,512 

Flemish  Democrats 21,713 

Catholics 19,405 

Moderates 11,693 

Independents 8,425 


207,429  -f  18  =  11,523 


APPENDIX  I. 


2T3 


quota,  having  been  proposed  by  Mr.  H.  R.  Droop  of 
London,  in  1869.1  In  the  Belgian  election  it  happens 
that  the  result  would  be  the  same  as  in  the  division 
by  the  exact  number  of  representatives,  although  but 
two  candidates  are  assigned  on  remainders  instead 
of  three.  The  chances,  however,  would  be  in  favor 
of  a  fairer  representation  for  the  larger  parties. 

Still  another  plan  of  distribution,  which  finds  a  unit 
of  representation  so  small  that  it  does  away  with 
remainders  entirely,  is  that  of  Professor  V.  D'Hondt 
of  Brussels.  This  is  the  plan  actually  employed  in 
the  Belgian  election,  and  is  explained  by  the  Commis- 
sion as  follows  :  — 

"  We  write,  in  the  order  of  their  importance  from  left  to 
right,  the  electoral  vote  of  the  six  tickets,  Socialists,  Progress- 
ists, Flemish  Democrats,  Catholics,  Moderates,  and  Indepen- 
dents, and  then  proceed  to  reduce  the  unit  of  representation  by 
successive  divisions,  until  a  unit  is  found  small  enough  to  be 
contained  eighteen  times  into  the  party  votes. 


SOCIAL-  PRO-          FLEMISH       CATHO-        MODEB-         IKDE- 

IST.  GRES8IST.        DEM.  UC.  ATE.       PENDENT. 

8,425 


1. 

106,681 

39,512 

21,713 

19,405        11,693 

2. 

53,000 

19,000 

10,000 

9,700         5,000 

3. 

35,000 

13,000 

7,000 

4. 

26,000 

9,878 

5. 

21,000 

6. 

17,000 

7. 

15,000 

8. 

13,000 

9. 

11,000 

10. 

10,000 

11. 

9,600 

1  "  On  the  Political  and  Social  Effects  of  Different  Methods 
of  Electing  Representatives,"  London,  1869, 


274       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

We  then  reason  as  follows :  If  there  had  been  only  one  seat 
to  fill,  it  would  have  fallen  to  the  largest  party,  the  Socialists ; 
we  therefore  write  down  the  figure  106,681,  which  assigns  the 
first  seat.  For  the  second  we  find  what  would  be  the  number 
of  votes  required  of  the  Socialists  if  the  two  seats  were  distrib- 
uted equally.  This  would  require  53,000  votes  for  each  seat, 
more  than  that  obtained  by  any  other  party.  We  write  down 
the  53,000,  which  assigns  the  second  seat.  Next,  106,681 
divided  by  three  gives  only  35,000,  a  figure  less  than  that  of 
the  Progressists,  39,512,  and  the  latter  figure  is  therefore  en- 
titled to  the  third  seat.  We  write  down  this  figure,  and  then 
determine^ that  if  the  Progressists  had  a  second  seat  they  would 
have  had  only  19,000  votes  to  each  seat.  The  fourth  and 
fifth,  therefore,  go  to  the  Socialists,  who  have  26,000  votes  for 
each  of  four  candidates  elected.  The  sixth  and  seventh  seats 
go  to  the  Flemish  Democrats  and  Socialists,  the  unit  of  rep- 
resentation now  descending  to  21,000  votes  for  each  seat.  The 
eighth  and  ninth  go  to  the  Progressists  and  Catholics,  who 
would  still  have  19,000  votes  for  each  candidate  to  be  elected. 
The  tenth  and  eleventh  go  to  the  Socialists;  the  twelfth 
and  thirteenth  to  the  Socialists  and  Progressists  (13,000 
votes  to  the  seat)  ;  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  to  the 
Moderate  Liberals  and  Socialists  (11,000  votes  per  seat); 
the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  to  the  Flemish  Democrats 
and  Socialists  (10,000  votes  per  seat) ;  and,  lastly,  the  eigh- 
teenth to  the  Progressists,  who  thereby  secure  one  seat  for 
9,878  votes. 

The  Socialists  have  now  obtained  ten  representatives,  the 
Progressists  four,  Flemish  Democrats  two,  Catholics  one,  and 
Moderate  Liberals  one,  total  eighteen ;  and  9,878  is  the  unit  of 
representation,  which  obviates  the  assignment  of  representa- 
tives to  any  party  on  the  basis  of  a  remainder.  This  number 
is  contained  ten  times  in  the  vote  of  the  Socialists,  four  times 
in  that  of  the  Progressists,  two  times  in  that  of  the  Flemish 
Democrats,  and  one  time  in  that  of  the  Catholics  and  Moderate 
Liberals,  and  it  is  not  contained  in  the  vote  of  the  Indepen- 
dents." 


APPENDIX  I  275 

The  main  difficulty  in  the  distribution  of  seats,  it 
will  be  noticed,  springs  from  the  fact  that  a  small 
party,  whose  vote  is  not  equal  to  a  single  unit  of  repre- 
sentation, may,  nevertheless,  secure  a  representative 
on  the  score  of  having  a  remainder  larger  than  the  re- 
mainders in  other  parties.  To  meet  this  difficulty,  1 
proposed,  in  the  Proportional  Representation  Review, 
March,  1894,  that  every  party  whose  total  vote  is  less 
than,  say,  85  per  cent  of  the  unit  of  representation,  be 
excluded  altogether  from  the  apportionment,  and  that 
a  new  unit  be  found  on  the  basis  of  the  remaining 
votes.  In  the  Belgian  election  the  Independent  vote 
is  only  73  per  cent  of  the  unit  11,523 ;  and  if  it  be 
excluded,  the  total  number  of  votes  of  other  parties 
would  be  199,004  (207,429  minus  8,425).  Dividing 
this  by  eighteen,  we  have  a  second,  or  effective  unit  of 
representation,  11,055,  which  provides  for  sixteen 
full  quotients,  and  gives  the  Catholics  and  Flemish 
Democrats  each  one  additional  on  remainders. 

The  same  result  could  be  reached  in  a  simpler  way. 
The  legislature  could  fix  specifically  the  fraction  or 
percentum  of  the  aggregate  vote,  falling  below  which, 
no  party  should  be  granted  a  representative.  For  ex- 
ample, in  the  above  election,  one-eighteenth  would  be 
5.55  per  cent  of  the  aggregate  vote.  Let  all  parties 
be  excluded  (where  eighteen  are  to  be  elected)  whose 
total  vote  is  less  than  one-twentieth,  5  per  cent,  of  the 
aggregate  vote  (in  this  case  10,371).  If  ten  are  to 
be  elected,  the  parties  to  be  excluded  would  be  those 
casting  less  than  9  per  cent  of  the  aggregate  vote. 
And,  supposing  ten  to  be  elected,  Sec.  VI.  of  the  law, 


276       PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION 

as  given  on  p.  121,  could  be  amended  so  as  to  read : 
"  Sec.  VI.  In  determining  the  results  of  the  election,  1. 
From  the  aggregate  number  of  valid  votes  cast  for  all 
tickets,  shall  be  deducted  the  votes  of  all  parties 
whose  total  vote  is  less  than  9  per  cent  of  the  aggre- 
gate, such  parties  to  be  excluded  altogether  from 
representation.  The  remainder  shall  be  divided  by 
the  number  of  candidates  to  be  elected ;  the  quotient, 
ignoring  fractions,  to  be  known  as  the  "  unit  of  repre 
sentation,"  etc. 

If  fifteen  representatives  are  to  be  elected,  the 
parties  excluded  would  be  those  receiving  less  than, 
say,  6  per  cent  of  the  aggregate  vote.  With  such 
a  distribution  the  election  returns  given  on  page  107, 
where  fifteen  presidential  electors  are  chosen,1  would 
have  excluded  the  People's  party,  whose  total  vote, 
328,392,  was  less  than  494,406  (6  per  cent  of  the  aggre- 
gate, 8,240,106),  and  the  result  would  have  been  eight 
Democrats  and  seven  Republicans,  instead  of  seven 
Democrats,  seven  Eepublicans,  and  one  Populist. 

Returning  to  the  application  of  these  four  plans  to 
the  Belgian  election,  we  should  have  the  following 
units  of  representation  in  the  order  of  size :  — 

UNITS  OF  REPRESENTATION. 

1.  Dividing  by  number  of  candidates     .    .    .  11,523 

2.  Droop  (number  of  candidates  plus  one)  .    .  10,917 

3.  Excluding  parties  less  than  5  per  cent    .     .  11,055 

4.  D'Hondt 9,878 

i  Republican  .    .  3,910,390  People's ....     328,392 

Democrat     .    .  3,808,791  Prohibition     .    .     192,533 

8,240,106 
Simple  unit  =  549,340.     Effective  unit  =  514,612. 


APPENDIX  I. 


277 


The  comparative  distribution  among    the  several 
parties  would  be  as  follows  :  — 


SIMPLE 

DIVISION. 

DROOP. 

D'HON 

Moderates 

1 

1 

1 

Progressists 

3 

3 

4 

Socialists 

9 

9 

10 

Flemish  Democrats 

2 

2 

2 

Independents 

1 

1 

0 

Catholics 

2 

2 

1 

EXCLUDING  PARTIES 

LESS  THAN  5 
T.  PER  CENT. 

1 

3 

10 
2 
0 
2 


As  exhibiting  the  difficulty  in  securing  accurate 
proportional  representation,  the  following  table  shows 
the  number  of  votes  in  each  party  required  to  secure 
one  representative,  under  the  various  plans  :  — 


J 

SIMPLE  DIVISION 
AND  DROOP. 

D'HONDT. 

EXCLUDING 
PARTIES 
LESS  THAN 
5  PER  CENT. 

Moderates    .    . 
Progressists 
Socialist  .     .     . 
Flemish  Dem., 
Independent    . 
Catholics     .    . 

1  seat  for  11,693  votes 
4       '    13,170      ' 
'       '    11,853      ' 
'       '    10,856      ' 
'       '      8,425      ' 
'       '      9,702      ' 

1  for  11,693 

1    '    9,878 
1     '  10,668 
1     '  10,856 
0    '    8,425 
1     '  19,405 

If  or  11,  693 
1  "  13,170 
1  "  10,668 
1  "  10,856 
0  "    8,425 
1  "    9,702 

It  will  be  seen  that,  in  this  particular  election, 
M.  D'Hondt's  highly  complicated  plan,  though  dis- 
pensing with  remainders,  is  yet  the  most  unequal  of 
all,  seeing  that  the  Progressists  get  one  representa- 
tive for  9,878  votes,  while  the  Catholics  get  only  one 
for  nearly  twice  as  many  (19,405). 

Considering  the  complexity  of  all  plans  except  the 
simple  division,  and  the  practical  objections  against 
overloading  the  reform  with  too  many  explanations, 


278         PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

besides  the  impossibility  in  any  case  of  an  absolutely 
perfect  result,  it  is  probable  that  the  bill  as  pre- 
sented by  the  American  committee  will  appeal  most 
strongly  to  the  public.  However,  it  seems  that  a 
feasible  plan,  which  would  obviate  too  great  influ- 
ence of  such  parties  as  are  too  insignificant  to  com- 
mand a  single  unit  of  representation,  would  be  just 
and  expedient. 


APPENDIX  II.  279 


APPENDIX  II. 


THE  HARE  PREFERENTIAL  PLAN. 

A  Form  of  Law  for  the  Election  of  Municipal  Boards  in  California. 

BY  ALFRED  CRIDGE. 

ALL  county,  municipal,  and  school  district  boards, 
including  school  trustees,  supervisors  of  counties  and 
of  cities  and  counties,  city  and  town  councils,  or  other 
municipal  or  county  body,  board,  or  commission,  shall 
hereafter,  be  elected  by  the  proportional  and  preferen- 
tial plan,  in  the  manner  following :  Every  qualified 
voter  shall  be  entitled  to  vote  for  as  many  members 
of  such  bodies,  boards,  or  commissions  as  are  to  be 
elected  in  the  whole  of  the  city,  town,  county,  or  school 
district,  without  regard  to  district  or  ward  lines ;  and 
no  members  of  such  boards  or  bodies  shall  hold  over, 
but  all  the  members  shall  be  elected  at  every  election 
hereafter  held  for  such  officers. 

The  elector  shall  prepare  his  ballot  by  marking  the 
figure  1  (one)  opposite  the  name  of  the  candidate  who 
is  his  first  choice  for  such  board.  He  shall,  in  like 
manner,  mark  the  figure  2  (two)  opposite  the  name  of 
the  candidate  who  is  second  choice  for  such  board, 
and  the  figure  3  (three)  opposite  the  name  of  the  can- 
didate who  is  his  third  choice,  and  so  on  in  regular 
numerical  order,  All  marking  of  the  names  of  candi- 


280        PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

dates  beyond  the  number  required  by  law  to  be  elected 
shall  be  void  and  of  no  effect. 

The  number  of  votes  required  to  elect  a  member  of 
such  board  shall  be  called  the  Quota.  The  quota  for 
each  membership  shall  be  ascertained  by  dividing  the 
whole  number  of  votes  cast  at  a  given  election  by  the 
number  of  candidates  to  be  elected  at  such  election 
for  such  board,  omitting  the  fraction  in  the  quotient, 
if  there  be  any.  All  the  ballots  cast  for  such  boards 
shall  be  taken  to  the  place  provided  by  law  for  can- 
vassing election  returns  for  the  purpose  of  counting. 
Every  candidate  for  such  boards,  whose  name  is 
printed  on  the  official  ballot,  shall  have  a  separate 
file  prepared  for  the  reception  of  the  ballots  cast  in 
his  favor.  As  each  ballot  is  opened  the  words  "Fig- 
ure One"  shall  be  announced,  followed  by  the  name 
of  the  candidate  opposite  to  which  the  figure  1  (one) 
is  marked.  The  ballot  shall  then  be  placed  on  the 
file  belonging  to  such  candidate,  without  calling  off 
any  other  names  on  the  ballot.  This  process  of  dis- 
tribution shall  be  continued  till  all  the  ballots  are 
distributed. 

When  all  the  ballots  have  thus  been  distributed  to 
the  files  of  those  candidates  designated  thereon  as 
first  choice,  any  candidate  or  candidates  having  a  full 
quota  shall  be  declared  elected.  If  any  candidate  has 
more  than  a  quota,  the  surplus  shall  be  taken  from 
the  top  of  the  file,  and  transferred  to  the  files  of  those 
not  having  a  quota,  as  follows  :  — 

Commencing  with  the  file  having  the  highest  sur- 
plus, the  ballots  shall  be  severally  distributed  to  the 


APPENDIX  II.  281 

files  of  the  other  candidates  designated  thereon  as 
second  choice ;  but  if  the  candidate  designated  as 
second  choice  has  been  elected,  then  the  ballot  shall 
be  transferred  to  the  file  of  the  candidate  designated 
thereon  as  third  choice ;  and  so  on,  until  a  candidate 
has  been  reached  who  has  not  received  a  quota,  or 
until  the  legally  marked  names  on  the  ballot  are  ex- 
hausted. Whenever  during  the  distribution  of  surplus 
ballots  any  candidate  obtains  a  quota,  he  shall  be  de- 
clared elected,  and  no  more  ballots  shall  be  counted 
for  him. 

When  the  distribution  of  the  surplus  ballots  has 
been  completed,  if  the  number  of  candidates  having 
votes  recorded  in  their  favor  is  greater  than  the  num- 
ber of  members  to  be  elected,  then  the  candidate 
having  the  least  number  of  votes  shall  be  declared 
out  of  the  count,  and  the  ballots  belonging  to,  or  filed 
for,  such  candidate,  shall  be  redistributed  among  the 
remaining  candidates.  In  redistributing  the  ballots 
of  a  candidate  who  has  been  declared  out  of  the  count, 
the  figure  marked  opposite  the  name  of  such  candi- 
date on  each  ballot  shall  be  first  announced,  followed 
by  the  name  of  the  candidate,  followed  by  the  word 
"Out."  Then  the  next  higher  figure  in  numerical 
order  shall  be  announced,  followed  by  the  name  of 
the  candidate  to  which  such  higher  figure  stands  oppo- 
site, and  the  ballot  shall  be  placed  on  the  file  belong- 
ing to  such  candidate,  unless  such  candidate  shall  have 
been  declared  elected,  or  declared  out  of  the  count,  in 
which  case  the  second  higher  figure  shall  be  announced, 
together  with  the  name  of  the  candidate  opposite 


282        PROPORTIONAL  EEPEESENTATION. 

thereto.  This  process  shall  continue  in  regular  nu- 
merical order  until  the  ballot  is  placed  on  the  file  of 
some  candidate  who  has  not  been  declared  elected,  or 
not  been  declared  out  of  the  count,  or  until  the  list 
of  legally  marked  names  on  the  ballot  is  exhausted. 
When  the  ballots  belonging  to  the  candidate  having 
the  lowest  number  of  votes  shall  have  been  redistrib- 
uted, then,  if  necessary,  the  candidate  having  the 
next  lowest  number  of  votes  shall  also  be  declared 
out  of  the  count,  and  the  ballots  belonging  to  such 
candidate  shall  be  redistributed  in  like  manner. 
Whenever,  during  the  redistribution  of  the  ballots,  it 
shall  be  found  that  a  candidate  has  received  his  quota 
of  votes,  he  shall  immediately  be  declared  elected,  and 
no  further  ballots  shall  be  placed  on  his  file  or  counted 
in  his  favor.  Candidates  having  the  lowest  number 
of  votes  shall  be  successively  declared  out  of  the 
count,  and  their  ballots  redistributed  until  the  number 
of  remaining  candidates  shall  be  so  reduced  that  the 
number  of  candidates  already  declared,  added  to  the 
number  of  remaining  candidates  who  have  not  been 
declared  out  of  the  count,  shall  be  equal  to  the  number 
of  members  to  be  elected.  Then  all  remaining  candi- 
dates who  have  not  been  declared  out  of  the  count 
shall  also  be  declared  elected.  If,  in  the  process  of 
declaring  candidates  out  of  the  count,  it  shall  be 
found  that  two  or  more  of  the  candidates  having  the 
lowest  number  of  votes  have  a  tie  vote,  or  an  equal 
number  of  votes,  then,  if  each  of  such  candidates 
shall  have  less  than  one  per.  cent  of  the  total  vote 
cast  at  the  election,  they  shall  all  be  declared  out  of 


APPENDIX  It  283 

the  count  at  the  same  time ;  but  if  each  of  such  can- 
didates has  more  than  one  per  cent  of  the  total  vote 
cast  at  the  election,  then  that  one  of  such  candidates 
shall  be  declared  out  of  the  count  against  whose 
name  on  his  ballots  the  figure  1  is  marked  the  least 
number  of  times ;  and  if  the  figure  1  (one)  is  marked 
an  equal  number  of  times  on  the  ballots  of  two  or 
more  such  candidates,  then  that  candidate  shall  be 
declared  out  of  the  count  against  whose  name  the  fig- 
ure 2  (two)  is  marked  the  least  number  of  times,  and 
so  on  in  regular  numerical  order. 

If  the  position  of  any  member  of  such  board  shall 
become  vacant,  the  candidate  who  was  last  declared 
out  of  the  count  shall  succeed  to  the  vacant  position. 

This  form  of  law  was  prepared  as  a  constitutional 
amendment  to  enable  the  eighteen  assemblymen  and 
nine  senators  from  the  city  and  county  of  San  Fran- 
cisco to  be  so  elected,  and  the  modification  is  adapted 
to  States  where  the  legislature  has  power  to  make 
general  laws  (as  it  has  in  this  State)  for  the  govern- 
ment of  counties  and  municipalities.  It  has  no  power 
to  make  special  laws  or  to  permit  local  option,  other- 
wise than  in  connection  with  a  vote  for  or  against  a 
city  or  town  charter  as  a  whole.  The  provision  for 
San  Francisco  specially  had,  therefore,  to  be  made  as 
a  constitutional  amendment.  In  some  State  or  States 
the  legislature  might  have  such  power. 

The  phraseology  used  in  the  Mechanics'  Institute 
amendment,  under  which  a  third  election  has  just 
been  held,  of  its  trustees,  is  much  shorter ;  but  for  a 


284        PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

State  law  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  make  it  petti- 
fogger tight,  even  at  the  cost  of  a  few  hundred  more 
words.  If  once  in  use  as  regards  any  organization  in 
a  State,  all  subsequent  legislation  to  extend  it  could 
be  comprised  in  a  very  few  words,  by  reference  to  it 
as  the  "proportional  and  preferential  vote  in  the 
manner  now  in  force  and  used  for  the  election  of  " 
(adding  the  requisite  designations). 

Perhaps  a  better  expression  could  be  devised  than 
the  words  "  our  board  "  or  "  such  boards,"  which  I 
have  substituted  for  the  words  "  senators  "  and  "  as- 
semblymen" in  the  constitutional  amendment.  It 
might  be  advisable  in  some  parts  to  designate  in  de- 
tail the  class  of  officials  to  be  elected,  such  as  alder- 
men, councilmen,  school  trustees,  etc.  That  is  a 
matter  to  be  considered  according  to  time  and  place. 


APPENDIX  III.  285 


APPENDIX   III. 


THE  GOVB  BILL. -LEGISLATIVE  REPRESENTATION. 

COMMONWEALTH  OP  MASSACHUSETTS,    \ 
In  the  Year  One  Thousand  Eight  Hundred  j 
and  Ninety-one. 

RESOLVE. 

To  amend  the  Constitution  relative  to  the  Election 
of  Senators  and  Representatives. 

Resolved,  by  both  houses,  that  it  is  expedient  to 
alter  the  Constitution  of  this  Commonwealth  by  the 
adoption  of  the  subjoined  article  of  amendment ;  and 
that  the  said  article,  being  agreed  to  by  a  majority  of 
the  senators  and  two-thirds  of  the  members  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  present  and  voting  thereon, 
be  entered  on  the  journals  of  both  houses,  with  the 
yeas  and  nays  taken  thereon,  and  referred  to  the 
General  Court  next  to  be  chosen;  and  that  the  said 
article  be  published,  to  the  end  that,  if  agreed  to  in 
the  manner  provided  by  the  Constitution  by  the  Gene- 
eral  Court  next  to  be  chosen,  it  may  be  submitted  to 
the  people  for  their  approval  and  ratification,  in  order 
that  it  may  become  a  part  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
Commonwealth. 

ARTICLE    OF    AMENDMENT. 

SEC.  I.  In  order  to  provide  for  a  representation 
of  the  citizens  of  this  Commonwealth,  founded  upon 


286        PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

the  principle  of  equality,  any  resident  of  this  Com- 
monwealth, eligible  under  the  Constitution  to  the 
office  of  senator,  may  be  nominated  as  a  candidate 
for  said  office  by  any  person. 

No  such  nomination  shall  be  valid  unless  the  fol- 
lowing conditions  are  complied  with :  — 

1.  The   nomination   shall   be    in   writing,    signed 
by  the  person  making  it,  and  shall  contain  the  name 
and  place  of  residence  of  the  candidate. 

2.  An   acceptance   of  the   nomination   signed  by 
the  candidate  shall  be  indorsed  thereon. 

3.  It   shall   be   deposited    in    the    office    of    the 
secretary  of  the  Commonwealth  not  more  than  three 
months  nor  less  than  five  weeks  before  the  day  of 
election. 

4.  There   shall   be   deposited   with    the    nomina- 
tion the  sum  of  fifty  dollars,  or  such  other  sum  not 
exceeding   one   hundred   dollars,   as   the   legislature 
may  hereafter  by  law  direct. 

SEC.  II.  Not  less  than  four  weeks  before  the  day 
of  election,  the  secretary  of  the  Commonwealth  shall 
furnish  to  each  candidate  and  to  every  voter  who 
shall  request  it,  a  printed  list  containing  the  names 
of  all  the  candidates  in  alphabetical  order  with  the 
place  of  residence  of  each,  and  the  name  of  the 
person  by  whom  each  was  nominated. 

SEC.  III.  At  any  time  after  his  nomination  and 
not  less  than  three  weeks  before  the  day  of  election, 
any  of  said  candidates  may  furnish  to  the  secretary 
of  the  Commonwealth  a  statement  in  writing,  signed 
by  himself  and  acknowledged  before  any  magistrate 


APPENDIX  III.  287 

authorized  to  take  acknowledgment  of  deeas,  which 
statement  shall  contain  the  names  of  one  or  more 
others  of  said  candidates  with  whom  he  believes  him- 
self to  be  in  accord  upon  the  most  important  public 
questions,  and  to  one  or  more  of  whom  he  wishes  to 
transfer  any  ineffective  votes  cast  for  himself. 

SEC.  IV.  The  secretary  shall  prepare  a  new  list 
of  candidates  similar  to  that  named  in  Sec.  II.  of  this 
article,  but  containing  also  against  the  name  of  each 
candidate  the  names  in  alphabetical  order  of  all  can- 
didates named  in  the  list,  if  any,  furnished  by  that 
candidate,  as  provided  in  Sec.  III. ;  and  he  shall,  not 
less  than  two  weeks  before  the  day  of  election,  furnish 
to  the  clerk  of  every  city  or  town  a  sufficient  number 
of  copies  of  said  new  list.  Every  such  clerk  shall,  im- 
mediately upon  the  receipt  thereof,  post  conspicu- 
ously, and  open  to  the  inspection  of  the  public,  one 
copy  of  said  list  at  each  and  every  place  in  his  city 
or  town  where  votes  are  to  be  received  at  said  elec- 
tion, and  shall  also  immediately  furnish  one  copy  to 
every  legal  voter  resident  in  said  city  or  town  who 
shall  demand  the  same. 

SEC.  V.  Every  legal  voter,  wherever  resident,  shall 
be  entitled  to  cast  his  vote  for  senator  in  favor  of  any 
person  whose  name  appears  in  the  aforesaid  list  of 
candidates ;  but  no  person  shall  vote  for  more  than 
one  candidate,  nor  for  any  person  whose  name  does 
not  appear  upon  the  aforesaid  list  of  candidates. 

But  whenever  a  candidate  duly  nominated  is 
omitted  from  the  list  published  by  the  secretary 
of  the  Commonwealth,  votes  may  be  cast  for  him 


288        PEOPOBTIONAL  EEPEESENTATION. 

with  the  same  effect  as  if  his  name  appeared  on  said 
list. 

If  the  secretary  shall  make  such  omission  inten- 
tionally or  through  wilful  neglect  of  duty,  he  shall, 
upon  conviction  thereof,  be  ever  after  incapable  of 
holding  any  office  of  trust  or  profit  under  the  Com- 
monwealth. 

SEC.  VI.  The  returns  of  votes  having  been  trans- 
mitted to  the  secretary  of  the  Commonwealth  as  pro- 
vided by  the  Constitution,  the  secretary  shall  make  a 
list  of  all  candidates  voted  for,  with  the  vote  received 
by  each  candidate  in  each  precinct  or  voting  place, 
and  his  total  vote,  and  said  list  shall  be  transmitted, 
published,  and  distributed  in  the  same  manner  pro- 
vided in  Sec.  IV.,  concerning  the  list  therein  named ; 
and  after  the  secretary  shall  have  ascertained  who  are 
the  persons  who  appear  to  be  elected,  he  shall  make 
a  list  of  the  successful  candidates,  with  the  computa- 
tion by  which  their  election  has  been  ascertained,  and 
shall  forthwith  furnish  a  copy  of  the  same  to  each 
candidate  and  also  to  every  voter  who  shall  request  it. 

SBC.  VII.  Ineffective  votes  shall  be  transferred 
according  to  the  request  of  the  candidate  for  whom 
they  were  originally  cast,  to  a  person  named  in  the 
list  furnished  by  said  candidate  as  provided  by 
Sec.  III. 

The  forty  candidates  then  having  the  highest  num- 
ber of  votes  shall  be  declared  elected,  and  the  secre- 
tary shall  issue  certificates  of  election  to  them. 

In  case  two  or  more  candidates  have  the  same 
number  of  votes,  the  candidates  residing  at  the  great- 


APPENDIX  III.  289 

est  distance  from  the  state-house  shall  be  deemed,  for 
the  purpose  of  election,  to  have  the  highest  number. 

SEC.  VIII.  The  following  shall  be  deemed  ineffec- 
tive votes,  and  shall  be  transferred  in  the  order 
named :  — 

1.  Any  votes  cast  for  a  candidate  in  excess  of 
one-fortieth  of  the  entire  vote  cast,  beginning  with 
the  candidate  receiving  the  largest  vote,  and  proceed- 
ing to  the  one  next  highest,  and  so  on. 

In  the  case  of  two  or  more  receiving  the  same 
vote,  the  transfer  shall  be  from  each  alternately,  in 
alphabetical  order. 

2.  Votes    cast    for    candidates    who  have   since 
their   nomination  died  or  become   ineligible  in  the 
same  order; 

3.  Original  votes  cast  for  candidates  who  fail  of 
election,  beginning  with  the  candidate  receiving  the 
smallest  total  vote,  and  proceeding  to  the  one  next 
lowest,  and  so  on ;  in  case  of  two  or  more  receiving 
the  same  vote  the  transfer  to  be  made  from  each 
alternately  in  alphabetical  order. 

No  votes  shall  be  transferred  from  any  candidate 
who  has  not  furnished  the  statement  named  in  Sec. 
III. 

SEC.  IX.  Every  ineffective  vote  of  a  candidate  shall 
be  transferred  to  the  candidate  named  in  his  said  list, 
living  and  eligible  at  the  time  of  counting  the  vote, 
for  whom  the  largest  number  of  votes  were  originally 
cast,  and  whose  vote  by  transfer  or  otherwise  does  not 
equal  one-fortieth  of  the  whole  vote  cast,  until  all  are 
transferred  as  far  as  possible. 


290        PEOPOBTIONAL  BEPBESENTATION. 

If  the  same  number  of  votes  were  originally  cast 
for  two  or  more  candidates  named  in  said  list,  the 
candidate  residing  nearest  the  one  from  whom  the 
votes  are  to  be  transferred  shall  be  preferred. 

SEC.  X.  The  secretary  shall  at  once  transmit  to 
the  treasurer  and  receiver-general  all  sums  of  money 
received  as  provided  in  Sec.  I. 

Immediately  after  declaring  the  names  of  the 
persons  elected  senators,  he  shall  draw  on  the  treas- 
urer and  receiver-general  a  warrant  for  the  payment 
of  the  sum  received  with  one  nomination,  and  issue 
the  same  to  the  person  nominating  each  candidate 
who  shall  appear  by  the  returns  to  have  received  one 
thousand  or  more  original  votes,  and  all  such  war- 
rants shall  be  paid  by  the  treasurer  and  receiver-gen- 
eral on  presentation.  The  remainder  of  the  sum 
paid  under  Sec.  I.  shall  be  and  remain  the  property 
of  the  Commonwealth. 

SEC.  XL  In  case  a  vacancy  shall  occur  in  the  sen- 
ate after  the  declaration  of  election  provided  in  Sec. 
VII.,  the  votes  cast  for  the  member  whose  seat  shall 
have  become  vacant,  together  with  any  ineffective 
votes  assigned  to  him,  shall  be  redistributed  in  the 
same  manner  as  if  he  had  died  or  become  ineligible 
before  the  canvassing  of  the  votes,  and  the  candidate 
not  before  elected,  who,  after  returning  to  him  any 
votes  originally  cast  for  him,  shall  then  appear  to 
have  the  largest  number  of  votes  shall  be  declared 
elected. 

SEC.  XII.  The  supreme  judicial  court,  upon  the 
petition  of  twenty-five  legal  voters,  shall  have  jurisdic- 


APPENDIX  III.  291 

tion  to  enforce  by  mandamus  the  correction  of  any 
erroneous  or  improper  issue  of  such  certificate  of  elec- 
tion, when  such  error  can  be  made  to  appear  from  the 
face  of  the  returns  issued  by  the  secretary  as  provided 
in  Sec.  VI.,  upon  canvassing  said  returns  in  the  man- 
ner provided  in  Sections  VII.,  VIII.,  and  IX. 

But  the  senate  shall  continue  to  be  the  final  judge 
of  the  election  of  its  members. 

SEC.  XIII.  The  legislature  may  at  any  time  provide 
by  law  that  representatives  be  elected  in  substantially 
the  same  manner  as  is  herein  provided  for  senators, 
and  by  such  law  may,  if  it  so  decides,  divide  the  Com- 
monwealth into  not  exceeding  six  electoral  districts, 
from  each  of  which  the  candidates  voted  for  in  that 
district,  must  be  taken,  and  by  voters  within  which 
such  candidates  must  be  nominated.  The  number  of 
voters  in  each  of  these  districts  to  be  as  nearly  equal 
as  possible. 


292        PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 


APPENDIX   IV. 


BOOKS,   PERIODICALS,  AND  SOCIETIES. 

FOLLOWING  is  a  list  of  the  more  important  books 
and  periodicals  devoted  to  proportional  representa- 
tion. The  reader  is  referred,  for  more  complete 
lists,  to  the  Proportional  Representation  Review,  De- 
cember, 1893;  to  Mr.  M.  N.  Forney's  "Political  Ee- 
form  by  the  Representation  of  Minorities,"  47  Cedar 
Street,  New  York,  1894,  where  magazine  references 
are  also  given ;  and  to  "  Poole's  Index." 

GILPIN,  THOMAS.  "  The  Kepresentation  of  Minorities  of 
Electors  to  act  with  the  Majority  in  Elected  Assemblies," 
Philadelphia,  1844.  This  is  believed  to  be  the  first  publi- 
cation on  the  subject  of  proportional  representation  in  any 
language.  It  is  to  be  reprinted  in  the  Annals  of  the  Ameri- 
can Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science. 

CONSIDEBANT,  ViCTOB.  "  De  la  Sincerite  du  Gouvernement 
Representatif,  ou  Exposition  de  1' Ejection  veridique," 
Geneve,  1846.  The  first  brochure  on  the  subject  published 
in  Switzerland.  Keprinted  in  1892  by  Charles  Burkli, 
Zurich.  Fifteen  centimes. 

HARE,  THOMAS.  "  The  Machinery  of  Representation,"  Lon- 
don, 1857.  Mr.  Hare's  first  publication.  "  The  Election  of 
Representatives,  Parliamentary  and  Municipal."  Third  edi- 
tion. Philadelphia,  1867,  350  pages.  The  classical  treatise. 

MILL,  JOHN  STUABT."  "Considerations  on  Representative 
Government,"  New  York,  1882,  365  pages.  Chapter  vii.  is 
an  enthusiastic  argument  for  the  Hare  system. 

BUCKALEW,  C.  R.    "  Proportional  Representation,"  Philadel- 


APPENDIX  IV.  293 

phia,  1872.  Senatoi  Buckalew  was  a  member  of  the  Senate 
committee  which  reported  in  favor  of  the  cumulative 
vote  in  the  " reconstruction"  of  the  Southern  States.  The 
committee's  report  is  given  in  this  book.  The  original 
is,  "  Report  of  the  Select  Committee  of  the  United  States 
Senate  on  Representative  Reform,"  Senate  document,  40th 
Congress,  3d  session,  No.  271,  March  2,  1869. 

STERNE,  SIMON.  "Representative  Reform  and  Personal  Rep- 
resentation," Philadelphia,  1871.  An  able  presentation  of 
the  Hare  system,  simplified  and  adapted  to  American  insti- 
tutions. Mr.  Sterne  at  present  advocates  the  Swiss  system. 

LUBBOCK,  SIB  JOHN.  "Representation,"  sixth  edition,  Lon- 
don, 1890,  88  pages.  Favors  the  single  transferable  vote. 
Author  is  president  of  the  English  Proportional  Represen- 
tation Society. 

CRIDGE,  ALFRED.  "Proportional  Representation:  includ- 
ing its  Relations  to  the  Initiative  and  Referendum,"  San 
Francisco,  1893.  Published  by  the  author,  429  Montgom- 
ery Street.  Ten  cents.  Favors  the  Hare  system. 

REMSEN,  D.  S.  "  Primary  Elections  :  a  Study  of  Methods 
for  Improving  the  Basis  of  Party  Representation,"  New 
York,  1894.  Application  of  proportional  representation 
to  primaries. 

FOKNEY,  M.  N.  "Political  Reform  by  the  Representation  of 
Minorities."  Published  by  the  author,  47  Cedar  Street, 
New  York,  1894.  Favors  Burnitz  system,  similar  to  "pre- 
ponderance of  choice."  Contains  extensive  bibliography, 
and  references  to  magazine  articles. 

SULLIVAN,  J.  W.  "  Direct  Legislation  through  the  Initiative 
and  Referendum,"  New  York,  1893.  Paper,  tweny-five 
cents.  The  best  presentation  of  direct  legislation,  with 
occasional  references  to  proportional  representation. 

La  Representation  Proportioned,  Paris,  F.  Pichon,  1888,  524 
pages.  Ten  francs.  Published  by  the  Socie'te'  pour  1'lStude 
de  la  Representation  Proportionelle.  Contains  the  most 
complete  account  of  the  reform  in  all  countries. 

La  Representation  Proportionate,  Revue  Mensuelle,  Bruxelles, 


294        PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

Belgium.  Published  by  L' Association  Reformiste  beige 
pour  la  Representation  Proportionelle,  since  1883.  Five 
francs  yearly.  Favors  D'Hondt  system.  The  volume  for 
1885  contains  a  full  account  of  the  international  congress 
at  Anvers. 

Bulletin  de  la  Societe  Suisse  pour  la  Representation  Propor- 
tionelle. Geneve  et  Bale  since  1885.  Prix  du  numero, 
50  centimes.  Printed  in  French  and  German.  A  complete 
record  of  progress  in  Switzerland. 

Hope  and  Home,  Alfred  Cridge,  editor,  San  Francisco. 
Twenty-five  cents  a  year.  Devoted  to  direct  legislation 
and  proportional  representation.  Favors  Hare  system. 

Proportional  Representation  Review,  published  quarterly  by 
the  American  Proportional  Representation  League,  Stough- 
ton  Cooley,  secretary,  Chicago.  Fifty  cents  a  year.  The 
American  League  was  organized  at  Chicago  in  1893.  The 
files  ofrthe  Review  (2  vols.,  fifty  cents  each)  contain  dis- 
cussions by  European  and  American  advocates. 

Direct  Legislation  Record,  Newark,  New  Jersey,  Eltweed 
Pomeroy,  editor.  Monthly,  twenty-five  cents  a  year. 


INDEX. 


Ability  of  representatives,  39-43, 
152-162,  164-167,  183-184, 195,  208- 
209,  217-218,  231,  233. 

Absenteeism,  153-162. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  quoted, 
209. 

Administration,  boards,  5;  muni- 
cipal council,  210  ff. 

Aldermen,  origin,  24;  elections, 
70-72,  77 ;  single  board,  137. 

American  Proportional  Represen- 
tation League'bill,  119-122. 

Andrae,  M.,  Danish  statesman,  104. 

Arbitration,  231. 

Balance  of  power,  40. 

Ballot  laws,  112,  219,  220. 

Basle,  city,  241. 

Belgium,  trial  election,  122-130. 

Berlin,  202. 

Berne,  Swiss  canton,  186. 

Berry,  J.  M.,  cited,  65. 

Bibliography,  293  ff. 

Borely,  M.,  cited,  111. 

Boston,  original  government,  5  ff ; 
limited  vote,  90;  absenteeism, 
155. 

Bribery,  79-80,  138  ff.,  166. 

Bryce,  James,  cited,  84, 198. 

Buckalew,  Senator,  C.  R.,  247. 

Burke,  Edmund,  quoted,  16, 17. 

Burkli,  Charles,  cited,  193. 

Burkli,  "Father  of  the  Referen- 
dum," 190. 

California  ballot  law,  117 ;  refer- 
endum vote,  187. 


Canada,  parliament,  133 ;  non-resi- 
dency, 166. 

Capen,  S.  B.,  cited,  155. 

Capitalist,  representation  of,  13  ff. 

Caucus,  legislative,  81-82. 

Chamberlain,  D.  H.,  quoted,  247. 

Chamberlain,  Joseph,  245. 

Checks  and  balances,  234. 

Chicago,  aldermanic  elections,  70; 
absenteeism,  153. 

Cities,  origin  of  council,  3,  4,  22- 
26 ;  government  of,  197  ff . ;  con- 
stitutionality of  proportional 
representation,  268-270. 

Civil  Service  Reform,  166,  175-176, 
211-216,  262. 

Confederation,  21. 

Congress,  origin,  21 ;  elections, 
55  ff . ;  constitutionality  of  pro- 
portional representation,  266. 

Connecticut,  bribery,  138 ;  colonial 
legislature,  20. 

Considdrant,  Victor,  cited,  111,  238. 

Constitutional  restrictions  on  le- 
gislatures, 5  ff. 

Constitutionality  of  proportional 
representation,  265-270. 

Corporations  and  lobby,  34, 35 ;  and 
machine,  84  ;  proportional  elec- 
tion of  directors,  264,  265. 

Corruption,  47. 

County  Commissioners ,  election  of, 
87. 

Cridge,  Alfred,  bill  for  Hare  sys- 
tem, 279  ff. 

Cumulative  vote,  92-98 ;  and  free 
list,  113  ff . 


296 


INDEX. 


Denmark,  parliament,  104. 
D'Hondt,  Professor  V.,  distribu- 
tion of  seats,  127,  273  if. 
Distribution  of  seats,  128,  271  ff. 
Direct  legislation,  186  ff. 
Droop,  H.  Pv.,  quota,  241,  272. 
Dutcher,  Salem,  cited,  73. 

Elections,  Congress,  16,  55  ff. ;  Le- 
gislatures, 65  ff. ;  British  Parlia- 
ment, 62,  64 ;  Italian  Parliament, 
64  ;  aldermen,  70  ff. 

England,  elections,  62,  64;  school 
boards,  97;  non-residency,  166; 
party  responsibility,  174;  cities, 
202,  213  ;  suffrage,  237. 

Executive  department,  193  ff. 

Fawcett,  Professor,  cited,  242. 

Forney,  M.  N.,  cited,  93. 

Foulke,  Wm.  D.,  quoted,  182. 

Fourier,  Chas.,  cited,  238. 

France,  Chamber  of  Deputies,  89  ; 
party  responsibility,  174;  muni- 
cipal suffrage,  203,  237. 

Fribourg,  Swiss  canton,  241. 

Geneva,  Swiss  canton,  118, 136. 

General  ticket,  86-89. 

Germany,  party  responsibility,  174; 

cities,  201,  213 ;  suffrage,  237. 
Gerrymander,  48-81,  135,  139,  140, 

167,  175 ;  original,  51. 
Giddings,  Professor  F.  H.,  cited,  79. 
Gilpin,  Thomas,  110,  237. 
Gladstone,  party  leader,  44. 
Glasgow,  suffrage,  202. 
Gove,  W.  H.,  bill  for  legislative 

representation,  285  ff. 
Greeley,  Horace,  cited,  251. 
Guilds,  representation  of,  13,  14, 

24,25. 

Hare  system,  100-105, 243 ;  bill  pro- 
posed by  Alfred  Cridge,  279  ff. 

Hart,  Professor  A.  B.,  cited,  43, 
154,  262. 


Hoffman,  Governor,  veto,  252  ff. 
Holls,  F.  W.,  quoted,  153, 154. 
House  of  Lords,  135. 

Illinois,  gerrymander,  80 ;  cumula- 
tive vote,  93-96,  113,  249,  259. 

Independence  of  voters,  143-153. 

Indiana,  congressional  elections, 
78 ;  legislature,  42,  65,  66 ;  presi- 
dential electors,  106,  276;  close 
state,  138. 

Initiative,  185  ff. 

Italian  election,  64. 

Johnson,  Hon.  Tom,  bill  for  con- 
gressional elections,  114, 115. 

Judiciary,  increased  power,  17, 194, 
261. 

Kansas  gerrymander,  80. 

Labor  and  capital,  230. 

Labor  unions,  representation  of, 

32. 
Legislatures,  failure,  4  ff.,  135,  232, 

266. 

Legislation  formerly  limited,  33,34. 
Limited  vote,  90-92. 
Lincoln,  Abraham,  cited,  179. 
Lobby  and   corporations,  34,  35; 

and  the  machine,  45-47. 
London,  original  government,  24; 

reformed  council,  224. 
Low,  President  Seth,  cited,  201, 203. 
Lowell,  A.  Lawrence,  cited,  189  ff. 
Lubbock,  Sir  John,  62-64,  104,  245. 
Lucerne,  Swiss  canton,  242. 

Machine,  4, 28 ;  based  on  universal 
suffrage,  33 ;  its  power,  37 ;  de- 
scribed, 38, 142, 173, 198 ;  coalition 
of  both  parties,  84. 

Marshall,  James  Garth,  cited,  243. 

Maryland,  colonial  legislature,  17. 

Massachusetts,  colonial  legisla- 
ture, 18-20  ;  senate,  78, 79 ;  ballot 
law,  117;  absenteeism,  153-154; 
civil  service,  212, 


INDEX. 


297 


Mayor,  origin,  23-24;  government 

by,  198  ff.,  207,  234. 
McCook,  Professor  J.  J.,  cited,  79, 

80. 

McKinley,  Wm.,  42, 167. 
Medill,  Joseph,  quoted,  250. 
Mill,  John  Stuart,  cited,  103,  185, 

243. 

Michigan  legislature,  66. 
Minneapolis  aldermen,  71. 
Morin,  Antoin,  cited,  237. 
Morrison,  Win.,  41, 167. 
Municipal  elections,  137,  144-149  ; 

enterprises,    223  ;    government, 

197  ff. 

Nationalization,  original  problem 
of  representation,  11-21. 

Naville,  Professor  Ernest,  cited, 
117,  239. 

Nebraska  legislature,  175. 

Neuchatel,  S,wiss  canton,  118,  241. 

New  York  City,  3,  4,  198 ;  alder- 
men, 71,  72  ;  gerrymander,  80  ; 
limited  vote,  90  ;  absenteeism, 
153 ;  suffrage,  202. 

New  York,  State  Assembly,  66,  67, 
76 ;  close  State,  138 ;  referendum 
vote,  186. 

Nominations,  144, 156. 

Non-residency,  166. 

Ohio,  Congressional  election,  59-61. 
legislature,  66 ;  referendum  vote, 
187. 

Paris,  suffrage,  203. 

Parliament,   British,    16,    17,   27; 

elections,  62-64  ;  Italian,  64. 
Parties,  rise  of,  26-28 ;  denned,  133 ; 

"  responsibility  "  of,  163  ff.;  third 

ana  minor,  173  ff.,  183, 184, 271  ff. 
Pennsylvania    gerrymander,    80 ; 

limited  vote,  260,  261. 
Philadelphia,  limited  vote,  261. 
Politics,  denned,  133. 
Preponderance  of  choice,  158, 159. 


President,  veto,  3  ;   not  a  party 

leader,  41. 

Presidential  electors,  88. 
Primaries,  38,  39, 153-162. 

Referendum,  186  ff. 

Remsen,  S.  D.,  cited,  157. 

Representation  of  social  classes, 
14-16. 

Representative  assemblies  in  col- 
onies, 30,  31 ;  in  India,  31  note. 

Represented  and  unrepresented 
voters,  72-78 ;  140-143, 179. 

Responsibility  of  respresentatives, 
168-171. 

Rice,  Isaac  F.,  cited,  264. 

Richardson,  Chas.,  cited,  161. 

Russell,  Lord  John,  quoted,  242. 

Saloons,  38,  40. 

School  board  elections,  87,  97,  98. 

Sections  represented,  209,  210. 

Senate,  United  States,  134-135; 
State,  136. 

Shaw,  Albert,  cited,  202,  214. 

Silver  question,  177. 

Single  transferable  vote,  100-105. 

Slavery  question,  179, 181. 

Social  classes,  representation  of, 
14-16. 

Social  reform,  223  ff. 

Societies  for  Proportional  Repre- 
sentation, 293,  294. 

Soluthurn,  Swiss  canton,  240. 

South  unrepresented  in  Congress, 
179. 

South  Carolina,  80,  248  ;  map  of 
gerrymander,  55. 

South  Dakota,  264. 

Speaker  of  the  House,  15,  43-45. 

Spence,  Miss  C.  H.,  cited,  101-103. 

Stickney,  Albert,  cited,  167. 

St.  Gall,  Swiss  canton,  242. 

St.  Paul,  aldermanic  election,  70. 

Suffrage,  29-33, 1-13, 172, 185, 202  ff., 
224,  236,  237,  246. 

Sullivan,  J.  W.,  cited,  190. 


298 


INDEX. 


Switzerland,  Association  Re"for- 
miste,  112 ;  referendum,  185  ff. ; 
suffrage,  237. 

Syracuse,  municipal  election, 
217  ff. 

Tammany  Hall,  38,  46,  71,  72,  141, 

225,251. 
Tariff,  177. 

Taxation  and  representation,  12. 
Texas  gerrymander,  80. 
Ticino,  Swiss  canton,  240. 
Tuckerman,  L.  B.,  quoted,  158, 159. 


Unrepresented  voters,  72-78,  140- 
143, 179. 

Veto,  executive,  3. 

Wage-earning  classes,  224. 
"Ward,  Lester  F.,  cited,  230  note. 
Ward  system,  24,  25,  42. 
Wilson,  Woodrow,  cited,  33,  34. 

Zug,     Swiss     canton,     116,     131, 

241. 
Zurich,  161, 186-190. 


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